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ABSTRACT 
Since the seminal Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe school prayer case, courts have been 
inundated with constitutional claims involving student religious speech at public schools.  Courts have struggled 
mightily with the question of whether this speech is private speech, which is free of Establishment Clause 
constraints, or government speech, which is subject to the bounds of that clause.  In this struggle, some courts have 
gotten lost in the maze of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and forgotten the core principles of justiciability and 
hierarchical precedent.  Instead, they have resorted to advisory opinions, ipse dixit, or judicial fiat, which has 
only served to make the fundamental Establishment Clause government speech and private speech dichotomy less 
clear.  This Article provides a close examination of two of the most egregious recent examples as a vehicle to 
advocate against the use of advisory opinions and judicial fiat in this area of jurisprudence.  It then provides a 
clear foundational framework, which consists of a justiciability requirement and a precedential requirement, for 
the judicial evaluation of religious student-speech classification claims in school law establishment cases.  This 
framework is offered to counteract extant harmful judicial practices.  These harmful approaches contribute to the 
continued confusion of school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence; delegitimize constitutional interpretation 
in this area; allow possible end runs around the Establishment Clause; harm religious liberty and sanctity; hurt 
the administration of the judicial system; and teach anti-democratic principles to citizens and schoolchildren.  To 
safeguard both sides of Jefferson’s wall, courts must ensure that they comply with justiciability requirements and 
the doctrine of hierarchical precedent when asked to classify religious student speech as school-sponsored government 
speech or as pure private speech in Establishment Clause cases.  This Article’s framework will allow them to do 
so. 
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“A Court of Justice acting as such . . . does not declare the law eo nomine and in the 
abstract, but waits until a case . . . is brought before it judicially involving the point 
in dispute: . . . [it] decides only as much of the question at a time as is required by 
the case before it, and its decision . . . is drawn from it by the duty which it cannot 
refuse to fulfil, of dispensing justice impartially between adverse litigants.” 
—John Stuart Mill1 
“It is in fact comforting to witness the reality that he who lives by the ipse dixit dies by 
the ipse dixit.  But one must grieve for the Constitution.” 
—Justice Antonin Scalia2 
INTRODUCTION 
At the start of the public Kountze High School football games, the players 
run through large, school-colored banners made by the school’s cheerleaders 
with Christian biblical scripture emblazoned upon them.3  The school district 
superintendent had once banned these banners due to Establishment Clause 
concerns, and the cheerleaders sued claiming violations of their free speech 
and free exercise of religion rights notwithstanding the district’s rescission of 
the ban.4  In a 2013, nine-sentence order, a Texas trial court found that the 
Establishment Clause did not prohibit the display of the religious banners 
without identifying the justiciability of this issue, without making any explicit 
reference to the First Amendment of the United States Constitution, and 
without referencing any case law.5  What followed was five years of confusing, 
protracted, and contentious litigation, centering around core disputes as to 
whether the banners were private speech or government speech and to what 
extent the Establishment Clause might apply.6  
 
 1 JOHN STUART MILL, UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY, CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE 
GOVERNMENT 403 (H.B. Acton ed., 1972).  
 2 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 726 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 3 See Samuel Smith, School District Appeals Texas Cheerleaders’ Bible Verse Case to State Supreme Court, 
CHRISTIAN POST (Jan. 18, 2018), https://www.christianpost.com/news/school-district-appeals-
texas-cheerleaders-bible-verse-case-to-state-supreme-court.html (showing one banner). 
 4 Jim Forsyth, Texas Judge Rules That Cheerleaders May Display Bible Banners, REUTERS (May 8, 2013, 
6:55 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-texas-cheerleaders/texas-judge-rules-that-
cheerleaders-may-display-bible-banners-idUSBRE94718W20130508. 
 5 Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 2013) 
(order granting summary judgment). 
 6 See Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 418 (Tex. 2016) (labeling this speech 
classification issue a central case dispute). 
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In Castroville, Texas, a public high school valedictorian gave a 
graduation speech on the school football field in which she prayed in Jesus’s 
name and thanked God for his blessings and for the support of the entire 
community throughout the week.7  In that week in 2011, a federal district 
judge had granted a motion filed by another graduating senior based on the 
Establishment Clause—a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”) 
and preliminary injunction directing the school district to instruct all student 
graduation speakers “not to present a prayer” that would “encourage[ ] 
others who may not believe in the concept of prayer to join in and believe 
the same concept.”8  In an emergency appeal of the order, the Fifth Circuit 
dissolved the TRO and injunction with an eight-sentence opinion that stated 
the court was “not persuaded that plaintiffs have shown that they are 
substantially likely to prevail on the merits, particularly on the issue that the 
individual prayers or other remarks to be given by students at graduation are, 
in fact, school-sponsored” speech,9 rather than private speech that is not 
governed by the Establishment Clause.10  The Fifth Circuit’s order cited 
neither the Constitution nor any case law,11 despite the inherent difficulty of 
this area of constitutional law.12  During the demagogued and heated 
litigation that followed,13 death threats were made against the federal district 
judge and his staff.14  
Close scrutiny of these two cases yields at least one inarguable precept:  
Establishment Clause school law, like all Establishment Clause law, is 
 
 7 Sonja Harris, Medina Valley HS Class of 2011 and Angela Hildenbrand a Fighting Valedictorian!, TEXAS 
GOP VOTE (June 6, 2011, 10:00 AM), https://www.texasgopvote.com/angela-
hildenbrand/medina-valley-hs-class-2011-and-angela-hildenbrand-fighting-valedictorian-002939. 
 8 Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-11-CA-422-FB, 2011 WL 13234770, at *2 
(W.D. Tex. June 1, 2011). 
 9 Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 11-50486 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011), available at 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-0005.pdf. 
 10 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (noting that the Establishment 
Clause applies only to government speech and not private speech). 
 11 Schultz, No. 11-50486, at *1–2. 
 12 See Richard H. Fallon Jr., Tiers for the Establishment Clause, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 59, 72 (2017) (discussing 
the complexity of the Establishment Clause doctrine). 
 13 See Andrew Cohen, The Misplaced Indignation of the Judge Who Criticized Obama, ATLANTIC (Apr. 5, 
2012), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/the-misplaced-indignation-of-the-
judge-who-criticized-obama/255474/ (describing the litigation). 
 14 See Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-11-CA-422-FB, at *3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 
2012), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-0001.pdf 
(discussing threats). 
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complex.15  Establishment Clause jurisprudence is thicket theory at its very 
essence.16  And we should not be surprised by this.17  Establishment Clause 
cases are difficult,18 because they involve the core question of the role of 
religion in American public life and the essential “meaning of America.”19  
The Supreme Court has always acknowledged the close relationship 
between religion and American history.20  Yet, it has also established “that 
governmental intervention in religious matters can itself endanger religious 
freedom.”21  The Court has framed these acknowledgments with a Janusian 
discourse, stating in Van Orden v. Perry, that “[o]ne face looks to the past in 
acknowledgment of our Nation’s heritage, while the other looks to the 
present in demanding a separation between church and state.”22  The 
dualities that are inherent in the constitutional religion clauses have led the 
Court to develop an Establishment Clause doctrine of twists, turns, and so 
many tests.23  
Despite the division and confusion within Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence, three foundational premises are clear.  First, justiciability 
 
 15 See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 677–78 (1984) (emphasizing the complexity of Establishment 
Clause interpretation); Yaseen Eldik & Monica C. Bell, The Establishment Clause and Public Education 
in an Islamophobic Era, 8 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 245, 257 (2012) (discussing the difficulties of school 
law Establishment Clause analysis). 
 16 See MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, LIBERTY OF CONSCIENCE: IN DEFENSE OF AMERICA’S TRADITION 
OF RELIGIOUS EQUALITY 227–28 (2008) (describing Establishment Clause jurisprudence as almost 
incomprehensible); Thomas C. Berg, Religion Clause Anti-Theories, 72 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 693, 
693–94 (1997) (highlighting the divisions among scholars and jurists regarding the proper approach 
to Establishment Clause analysis). 
 17 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (“The language of the Religion Clauses of 
the First Amendment is at best opaque . . . .”); Aaron R. Petty, Accommodating “Religion,” 83 TENN. 
L. REV. 529 (2016) (discussing the complexity of religion). 
 18 See Gregory C. Sisk & Michael Heise, Ideology “All the Way Down”? An Empirical Study of Establishment 
Clause Decisions in the Federal Courts, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1201, 1230 (2012) (discussing the persistent 
tensions that result from Establishment Clause litigation).  
 19 Carl H. Esbeck, The Establishment Clause as Structural Restraint on Governmental Power, 84 IOWA L. REV. 
1, 32 (1998). 
 20 See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 212 (1963) (noting the close identifications 
between religion and American history); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 434 (1962) (“The history of 
man is inseparable from the history of religion.”). 
 21 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 683 (2005). 
 22 Id.  
 23 See Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980) (admitting that 
the difficulty of Establishment Clause cases has resulted in a “course [that] sacrifices clarity and 
predictability for flexibility”). 
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requirements prohibit advisory opinions.24  So, to make an Establishment 
Clause decision, a court must have a live Establishment Clause case or 
controversy between adverse parties with genuinely adverse legal interests.  
Second, lower courts are bound by relevant higher-court precedent.25  So, in 
Establishment Clause cases, federal circuit courts, federal district courts, and 
all state courts are bound by controlling Supreme Court case law.  Third, the 
Establishment Clause does not apply to private speech; it only applies to 
government speech.26  So, if the challenged conduct is private speech, the 
Establishment Clause analysis must end. 
The question of what has been considered private speech as opposed to 
government speech has found significant resonance in school law cases.27  In 
the 2000 Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe decision, the Court 
determined that a pre-football game prayer by a student, which resulted from 
mechanisms initiated by the school and was delivered with extensive indicia 
of state support, was subject to Establishment Clause analysis as it was school-
sponsored speech, making it government speech and not private speech.28  In 
the twenty years since Santa Fe, this pivotal question of how to define allegedly 
unconstitutional religious speech as a matter of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence has figured prominently in other areas in the school law milieu, 
as courts have been tasked with determining potential establishment 
violations that attend the display of student-created religious messages on 
run-through banners at school sporting events and student-led graduation 
invocations.29  
 
 24 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (labeling the prohibition on advisory opinions as 
fundamental to justiciability requirements).  But see infra note 103 and accompanying text 
(explaining that certain states continue to allow advisory opinions). 
 25 See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 713 n.13 (1995) (articulating this binding-precedent 
rule). 
 26 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 
496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion)) (establishing this fundamental speech dichotomy for 
school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence). 
 27 See Luke Meier, Using Agency Law to Determine the Boundaries of the Free Speech and Establishment Clauses, 
40 IND. L. REV. 519, 526–27 (2007) (discussing how school law has focused on the perplexing 
constitutionality of the religious speech of students under the Free Speech Clause and the 
Establishment Clause); Anton Sorkin, Graduation Ceremonies: A Prayer for Balancing Sponsorship and 
Censorship, 41 S. ILL. U. L.J. 345, 348–49 (2017) (discussing the continued constitutional debate 
between “school sponsorship of religion and school censorship of private speech”). 
 28 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 530 U.S. at 309–10. 
 29 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 3–14. 
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These recent school law cases present cautionary tales regarding the 
particular and pernicious jurisprudential problems that can occur in the 
evaluation of claims that students’ religious speech is private speech, which 
takes the dispute out of the ambit of Establishment Clause analysis.  Courts 
have struggled mightily with these classification issues.30  In this struggle, 
some courts have gotten lost in the maze of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence and forgotten the core principles of justiciability and binding 
precedent.31  Instead, they have resorted to advisory opinions or ipse dixit, 
which has only served to make the fundamental Establishment Clause 
private speech/government speech dichotomy less clear.32  
This Article provides an extended discussion of two of the most egregious 
recent examples of these judicial approaches as a vehicle to advocate against 
the use of advisory opinions and judicial fiat in student religious-speech 
jurisprudence.  It then offers a clear foundational framework for the judicial 
evaluation of private religious-speech classification claims in school law 
establishment cases.  This dual-pronged framework consists of a justiciability 
requirement and a precedential requirement.  First, it requires courts to 
ensure the Establishment Clause issue is properly justiciable, which requires 
an actual Establishment Clause case or controversy between actually adverse 
parties.  If the justiciability prerequisite is met, the framework next requires 
courts to issue decisions regarding the classification of religious student 
speech as private speech or government speech through an express, reasoned 
application of the United States Constitution and binding precedent rather 
than through mere ipse dixit.  A proper application of this framework will 
preserve the clarity of the uncontroverted student speech dichotomy in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  And the preservation of any clarity in 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is beneficial. 
 
 30 See generally Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 657–58 (2014) (discussing 
the environment that might contribute to the lower courts’ struggles in applying the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional precedents).  
 31 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (deeming the 
Establishment Clause “a maze”). 
 32 See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 605, 607 (2008) (“When a private person speaks, the establishment clause plays no role, but 
the free speech clause does.  When the government speaks, it is just the reverse:  The establishment 
clause, but not the free speech clause, applies.”); Richard F. Duncan, Public Schools and the Inevitability 
of Religious Inequality, 1996 B.Y.U. L. REV. 569, 573 (1996) (discussing judicial confusion as to what 
constitutes private student speech versus school-sponsored government speech). 
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I. THE COMPLEXITY OF ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE  
The First Amendment of the Constitution provides that “Congress shall 
make no law respecting an establishment of religion.”33  The Supreme Court 
has incorporated the Establishment Clause as operative against the states 
through the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.34  The 
Establishment Clause is not limited to legislation; it extends to all 
governmental action.35  Consequently, all forms of federal or state 
governmental conduct,36  including prayer and other religious speech,37 have 
the potential to give rise to an Establishment Clause violation.38  
Due in part to claims of a deficient rationale for incorporation,39 and in 
part to the Supreme Court’s disordered development of this area of First 
 
 33 U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 34 See Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963) (reaffirming the incorporation 
established in Everson v. Bd. of Educ.); Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947) 
(incorporating the Establishment Clause against the states via the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause); Carl H. Esbeck, Uses and Abuses of Textualism and Originalism in Establishment Clause 
Interpretation, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 489, 596 (2011) (“[T]here is no chance that Everson’s incorporation 
of the clause will be reversed.”); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Incorporation of the Establishment Clause 
Against the States: A Logical, Textual, and Historical Account, 88 IND. L.J. 669, 670 (2013) (discussing the 
Due Process Clause’s personal liberty protections as the basis for Everson’s incorporation). 
 35 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (“[G]overnment speech must 
comport with the Establishment Clause.”); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984) (noting 
the Establishment Clause’s application to “legislation or official conduct to determine whether . . . 
it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so”). 
 36 See Kent Greenawalt, Common Sense About Original and Subsequent Understandings of the Religion Clauses, 8 
U. PA. J. CONST. L. 479, 507 (2006) (identifying how both federal and state governmental action 
can implicate the Establishment Clause). 
 37 See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 875 (2005) (“The prohibition on establishment 
covers a variety of issues from prayer in widely varying government settings, to financial aid for 
religious individuals and institutions, to comment on religious questions.”). 
 38 See B. Jessie Hill, (Dis)owning Religious Speech, 20 GEO. MASON L. REV. 361, 376 (2013) (detailing 
how government speech can violate the Establishment Clause); Andy G. Olree, Identifying Government 
Speech, 42 CONN. L. REV. 365, 368–69 (2009) (stating government speech that approves or 
disapproves of religion can violate the Establishment Clause). 
 39 See, e.g., Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 678–80 (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(criticizing the incorporation of the Establishment Clause); EDWARD S. CORWIN, A 
CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 114 (1951) (arguing states actually “are entirely 
free to establish religions, provided they do not deprive anybody of religious liberty”); William P. 
Gray, Jr., The Ten Commandments and the Ten Amendments: A Case Study in Religious Freedom in Alabama, 
49 ALA. L. REV. 509, 530 (1998) (arguing that incorporation contravenes the federalist purpose of 
the Establishment Clause). 
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Amendment jurisprudence,40 Establishment Clause doctrine is “under 
perpetual clouds of instability, illegitimacy, and controversy.”41  The Court 
has acknowledged the complexity of this area of constitutional interpretation, 
emphasizing that the Establishment Clause “is not a precise, detailed 
provision in a legal code capable of ready application.”42  Consequently, the 
Court has justified its divergent Establishment Clause doctrine by noting that 
this analysis cannot be reduced “to a single verbal formulation.”43  The result 
of these variances has been that the Court’s approach to analyzing the 
Establishment Clause is consistently inconsistent.44   
So many tests have been applied when making Establishment Clause 
decisions.45  In addition to the infamous Lemon v. Kurtzman test,46 the Supreme 
Court, or a portion of it, has applied or called for “almost every plausible 
textual, historical, and policy argument” in these cases.47  Adding to the 
confusion of this divergent doctrine has been “the bog of concurring and 
dissenting opinions, and the opinions that concur in the judgment only, that 
 
 40 See Fallon, supra note 12, at 60 (“Establishment Clause doctrine is notoriously confused and 
disarrayed . . . .”). 
 41 Gedicks, supra note 34, at 676; see also Am. Legion v. Am. Humanist Ass’n, 139 S. Ct. 2067, 2080 
(2019) (plurality opinion) (describing the interpretation of the Establishment Clause as a “vexing 
problem”). 
 42 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984). 
 43 Cty. of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 591 (1989). 
 44 See John H. Mansfield, Peremptory Challenges to Jurors Based Upon or Affecting Religion, 34 SETON HALL 
L. REV. 435, 460 (2004) (arguing it is difficult to find consistency in the Court’s Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence); William P. Marshall, “We Know It When We See It” The Supreme Court And 
Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 495 (1986) (“[S]ince Everson, the Court has reached results in 
establishment cases that are legendary in their inconsistencies.”); Thomas R. McCoy, A Coherent 
Methodology for First Amendment Speech and Religion Clause Cases, 48 VAND. L. REV. 1335, 1336 (1995) 
(arguing that the Court has failed to articulate a “discernible distinction” between government 
actions that do and do not violate the Establishment Clause); Paul E. McGreal, Social Capital in 
Constitutional Law: The Case of Religious Norm Enforcement Through Prayer at Public Occasions, 40 ARIZ. ST. 
L.J. 585, 587 (2008) (labeling the “Court’s Establishment Clause holdings . . . ‘inconsistent’”). 
 45 See Khaled A. Beydoun, Bisecting American Islam? Divide, Conquer, and Counter-Radicalization, 69 
HASTINGS L.J. 429, 486–88 (2018) (discussing the variety of Establishment Clause tests applied by 
federal courts). 
 46 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971) (citations omitted) (quoting Walz v. Tax 
Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)) (“First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor inhibits religion[; and] 
finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government entanglement with religion.’”); see also 
Michael J. Frank, The Evolving Establishment Clause Jurisprudence and School Vouchers, 51 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 997, 1009 (2002) (labeling the Lemon test as “infamous”). 
 47 Comment, The Supreme Court, the First Amendment, and Religion in the Public Schools, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 
73, 88 (1963). 
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leave[s one] with the sense [of] walking on unsettled earth.”48  These analyses 
and arguments have included the coercion test, the historical approach, the 
separation approach, the accommodation perspective, the endorsement test, 
the reasonable observer test, the neutrality principle, the non-preferentialist 
approach, the non-incorporation approach, a divisiveness analysis, and an 
ad hoc approach.49  As a result, Establishment Clause jurisprudence has 
unfolded in a scattershot and prolonged way.50 
Part of the reason for this uneven development is the divergency of 
Establishment Clause cases the Court has reviewed.51  The Court has 
decided cases involving religious expression in public schools and other 
public environments; 52 cases involving the provision of public financial aid 
to religious entities;53 and “‘accommodation’ cases in which the government 
exempts religious institutions or religiously motivated actors from legal 
regulations that otherwise would forbid religiously required or compel 
religiously forbidden action.”54  In creating a taxonomy of these cases, 
Professor Douglas Laycock has concluded there are “three major lines of 
religious liberty cases:  funding of religious organizations, regulation of 
religious practice, and sponsorship and regulation of religious speech.”55  
 
 48 Kondrat’yev v. City of Pensacola, 903 F.3d 1169, 1184 (11th Cir. 2018) (Royal, J., concurring). 
 49 See John M. Bickers, False Facts and Holy War: How the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause Cases Fuel 
Religious Conflict, 51 IND. L. REV. 305, 307 (2018) (discussing the “troublesome tests” the Court has 
employed in developing its Establishment Clause doctrine); William J. Dobosh, Jr., Coercion in the 
Ranks: The Establishment Clause Implications of Chaplain-Led Prayers at Mandatory Army Events, 2006 WIS. 
L. REV. 1493, 1499 (2006) (highlighting the Court’s “convoluted” approach in analyzing the 
Establishment Clause); Steven G. Gey, Reconciling the Supreme Court’s Four Establishment Clauses, 8 U. 
PA. J. CONST. L. 725, 761 (2006) (discussing the nonpreferentialist, nonincorporation, divisiveness, 
and ad hoc analyses); Kent Greenawalt, Quo Vadis: The Status and Prospects of “Tests” Under the Religion 
Clauses, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. 323, 361 (1995) (listing the various Establishment Clause tests). 
 50 See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 685 (2005) (discussing the varied approaches in the Court’s 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) 
(noting that the Court had only directly considered the extent of the Establishment Clause eight 
times prior to 1963). 
 51 See Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 720 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (highlighting how 
different types of Establishment Clause cases require different approaches); Fallon, supra note 12, at 
72 (discussing “the existence of distinctive rights or interests to which the Establishment Clause 
affords protection, or at least solicitude, of varying degrees”). 
 52 DANIEL O. CONKLE, RELIGION, LAW, AND THE CONSTITUTION 191 (2016). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Fallon, supra note 12, at 71. 
 55 Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes 
but Missing the Liberty, 118 HARV. L. REV. 155, 156 (2004).  
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School law has been a fulcrum point within each of these lines of the 
Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence.56  The Court 
provided its first extended examination of the Establishment Clause in the 
1947 school law case of Everson v. Board of Education,57 which first incorporated 
the clause against the states.58  A year later, the first invalidation of a state 
governmental practice took place in another school law case, Illinois ex rel. 
McCollum v. Board of Education.59  Both of these cases cemented their 
establishment analysis in Thomas Jefferson’s interpretation that “the clause 
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect ‘a wall of 
separation between church and State.’”60 
Despite this initial uniform application of the Jeffersonian separationist 
principle,61 the Court’s subsequent school law Establishment Clause doctrine 
has become a legal leviathan in terms of its complexity and its varied analyses 
to the multitude of contexts in the special school environment.62  Within all 
of this variety, the Court has stated that school law Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence consists of “line-drawing, of determining at what point a 
dissenter’s rights of religious freedom are infringed by the State.”63  Yet, the 
Court has candidly acknowledged that it “can only dimly perceive the lines 
 
 56 See Martha McCarthy, Religion and Education: Whither the Establishment Clause?, 75 IND. L.J. 123, 125 
(2000) (“Schools have provided the battleground for some of the most notable Establishment Clause 
disputes, which is not surprising, given the special concern for protecting children from religious 
establishments.”). 
 57 Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 3 (1947); see also Daniel O. Conkle, Toward A General Theory of 
the Establishment Clause, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 1113, 1124 (1988) (discussing the Court’s first extended 
examination of the Establishment Clause in Everson). 
 58 Everson, 330 U.S. at 15–16. 
 59 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). 
 60 Everson, 330 U.S. at 16 (citing Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878) (quoting 8 
THOMAS JEFFERSON, THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 113 (Ford ed. 1904–1905))); see also 
McCollum, 333 U.S. at 211 (finding an Establishment Clause violation based on an impermissible 
intertwinement of state and religion that did not comply with the “wall of separation between 
church and State”). 
 61 See McCollum, 333 U.S. at 212 (“[A]s we said in . . . Everson . . . the First Amendment has erected a 
wall between church and State which must be kept high and impregnable.”).  
 62 See Jonathan C. Drimmer, Hear No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Duty of Public Schools to Limit Student-Proposed 
Graduation Prayers, 74 NEB. L. REV. 411, 418 (1995) (discussing numerous Establishment Clause 
controversies the Court has examined “in myriad educational settings”); Preston C. Green III et 
al., Parents Involved, School Assignment Plans, and the Equal Protection Clause: The Case for Special 
Constitutional Rules, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 503, 538 (2011) (discussing the intricacies of school law 
Establishment Clause doctrine). 
 63 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 598 (1992). 
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of demarcation in this extraordinarily sensitive area of constitutional law.”64  
And so, most school law Establishment Clause cases exist within a space of 
controversy as to their proper mode and method of analysis.65 
II. CLARITY IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE: 
JUSTICIABILITY REQUIREMENTS, THE HIERARCHICAL PRECEDENT 
DOCTRINE, AND THE GOVERNMENT SPEECH/PRIVATE SPEECH 
DICHOTOMY 
A. Justiciability Requirements 
What is not at controversy in federal Establishment Clause  jurisprudence 
is the requirement of justiciability.66  The Supreme Court has stated that 
“[c]oncerns of justiciability go to the power of the federal courts to entertain 
disputes, and to the wisdom of their doing so.”67  It is well-settled 
constitutional law that federal trial and appellate courts only have the power 
to act on justiciable cases or controversies.68  
Although they are easy to conflate,69 federal jurisdiction and justiciability 
are distinct,70 “in that a court can have jurisdiction to decide a case that turns 
 
 64 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971). 
 65 See Doe ex rel. Doe v. Elmbrook Sch. Dist., 687 F.3d 840, 872 (7th Cir. 2012) (Posner, J., dissenting) 
(“The case law that the Supreme Court has heaped on the defenseless text of the establishment 
clause is widely acknowledged, even by some Supreme Court Justices, to be formless, unanchored, 
subjective and provide no guidance.”); Mark W. Cordes, Prayer in Public Schools After Santa Fe 
Independent School District, 90 KY. L.J. 1, 1 (2002) (“Religion in public schools has long been a 
subject of intense controversy in our country and from all appearances will remain so for a long 
time to come.”); Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV. 
477, 478 (1991) (characterizing the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence as “unprincipled, 
incoherent, and unworkable”). 
 66 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516 (2007) (explaining the basic requirements of a 
justiciable controversy); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 95–97 (1968) (discussing justiciability 
requirements in an Establishment Clause school law case). 
 67 Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 316 (1991). 
 68 See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 788 (1969); see also Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. 165, 172 
(2013) (discussing the applicability of the case or controversy requirement to federal trial and 
appellate courts). 
 69 See Katherine Mims Crocker, Justifying A Prudential Solution to the Williamson County Ripeness Puzzle, 
49 GA. L. REV. 163, 201 (2014) (“Courts often treat justiciability as part and parcel of subject-
matter jurisdiction . . . .”). 
 70 See Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH. & LEE L. 
REV. 493, 529 (2006) (noting the judiciary considers jurisdiction and justiciability as distinct 
concepts). 
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on nonjusticiability.”71  Article III of the Constitution limits federal court 
subject matter jurisdiction to particular types of cases and controversies.72  
Because causes are presumed to be outside this limited jurisdiction,73 it is the 
role of the complainant to clearly and affirmatively allege facts that properly 
invoke federal court jurisdiction.74  Subject matter jurisdiction “can never be 
forfeited or waived.”75  Federal appellate courts must consider the question 
of proper subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte even if the lower court did not 
address it or the parties do not raise it on appeal.76 
 Justiciability is a “threshold question in every federal case, determining 
the power of the court to entertain the suit.”77  Justiciability doctrines are 
derived from both the Article III case-or-controversy requirement and from 
prudential considerations of judicial administration.78  These doctrines 
include standing, prohibition against advisory opinions, mootness, ripeness, 
and the political question doctrine.79   
With respect to the constitutionally derived limits of justiciability, Article 
III requires a live case or controversy between adverse parties that is extant 
 
 71 John Harrison, The Political Question Doctrines, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 457, 496 (2017). 
 72 See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, 
arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall 
be made, under their Authority; —to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and 
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the 
United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State 
and Citizens of another State,—between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the same 
State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, 
and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”). 
 73 Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994); William M. Janssen, Remands by 
Deception, 81 MO. L. REV. 75, 87 (2016) (discussing limited federal subject matter jurisdiction). 
 74 See Bender v. Williamsport Area Sch. Dist., 475 U.S. 534, 546 n.8 (1986) (stating federal courts will 
presume they lack jurisdiction unless the complainant alleges facts that affirmatively show that 
jurisdiction).  
 75 United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002). 
 76 See Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 583 (1999) (“Subject-matter limitations on 
federal jurisdiction serve institutional interests.  They keep the federal courts within the bounds the 
Constitution and Congress have prescribed.  Accordingly, subject-matter delineations must be 
policed by the courts on their own initiative even at the highest level.”). 
 77 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975). 
 78 See Tommy Tobin, Deciding Not to Decide: Federal Courts’ Discretion to Decline Review and Miller v. City of 
Wickliffe, 46 HOFSTRA L. REV. 709, 713 (2017) (discussing the constitutional and prudential 
sources for justiciability). 
 79 Lisa A. Kloppenberg, Measured Constitutional Steps, 71 IND. L.J. 297, 304 (1996) (listing the 
justiciability requirements). 
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at the time of the federal judicial decision.80  A live case or controversy is an 
actual one.81  The adverse party requirement requires parties with adverse 
legal interests, and not necessarily adverse legal arguments.82  These adverse 
legal interests must be genuinely adverse.83  An absence of a live controversy 
between adverse parties with adverse legal interests should result in a finding 
of nonjusticiability, and the court should not make a judicial determination 
on, and, instead, should dismiss, that issue.84  
Appellate courts should vacate and remand for dismissal any trial court 
decisions on  nonjusticiable issues.85  “No matter how vehemently the parties 
continue to dispute the lawfulness of the conduct that precipitated the 
lawsuit,” these judicial actions are required when the dispute “‘is no longer 
embedded in any actual controversy about the plaintiffs’ particular legal 
rights.’”86  Justiciability cannot be based merely on the parties’ agreement.87  
 
 80 See Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987) (“Article III of the Constitution requires that there 
be a live case or controversy at the time that a federal court decides the case . . . .”); James E. 
Pfander & Daniel D. Birk, Article III Judicial Power, the Adverse-Party Requirement, and Non-Contentious 
Jurisdiction, 124 YALE L.J. 1346, 1359 (2015) (“Scholars and jurists widely accept the proposition 
that the federal judicial power can be exercised only when a court is presented with a concrete 
dispute between parties possessed of adverse legal interests.”). 
 81 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 67 (1997) (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 
422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975)) (“To qualify as a case fit for federal-court adjudication, ‘an actual 
controversy must be extant at all stages of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.’”); 
United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 758 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (explaining the live 
controversy requirement is an actual controversy requirement). 
 82 See Ann Woolhandler, Adverse Interests and Article III, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 1025, 1032–33 (2017) 
(discussing this justiciability requirement). 
 83 See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304 (1943) (per curiam) (finding “the absence of a 
genuine adversary issue between the parties” makes an issue nonjusticiable and “a court may not 
safely proceed to judgment” when there is a lack of genuine adversity); Martin H. Redish & 
Andrianna D. Kastanek, Settlement Class Actions, the Case-or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the 
Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 548 (2006) (“Supreme Court decisions could not be 
more certain that Article III is satisfied only when the parties are truly ‘adverse’ to one another 
. . . .”). 
 84 See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 315 (1991) (stating there is no justiciability when there is an 
absence of a live controversy). 
 85 Firefighters Local Union No. 1784 v. Stotts, 467 U.S. 561, 594 (1984) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) 
(providing the appropriate appellate remedy for trial court decisions on nonjusticiable issues); see 
also Renne, 501 U.S. at 315 (vacating an appellate court’s judgment and remanding with instructions 
to dismiss a nonjusticiable cause of action filed in the trial court). 
 86 Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. 85, 91 (2013) (quoting Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. 87, 93 
(2009)). 
 87 Int’l Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 964 v. BF Goodrich Aerospace 
Aerostructures Grp., 387 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 2004). 
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If there is no justiciable case or controversy, which means an actual 
controversy between actually adverse parties, “the courts have no business 
deciding [a dispute], or expounding the law in the course of doing so.”88  
This principle reflects Article III limits imposed upon the federal courts89 
and the “‘oldest and most consistent thread in the federal law of justiciability 
. . . that the federal courts will not give advisory opinions.’”90  An advisory 
opinion is an opinion on a matter that does not involve “an actual dispute 
between adverse litigants” or an opinion that does not have “a substantial 
likelihood that [it] will bring about some change or have some effect.”91  
Consequently, a request for an advisory opinion is a request for a judicial 
ruling on a nonjusticiable issue.92  Federal cases must retain their “‘character 
as a present, live controversy’” between adverse parties in order for courts 
“‘to avoid [improper] advisory opinions on abstract questions of law.’”93  
The prohibitions on advisory opinions apply to declaratory judgment 
actions in constitutional adjudication as well, in that they require “concrete 
legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions.”94  For declaratory 
judgment actions, this requires that the alleged facts “show that there is a 
substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of 
sufficient immediacy.”95  The justiciability rules that prohibit advisory 
opinions reflect that such claims “are not pressed before the Court with that 
clear concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed and 
necessary for decision from a clash of adversary argument exploring every 
aspect of a multifaced situation embracing conflicting and demanding 
interests.”96  Therefore, there is no justiciable controversy when parties 
 
 88 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006). 
 89 See Jeffrey L. Rensberger, Of Hats and Robes: Judicial Review of Nonadjudicative Article III Functions, 53 U. 
RICH. L. REV. 623, 628 (2019) (placing the prohibition on advisory opinions within the justiciability 
requirements that reflect the limitations of Article III). 
 90 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96 (1968) (quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE 
LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 34 (1963)). 
 91 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 2.2 (7th ed. 2016). 
 92 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 (stating “no justiciable controversy is presented . . . when the parties are 
asking for an advisory opinion”). 
 93 Princeton Univ. v. Schmid, 455 U.S. 100, 103 (1982) (per curiam) (quoting Hall v. Beals, 396 U.S. 
45, 48 (1969) (per curiam)). 
 94 Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969) (quoting United Pub. Workers of Am. (C.I.O.) v. 
Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 89 (1947)). 
 95 Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941). 
 96 Flast, 392 U.S. at 96–97 (quoting United States v. Fruehauf, 365 U.S. 146, 157 (1961)). 
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request an advisory opinion.97  Because courts are duty bound to not make 
decisions on nonjusticiable matters, appellate courts must consider the 
question of whether a lower court issued an impermissible advisory opinion, 
like all justiciability questions, sua sponte.98  
State courts are not bound by the federal Constitution’s jurisdictional or 
Article III case-or-controversy requirements; they are bound by their own 
state’s jurisdictional or justiciability requirements,99 “even when they address 
issues of federal law.”100  For example, the Texas Supreme Court has 
expressly affirmed this for its state courts, finding that Texas law should 
determine justiciability issues “as long as applying state law does not defeat 
. . . ‘the uncertainly defined obligation of state courts to provide a remedy for 
federal wrongs.’”101  In Texas, the state constitution’s Separation of Power 
and Open Courts provisions are the bases for the state’s justiciability 
doctrine.102  Some states, like Texas, have a prohibition on advisory opinions, 
which parallels the federal justiciability doctrine; other states do not have 
those prohibitions.103  
 
 97 Id. at 95 (“[N]o justiciable controversy is presented when the parties . . . are asking for an advisory 
opinion . . . .”). 
 98 See United States v. Ramos, 695 F.3d 1035, 1046 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating courts have an 
independent duty to examine questions of justiciability “(sua sponte if necessary)”); Canez v. 
Guerrero, 707 F.2d 443, 446 (9th Cir. 1983) (stating courts have “a duty to consider [justiciability] 
sua sponte”); Sarah Helene Duggin & Mary Beth Collins, ‘Natural Born’ in the USA: The Striking 
Unfairness and Dangerous Ambiguity of the Constitution’s Presidential Qualifications Clause and Why  
We Need to Fix It, 85 B.U. L. REV. 53, 110 (2005) (“Courts are required to 
address justiciability questions sua sponte regardless of whether the parties do so, and the importance 
of these issues increases dramatically when major constitutional issues arise.”); Madeline Fleisher, 
Judicial Decision Making Under the Microscope: Moving Beyond Politics Versus Precedent, 60 RUTGERS U. L. 
REV. 919, 943 (2008) (“[J]usticiability issues . . . can be brought up sua sponte by judges themselves 
even if they are not raised by the parties.”). 
 99 See Doremus v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 429, 434 (1952) (“We do not undertake to say that a state 
court may not render an opinion on a federal constitutional question even under such 
circumstances that it can be regarded only as advisory.”). 
 100 ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989). 
 101 Perry v. Del Rio, 66 S.W.3d 239, 249 (Tex. 2001) (quoting 16B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4023, at 353 (2d ed. 1996)).  Texas’s justiciability 
requirements must be discussed to establish the foundations for this Article’s Matthews v. Kountze 
Independent School District discussion.  See infra Part III.A. 
 102 See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. 2012) (citations omitted) (describing 
justiciability as “a doctrine rooted in the Separation of Powers provision and the Open Courts 
provision of the Texas Constitution”). 
 103 See Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. 
REV. 1833, 1844–46 (2001) (discussing different provisions on state courts and advisory opinions); 
Robert M. O’Neil, The Separation of Powers in a Federal System, 37 EMORY L.J. 539, 540 (1988) (“States 
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In Texas state courts, like federal courts, “[s]ubject matter jurisdiction is 
essential to the authority of a court to decide a case.”104  Unlike the federal 
judicial system, Texas subject matter jurisdiction requires that the case be 
justiciable.105  Texas courts must have proper subject matter jurisdiction to 
make an adjudication on a matter, and such “jurisdiction is never presumed 
and cannot be waived.”106  Also, the question of proper subject matter 
jurisdiction must be considered by Texas courts sua sponte.107  
Like federal justiciability, Texas justiciability requires that there be a live 
controversy between genuinely adverse parties.108  A live controversy is an 
actual and real controversy.109  Adverse parties are parties with adverse legal 
interests.110  Like federal justiciability doctrine, it is well-settled Texas 
justiciability doctrine that there “be a justiciable controversy between the 
parties before a declaratory judgment action will lie.”111  So, for a declaratory 
judgment action to be justiciable, there must be a “substantial controversy 
involving [a] genuine conflict of tangible interests.”112  Consequently, the 
Texas Supreme Court has stated that the state Declaratory Judgments Act 
 
such as Alabama, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire empower their courts to render advisory 
opinions to the other two branches in circumstances where federal judges clearly would lack a 
justiciable case or controversy.”). 
 104 Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex. 1993). 
 105 State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (citation omitted) (“Subject matter 
jurisdiction requires . . . that the case be justiciable.”). 
 106 Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443–44. 
 107 See State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 805 (Tex. 2015) (Willett, J., dissenting) (acknowledging “the 
judiciary’s sua sponte duty to ensure subject-matter jurisdiction”); Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of 
Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371, 379 (Tex. 2006) (Brister, J., concurring) (“Subject-matter jurisdiction . . . 
must be considered by a court sua sponte[.]”); Tex. Workers’ Comp. Comm’n v. Garcia, 893 S.W.2d 
504, 517 n.15 (Tex. 1995) (stating issues related to subject matter jurisdiction “may be raised by an 
appellate court sua sponte”). 
 108 See Gomez, 891 S.W.2d at 245 (citations omitted) (“Subject matter jurisdiction requires that the party 
bringing the suit have standing, that there be a live controversy between the parties, and that the 
case be justiciable.”). 
 109 See Neeley v. W. Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 774 (Tex. 2005) 
(“Standing to assert a constitutional violation depends on whether the claimant asserts a 
particularized, concrete injury.”). 
 110 In re Guardianship of DeLuna, 286 S.W.3d 379, 383 (Tex. App. 2008) (citations omitted) (“A 
justiciable controversy is one that is definite and concrete and impacts the legal relations of parties 
having adverse legal interests.”). 
 111 Cal. Prods., Inc. v. Puretex Lemon Juice, Inc., 334 S.W.2d 780, 781 (Tex. 1960). 
 112 Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907 S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995) (quoting Bexar-Medina-Atascosa 
Counties Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 1 v. Medina Lake Prot. Ass’n, 640 S.W.2d 778, 
779–80 (Tex. App. 1982)). 
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“does not license litigants to fish in judicial ponds for legal advice.”113  
Nonjusticiable issues should be dismissed by Texas trial courts.114  When an 
appellate court finds that there was a decision made on a nonjusticiable issue 
in the trial court, the remedy is to vacate any previously issued orders or 
judgments and dismiss the case.115  
If a Texas district court decides a matter without the justiciable 
requirement of a live controversy, “then its decision would not bind the 
parties.”116  Such a decision is a prohibited advisory opinion that violates the 
state’s constitutional separation of powers doctrine that allocates the issuance 
of advisory opinions to “the executive rather than the judicial 
department.”117  Like in federal jurisprudence, Texas courts are barred from 
issuing advisory opinions in all cases, including in response to requests for 
declaratory judgment.118  Finally, like federal courts, because Texas courts 
are duty bound to not make decisions on nonjusticiable matters, state 
appellate courts must consider the question of whether a lower court issued 
an impermissible advisory opinion, like all justiciability questions, sua 
sponte.119  
B. The Hierarchical Precedent Doctrine 
What is not at controversy in Establishment Clause jurisprudence is that 
lower courts are bound by relevant precedent from controlling higher 
 
 113 Cal. Prods., Inc., 334 S.W.2d at 781 (quoting WALTER H. ANDERSON, 1 DECLARATORY 
JUDGMENTS 47 (2d ed. 1951)). 
 114 See Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC v. Freeman, 556 S.W.3d 246, 250 (Tex. 2018) (holding that the 
trial court properly dismissed a nonjusticiable claim), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1344 (2019). 
 115 See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 162 (Tex. 2012) (“If a case is or becomes moot, 
the court must vacate any order or judgment previously issued and dismiss the case for want of 
jurisdiction.”). 
 116 State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (citation omitted). 
 117 Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993) (citing TEX. CONST. 
art. II, § 1).  
 118 See id. (citations omitted) (interpreting the state Declaratory Judgment Act “to be merely a 
procedural device for deciding cases already within a court’s jurisdiction rather than a legislative 
enlargement of a court’s power, permitting the rendition of advisory opinions”). 
 119 See Am. K-9 Detection Servs., LLC, 556 S.W.3d at 260 (“[J]usticiability [is] a jurisdictional matter.  
Thus, it may be raised at any time or by the court sua sponte.”); see also Farmers Tex. Cty. Mut. Ins. 
Co. v. Griffin, 955 S.W.2d 81, 82 (Tex. 1997) (per curiam) (stating that justiciability issues must be 
raised sua sponte); Craig v. Tejas Promotions, LLC, 550 S.W.3d 287, 302 n.63 (Tex. App. 2018) 
(discussing an “obligat[ion] to consider these justiciability issues sua sponte”). 
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courts.120  Consequently, when a higher court has already decided an issue, 
a lower court has no discretion to ignore that precedent.121  This has been 
deemed the “the doctrine of hierarchical precedent,” “the binding precedent 
rule,” or “vertical stare decisis.”122  This is a foundational principle of the 
American judicial system.123 
Under the rule of hierarchical precedent and the Supremacy Clause’s 
provision that the “Constitution . . . shall be the supreme Law of the 
Land,”124 all lower federal courts and all state courts are bound by the 
Supreme Court’s constitutional decisions.125  Although state courts are not 
bound by federal rules of justiciability, they are bound by the Supreme 
Court’s constitutional precedent when they adjudicate federal constitutional 
issues.126  Consequently, all courts must follow the constitutional precedents 
established by the Supreme Court “until [the Court] sees fit to reexamine 
 
 120 See Johnson v. DeSoto Cty. Bd. of Comm’rs, 72 F.3d 1556, 1559 n.2 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing 
the requirements of the binding precedent rule); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?: The 
Supreme Court, the Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U. L. REV. 967, 969 
(2000) (discussing the Court’s insistence that lower courts apply direct precedent even where it 
seems like it may be overruled); Mark Alan Thurmon, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the 
Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 422 (1992) (“Few would dispute 
that lower courts must follow the decisions of the Supreme Court.”). 
 121 See Johnson, 72 F.3d at 1559 n.2 (“The binding precedent rule affords a court no such discretion 
where a higher court has already decided the issue before it.”). 
 122 See id. (using the term “binding precedent rule”); see also Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts 
Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 STAN. L. REV. 817, 819 (1994) (using the label “the doctrine of 
hierarchical precedent”); Lewis A. Kornhauser, Adjudication by a Resource-Constrained Team: Hierarchy 
and Precedent in a Judicial System, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 1605, 1609 (1995) (footnote omitted) (stating 
federal courts “adhere to . . . strict vertical precedent”); Kurt T. Lash, Originalism, Popular Sovereignty, 
and Reverse Stare Decisis, 93 VA. L. REV. 1437, 1454 (2007) (“Vertical stare decisis refers to the binding 
effect of precedent on lower courts.”); Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United 
States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787, 790 (2012) (using the term “vertical stare decisis”); Frederick Schauer, Has 
Precedent Ever Really Mattered in the Supreme Court?, 24 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 381, 385 (2007) (employing 
the term “vertical precedent”). 
 123 See Caminker, supra note 122, at 818 (discussing the “longstanding doctrine” of hierarchical 
precedent in the American judicial system); see also Amy J. Griffin, Dethroning the Hierarchy of Authority, 
97 OR. L. REV. 51, 59–60 (2018) (labeling vertical precedent as “the strongest form of judicial 
authority”).  
 124 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
 125 See Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 713 n.13 (1995) (stating all lower courts must adhere 
to Supreme Court precedent). 
 126 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (“We have recognized often that the 
constraints of Article III do not apply to state courts, and accordingly the state courts are not bound 
by the limitations of a case or controversy or other federal rules of justiciability even when they 
address issues of federal law, as when they are called upon to interpret the Constitution[.]”). 
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[them].”127  This hierarchical precedent rule of American constitutional law 
“is indefeasible and absolute.”128 
C. The Establishment Clause Government Speech/Private Speech Dichotomy 
Finally, what is not at controversy in Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
is that the clause only applies to government speech;129 it does not apply to 
private speech.130  In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, the Supreme 
Court cemented this fundamental dichotomy into its school law doctrine.131  
Here, the Court determined at the outset of the opinion that “there is a 
crucial difference between government speech endorsing religion, which the 
Establishment Clause forbids, and private speech endorsing religion, which 
the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses protect.”132  All of the Justices, 
even the dissenters, agreed with this principle.133  Because this Santa Fe 
crucial-difference principle is a core “remarkable consistency” in case law 
regarding religious speech in public schools, it merits close discussion.134 
The Supreme Court examined the Establishment Clause and student 
prayers at public high school football games in Santa Fe.135  In this case, a 
 
 127 1B JAMES WM. MOORE, MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 0.402[1], at I–10 (2d ed. 1996). 
 128 Randy J. Kozel, Settled Versus Right: Constitutional Method and the Path of Precedent, 91 TEX. L. REV. 
1843, 1850 (2013). 
 129 See Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 468 (2009) (providing that a key restraint on 
government speech, but not private speech, is that it “must comport with the Establishment 
Clause”). 
 130 See Perry O. Chrisman, Confessions of a Baptist Lawyer, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1041, 1045 (1996) 
(stating there is no Establishment Clause application to “purely private speech”); see also Steven G. 
Gey, When is Religious Speech not “Free Speech”?, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV. 379, 383 (2000) (discussing the 
Supreme Court’s repeated acknowledgments that the Establishment Clause does not apply to 
private speech); Claudia E. Haupt, Mixed Public-Private Speech and the Establishment Clause, 85 TUL. L. 
REV. 571, 577 (2011) (“[P]rivate speech by itself does not present any Establishment Clause 
concerns.”).  
 131 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000) (invalidating a public school’s policy 
of allowing a student-led prayer over the public address system on the grounds that it “establishes 
an improper majoritarian election on religion”). 
 132 Id. at 302 (emphasis in original) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) 
(plurality opinion)). 
 133 See id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (emphasizing the difference between how the Constitution 
treats government speech and private speech endorsing religion). 
 134 Laycock, supra note 55, at 218. 
 135 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317 (reasoning that by incorporating prayer into a “school-related procedure, 
which entrusts the inherently nongovernmental subject of religion to a majoritarian vote, a 
constitutional violation has occurred”). 
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Mormon student and a Catholic student, with their mothers, claimed their 
public school district violated the Establishment Clause by “allow[ing] 
students to read Christian invocations and benedictions from the stage at 
graduation ceremonies, and to deliver overtly Christian prayers over the 
public address system at home football games.”136  The Court granted review 
only as to the football game prayer policy.137  This left the question of 
whether state policies and practices regarding student invocations at public 
school graduations were violative of the Establishment Clause open for future 
judicial resolution.138   
In Santa Fe, the Court determined the school’s pre-game invocation policy 
violated the Establishment Clause.139  In doing so, the Court first highlighted 
the important role of public worship and prayer in many American 
communities.140  The Court stressed that the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment do not prohibit all religious activities in American public schools 
as the clauses’ purposes were the security of religious liberty.141  However, 
the Court emphasized that “religious activity in public schools, as elsewhere, 
must comport with the First Amendment”142 and that this policy did not do 
so.143  
The policy at issue provided:  
The board has chosen to permit students to deliver a brief invocation 
and/or message to be delivered during the pre-game ceremonies of home 
 
 136 Id. at 295. 
 137 See id. at 301 (limiting the grant of certiorari to the question of student-led and student-initiated 
prayer at football games). 
 138 This has not been resolved.  See Steven K. Green, All Things Not Being Equal: Reconciling Student Religious 
Expression in the Public Schools, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 843, 873 (2009) (discussing the inconsistences 
in the federal courts’ treatment of student prayers at school graduations); see also Bruce Ledewitz, 
Toward a Meaning-Full Establishment Clause Neutrality, 87 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 725, 764 (2012) 
(discussing multiple controversies regarding student prayers at public school graduations); Myron 
Schreck, Balancing the Right to Pray at Graduation and the Responsibility of Disestablishment, 68 TEMP. L. 
REV. 1869, 1869 (1995) (discussing “the battle over [student] prayer at public school graduation 
ceremonies”). 
 139 See Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 316 (reasoning that the policy created the perception of school endorsement 
of a religious practice). 
 140 See id. at 307 (“We recognize the important role that public worship plays in many communities, as 
well as the sincere desire to include public prayer as a part of various occasions so as to mark those 
occasions’ significance.”). 
 141 See id. at 313 (quoting Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962) (stating that “the common purpose 
of the Religion Clauses ‘is to secure religious liberty.’”).  
 142 Id. at 307. 
 143 See id. at 316 (explaining that the school’s policy was unconstitutional because “it impermissibly 
impose[d] upon the student body a majoritarian election on the issue of prayer”). 
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varsity football games to solemnize the event, to promote good 
sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the appropriate 
environment for the competition.  Upon advice and direction of the high 
school principal, each spring, the high school student council shall conduct 
an election, by the high school student body, by secret ballot, to determine 
whether such a statement or invocation will be a part of the pre-game 
ceremonies and if so, shall elect a student, from a list of student volunteers, 
to deliver the statement or invocation.  The student volunteer who is selected 
by his or her classmates may decide what message and/or invocation to 
deliver, consistent with the goals and purposes of this policy.  If the District 
is enjoined by a court order from the enforcement of this policy, then and 
only then will the following policy automatically become the applicable 
policy of the school district.  The board has chosen to permit students to 
deliver a brief invocation and/or message to be delivered during the pre-
game ceremonies of home varsity football games to solemnize the event, to 
promote good sportsmanship and student safety, and to establish the 
appropriate environment for the competition.  Upon advice and direction of 
the high school principal, each spring, the high school student council shall 
conduct an election, by the high school student body, by secret ballot, to 
determine whether such a message or invocation will be a part of the pre-
game ceremonies and if so, shall elect a student, from a list of student 
volunteers, to deliver the statement or invocation.  The student volunteer 
who is selected by his or her classmates may decide what statement or 
invocation to deliver, consistent with the goals and purposes of this policy.  
Any message and/or invocation delivered by a student must be nonsectarian 
and nonproselytizing.144 
This final reviewed policy was a slight modification of a previous school 
district policy that was “titled ‘Prayer at Football Games’” and that originally 
used only the term “invocations,” rather than the terms “invocation,” 
“messages,” and “statements.”145  
In conducting its review of this policy, the Court first dismissed the state’s 
claims that the invocations were “private student speech” that was not 
subject to the constraints of the Establishment Clause.146  Here, the Court 
rejected the state’s argument that the dual student elections for approval of 
the invocations at the games and for the invocation student speaker turned 
the public speech into private speech, which would insulate the school from 
a finding of unconstitutional coercion.147  In doing so, the Court made clear 
 
 144 Id. at 298–99 n.6 (citation omitted). 
 145 Id. at 298, 309. 
 146 Id. at 302. 
 147 See id. at 305, 310 (reasoning that despite the school’s assertion that it employed a “hands-off” 
approach to the pregame prayer, the policy reveals both perceived and actual endorsement of 
religion). 
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that the Establishment Clause does not apply to private student speech, 
explicitly agreeing with a previous equal access decision that only 
government speech is constrained by the Establishment Clause.148    
The clarity of the Santa Fe crucial distinction between government speech 
and private speech in school law jurisprudence was mere prologue to a rather 
complex framework for the constitutional classification of the students’ 
religious speech, as being subject to the Establishment Clause.  The jumping-
off point in this analysis was the finding that the invocations were “authorized 
by a government policy . . . .”149  The students’ prayers were delivered “on 
government property at government-sponsored school-related events . . . 
over the school’s public address system, by a speaker representing the student 
body, under the supervision of school faculty . . . .”150  These factors all 
supported the Court’s conclusion these invocations could not be classified as 
private speech.   
Additionally, the Court found these prayers did not take place within a 
government-created limited public forum that would allow them to be 
considered private speech, as there was no policy or practice evidence that 
the school officials had “any intent to open the [pregame ceremony] to 
‘indiscriminate use,’ . . . by the student body generally.”151  Instead, the 
school engaged in a selective access process, where the same student each 
football season delivered the invocation.152  The resulting invocation was 
“subject to particular regulations that confine[d] the content and topic of the 
student’s message.”153  The Court determined this selective access approach 
and regulated student messaging countervailed the governmental claims of 
the creation of a protected public forum that would create a private speech 
zone for the student’s invocation.154 
Also determinative to the Court’s conclusion that the pre-game student 
prayer was not private speech was the finding that the selection of the student 
invocation giver was the result of a state-initiated process.155  Here, the Court 
 
 148 See id. at 302 (citing Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion)). 
 149 Id.  
 150 Id. at 302, 310. 
 151 Id. at 303 (alterations in original) (quoting Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270 
(1988)). 
 152 Id. 
 153 Id. 
 154 Id. (citing Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 47 (1983)). 
 155 See id. at 303–04 (referring to Santa Fe’s student election system). 
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rejected the state’s arguments that it had taken a “‘hands-off’ approach to 
the pregame invocation” and that the “individual student [was] the ‘circuit-
breaker’ in the process,” which transformed the invocation into private 
speech.156  Essentially, the Court found that the state created the circuit; it 
created the invocation and student selection process by initiating the dual 
elections with its policy.157  The school’s initiation of and extensive 
entanglement in this process revealed “the ‘degree of school involvement’ 
[that made] it clear that the pregame prayers [bore] ‘the imprint of the State 
and thus put school-age children who objected in an untenable position.’”158   
Another basis for the Court’s determination that the invocations were not 
private speech was that the state-initiated selection mechanism was a 
majoritarian one, which “ensure[d] that only those messages deemed 
‘appropriate’ under the District’s policy may be delivered.”159  Consequently, 
the state could no longer claim that these invocations were pure private 
speech.  Further, the state-initiated majoritarian mechanisms made access to 
the forum dependent upon majoritarian consent.160  Because “‘[a]ccess to a 
public forum . . . does not depend upon majoritarian consent,’”161 there was 
no such public forum for private speech during this pregame ceremony.162  
These majoritarian-controlled systems were constitutionally problematic 
because they provided insufficient safeguards for minority speakers and for 
diversity of speech.163  The Court found that “the majoritarian process 
implemented by the District guarantees, by definition, that minority 
candidates will never prevail and that their views will be effectively 
silenced.”164  These student elections did “nothing to protect minority views 
but rather place[d] the students who hold such views at the mercy of the 
 
 156 Id. at 305 (footnote omitted). 
 157 See id. at 305–06 (supporting the conclusion that the student prayer was not private speech). 
 158 Id. at 305 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)). 
 159 Id. at 304. 
 160 See id. (“[T]his student election does nothing to protect minority views but rather places the students 
who hold such views at the mercy of the majority.”). 
 161 Id. (quoting Bd. of Regents v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2000)). 
 162 Id. at 304–05. 
 163 Id.  Protection of the minority was especially relevant to the case.  One month into these 
constitutional proceedings, the district court had to enter an all-caps-inclusive protective order 
allowing the student plaintiffs to proceed anonymously as a measure to keep them safe “from 
intimidation or harassment.”  Id. at 294, 294 n.1.  
 164 Id. at 304. 
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majority.”165  All of these findings regarding the majoritarian-controlled 
aspects of the state-initiated student invocation supported the Court’s 
conclusion that the invocations were not subject to protection from the 
requirements of the Establishment Clause as private speech.166 
In addition to the school’s involvement in the speaker selection process, 
the Court also found the express and implied terms of the school district 
policy, its history, and its actual purpose “invite[d] and encourage[d] 
religious messages” of the students in order to classify these invocations as 
non-private speech.167  The Court emphasized the only expressly endorsed 
message in the policy was “an ‘invocation’—a term that primarily describes 
an appeal for divine assistance.”168  In the history of the high school, an 
invocation had always been “a focused religious message.”169  As a result, the 
Court concluded that “the expressed purposes of the policy encourage[d] the 
selection of a religious message [specifically prayer], and that is precisely how 
the students underst[ood] the policy.”170  It also found that the express policy 
purpose, “to solemnize the event,” was most obviously accomplished through 
a religious message.171  Therefore, the express and implied terms, the history, 
and the purpose of the policy indicated state support of the student 
invocations, which contributed to the Court’s rejection of the state’s claim 
that these invocations were private speech. 
Beyond the student speaker selection process and the policy’s text, 
additional factual factors established “[t]he actual or perceived endorsement 
of the message” by the school, which supported the Court’s conclusion that 
the invocations were not private speech.172 These factors included:  
Once the student speaker is selected and the message composed, the 
invocation is then delivered to a large audience assembled as part of a 
regularly scheduled, school-sponsored function conducted on school 
property. The message is broadcast over the school’s public address system, 
which remains subject to the control of school officials. It is fair to assume 
that the pregame ceremony is clothed in the traditional indicia of school 
sporting events, which generally include not just the team, but also 
 
 165 Id.  
 166 See id. at 304–06. 
 167 Id. at 306. 
 168 Id. at 306–07. 
 169 Id. at 307. 
 170 Id.  
 171 Id. at 306. 
 172 Id. at 307. 
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cheerleaders and band members dressed in uniforms sporting the school 
name and mascot. The school’s name is likely written in large print across 
the field and on banners and flags. The crowd will certainly include many 
who display the school colors and insignia on their school T-shirts, jackets, 
or hats and who may also be waving signs displaying the school name.173  
The Court found the combination of these factors would lead an objective 
high school student to “unquestionably perceive the inevitable pregame 
prayer as stamped with [the] school’s seal of approval.”174  
This objective student’s perception that the school encouraged the prayer 
was reinforced by the history, text, and actual purposes of the policy.175  The 
Court found that, while there is some judicial deference owed to a state’s 
characterization of the purpose for a religious policy, “it is nonetheless the 
duty of the courts to ‘distinguis[h] a sham secular purpose from a sincere 
one.’”176  Here, the Court refused to give deference to the state’s asserted 
secular purposes of the policy—to “foste[r] free expression of private 
persons[,] . . . to solemniz[e] the event, to promot[e] good sportsmanship 
and student safety, and to establis[h] the appropriate environment for the 
competition,”177 because these purposes were not furthered when only one 
student was “permitted to give a content-limited message” and the message 
was “prayer sponsored by the school.”178  The Court also emphasized that 
the name of the original policy, “Prayer at Football Games,” demonstrated 
that the specific purpose of the policy was not a secular purpose; it “was to 
preserve a popular ‘state-sponsored religious practice.’”179  This school-
sponsored religious speech was not permissible under the Establishment 
Clause because it created a schism between schoolchildren, “send[ing] the 
ancillary message to members of the audience who are non-adherents ‘that 
they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an 
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members 
of the political community.’”180   
 
 173 Id. at 307–08. 
 174 Id. at 308. 
 175 See id. (“In this context the members of the listening audience must perceive the pregame message 
as a public expression of the views of the majority of the student body delivered with the approval 
of the school administration.”).  
 176 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 75 (1985) (O’Connor, J. 
concurring)). 
 177 Id. at 306, 309 (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 
 178 Id. at 309. 
 179 Id. (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)). 
 180 Id. at 309–10 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J. concurring)). 
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As a result of these extensive findings, the Court concluded the student 
invocations under the policy were not private speech.181  In summarizing this 
conclusion, the Court stated that “[t]he delivery of such a message—over the 
school’s public address system, by a speaker representing the student body, 
under the supervision of school faculty, and pursuant to a school policy that 
explicitly and implicitly encourages public prayer—is not properly 
characterized as ‘private’ speech.”182  
The dissent disagreed with this private-speech conclusion.183  Its analysis 
was brief.184  It consisted of two sentences:  “Here, by contrast, the potential 
speech at issue, if the policy had been allowed to proceed, would be a message 
or invocation selected or created by a student.  That is, if there were speech 
at issue here, it would be private speech.”185 
After determining the student prayer was not private speech, the Court’s 
majority opinion applied a substantive coercion analysis to determine the 
invocation policy violated the Establishment Clause.186  The Court first 
found unconstitutional governmental coercion because the district policy 
created elections to determine if the pre-football game ceremony would 
feature religious messages, which “encourage[d]  divisiveness along religious 
lines in a public school setting.”187  Next, the Court dismissed the state’s 
argument of the absence of coercion because attendance at an 
extracurricular football game is voluntary based on the compulsory football 
game attendance requirements for certain students and the social conformity 
pressures on all high school students.188  Here, the Court stated that “the 
State cannot [constitutionally] require one of its citizens to forfeit his or her 
rights and benefits as the price of resisting conformance to state-sponsored 
religious practice.”189  Based on these findings, the Court concluded “that the 
delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing those 
 
 181 Id. at 310. 
 182 Id. 
 183 See id. at 324 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the speech at issue would have been private 
speech rather than government speech). 
 184 See id. (disposing of whether the potential speech was private in a short paragraph). 
 185 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 186 Id. at 310 (majority opinion). 
 187 Id. at 311. 
 188 See id. at 311–12 (“For many . . . the choice between attending these games and avoiding personally 
offensive religious rituals is in no practical sense an easy one.”)  
 189 Id. at 312 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596 (1992)). 
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present to participate in an act of religious worship,”190 especially in a 
community that included non-adherent children who merit vigilant 
constitutional protection.191  Therefore, the Court found an Establishment 
Clause violation by this policy and the coercion that resulted from it because 
“the religious liberty protected by the Constitution is abridged when the State 
affirmatively sponsors the particular religious practice of prayer.”192 
The final portion of the opinion dealt with the school district’s claim that 
the plaintiffs had made a premature facial challenge to the policy that must 
fail, because no student had delivered an invocation under that policy and 
there was “no certainty that any of the statements or invocations [under the 
policy] will be religious.”193  The Court dismissed this argument, stating that 
it was not just concerned with the constitutional injury that would result from 
“a student [being] forced to participate in an act of religious worship because 
she chooses to attend a school event.”194  It was also concerned with the two 
constitutional injuries that were presented in this facial challenge:  1) “the 
mere passage by the District of a policy that has the purpose and perception 
of government establishment of religion” and 2) “the implementation of a 
governmental electoral process that subjects the issue of prayer to a 
majoritarian vote.”195  With respect to this first issue, the Court reiterated 
that the text of the policy revealed its “unconstitutional purpose,” which 
required its invalidation under the “secular legislative purpose” requirement 
of the first prong of the Lemon test.196  Beyond the text of the policy, the Court 
found the context in which that policy was implemented clearly 
demonstrated “the purpose of endorsing school prayer.”197  As a result, the 
Court concluded that “the simple enactment of this policy, with the purpose 
and perception of school endorsement of student prayer, was a constitutional 
violation.”198  
With respect to the second issue, the Court found “[t]his policy likewise 
[did] not survive a facial challenge because it impermissibly impose[d] upon 
 
 190 Id.  
 191 Id. 
 192 Id. at 313.  
 193 Id. 
 194 Id. at 313–14. 
 195 Id. at 314. 
 196 Id. at 315 (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971)). 
 197 Id. 
 198 Id. at 316. 
 
June 2020] JUSTICIABILITY AND JUDICIAL FIAT 939 
   
 
the student body a majoritarian election on the issue of prayer.”199  The 
policy’s empowerment of the “student body majority with the authority to 
subject students of minority views to constitutionally improper messages”  in 
the form of school-sponsored prayer was a violation of the Establishment 
Clause.200  Therefore, being mindful of  “the myriad, subtle ways in which 
Establishment Clause values can be eroded,” the Supreme Court concluded 
that the policy was an impermissible violation of that clause.201 
Santa Fe is the seminal case on the classification of student religious speech 
within Establishment Clause jurisprudence.202  It makes clear the crucial 
difference in school law between private speech, which is not governed by 
the Establishment Clause, and government speech, which is constrained by 
that clause.203  Yet, in its extended analysis of this principle, the Court does 
not provide a complete, concise articulation of the precise method for this 
type of religious-speech classification.  
Courts have struggled to accomplish this classification task in 
Establishment Clause cases that have been litigated since Santa Fe,204 
demonstrating that “[n]o matter how clearly stated a distinction is in theory, 
it will become complex and tangled in practice.”205  This area has become a 
particular point of contention in litigation involving student religious 
speech.206  Therefore, despite the clarity of the Santa Fe speech dichotomy, 
confusion persists within school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
 
 199 Id. 
 200 Id. 
 201 Id. at 314, 316 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)). 
 202 See Meier, supra note 27, at 521 (identifying Santa Fe as the key case for distinguishing private speech 
versus government speech for religious student speech).  
 203 See Kathleen A. Brady, The Push to Private Religious Expression: Are We Missing Something?, 70 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 1147, 1148 (2002) (characterizing the Santa Fe private speech/government speech 
dichotomy as an uncontroverted principle at the core of the Court’s school law jurisprudence).  
 204 See generally Hillel Y. Levin et al., To Accommodate or Not to Accommodate: (When) Should the State Regulate 
Religion to Protect the Rights of Children and Third Parties?, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 915, 992 (2016) 
(discussing how courts and the country are still trying to resolve “a difficult question: When a 
religious practice imposes costs and risks on third parties, how can we tell whether tolerance of that 
practice violates the Establishment Clause?”).  
 205 Edward L. Rubin, Sex, Politics, and Morality, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 38 (2005). 
 206 See Patrick M. Garry, Inequality Among Equals: Disparities in the Judicial Treatment of Free Speech and 
Religious Exercise Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 361, 386–87 (2004) (discussing divergent judicial 
approaches to the classification of religious student speech in Establishment Clause and free exercise 
cases). 
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regarding the proper way to classify student religious speech as either 
government speech or private speech.207  
III. CONTINUED CONFUSION IN SCHOOL LAW ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE  
In the twenty years since the Santa Fe decision, the classification of student 
religious speech has become an analytical battlefield in school law 
Establishment Clause cases.  When addressed with this precise issue, courts 
have been inconsistent in their modes and methods of analysis.208  This 
continued confusion has been particularly apparent in constitutional 
litigation involving the display of students’ religious messages at school 
sporting events and student-led graduation invocations.  Two of these cases, 
Matthews v. Kountze Independent School District and Schultz v. Medina Valley 
Independent School District, are paradigmatic examples of the problems of 
nonjusticiability and judicial fiat in this area of First Amendment school law.  
Like Santa Fe, both cases centered around students’ religious speech on Texas 
high school football fields.209 
 
 
 
 
 
 207 See Steven G. Gey, The Procedural Annihilation of Structural Rights, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 30 (2009) 
(discussing the confusion in school law in classifying religious student speech); see also Brady, supra 
note 203, at 1152 (stating that most disputed Establishment Clause school law cases involve the 
“grey area” of student religious speech). 
 208 This tracks with other areas of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  See Michael J. Gerhardt, The 
Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 104 n.151 
(1991) (referencing the inconsistencies of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence); 
Martha Minow, Should Religious Groups Be Exempt from Civil Rights Laws?, 48 B.C. L. REV. 781, 790 
n.55 (2007) (mentioning the inconsistency of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence); David M. Smolin, The Religious Root and Branch of Anti-Abortion Lawlessness, 47 BAYLOR 
L. REV. 119, 142 (1995) (“The specific holdings of the Court interpreting the Establishment Clause 
have been so inconsistent that most commentators long ago stopped trying to reconcile the cases.”). 
 209 See Joe Dryden, The Religious Viewpoint Antidiscrimination Act: Using Students as Surrogates to Subjugate the 
Establishment Clause, 82 MISS. L.J. 127, 135 (2013) (“Texas . . . is no stranger to Establishment Clause 
litigation . . . .”).  Indeed, “[e]verything is bigger in Texas,” including, apparently, litigation 
involving the application of the Establishment Clause to student religious speech.  Hall v. McRaven, 
508 S.W.3d 232, 245 (Tex. 2017) (Willett, J., concurring).   
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 A. The Establishment Clause and Student-Created Religious Messages at School 
Sporting Events: The Justiciability Saga of Matthews v. Kountze Independent 
School District 
Although the Supreme Court’s Santa Fe decision established a strong 
precedent regarding the classification of school-sponsored student 
invocations at high school football games as government speech that violates 
the Establishment Clause,210 an ancillary issue has arisen regarding the 
display of student-created religious messages at public school sporting events.  
One such dispute originated at a public high school in Kountze, Texas, 
which is about 100 miles away from Santa Fe, Texas.211  However, unlike 
Santa Fe, this case was litigated in the state courts; it involved cheerleader-
created religious displays on the run-through banners at football games; it 
was brought by students against the school district not for sponsoring the 
religious speech, but for restricting it; and its petition alleged violations of the 
cheerleaders’ First Amendment rights of free speech and free exercise of 
religion, rather than a claimed Establishment Clause violation.212  And yet, 
the trial court’s impermissible advisory opinion—that the Establishment 
Clause did not prohibit the display of the religious banners without making 
any express determination as to whether the banners constituted government 
speech or private speech—initiated six years of intense and protracted 
litigation.213   
1. The Trial Court Proceedings 
In Matthews v. Kountze Independent School District, the parents of student 
cheerleaders brought suit on behalf of their children against the school 
district and its superintendent after the superintendent “prohibited the 
Cheerleaders from including religious messages on run-through banners 
used at the beginning of high school football games” during the 2012 football 
 
 210 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302, 316 (2000).   
 211 Emma Green, Cheerleaders for Christ, ATLANTIC (Apr. 5, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/
politics/archive/2016/04/kountze-cheerleaders-free-speech-religion-banners-football/476892/ 
(discussing the Matthews litigation); Driving Directions from Santa Fe, TX to Kountze, TX, 
GOOGLE MAPS, http://maps.google.com (follow “Directions” hyperlink; then search starting point 
field for “Santa Fe, TX” and search destination field for “Kountze, TX”). 
 212 Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex. rel. Matthews, 482 S.W.3d 120, 124–26 (Tex. App. 
2014). 
 213 Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796, at 2 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 
2013). 
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season.214  These run-through banners had been made for a number of years 
by the high school cheerleading squad for varsity football games.215  The 
large banners were displayed by the squad on the school field for the football 
team to charge through at the start of each game.216  The content of the 
banners was decided by the entire squad.217  To make sure the banners were 
appropriate for the game and did not have poor sportsmanship, they were 
reviewed and approved by the squad’s school sponsors.218  For the 2012 
football season, the cheerleading squad used biblical scripture and Christian 
symbols on the run-through banners.219   
On September 18, 2012, one day after receiving complaints from the 
Freedom From Religion Foundation (“FFRF”) that the banners violated the 
Establishment Clause and then seeking legal advice, the district 
superintendent informed the district principals that the banners could no 
longer include religious messages.220  On that same day, the new policy was 
announced on the high school’s intercom by a campus administrator.221  The 
superintendent instituted this new policy without first consulting the district’s 
Board of Trustees.222   
On September 20, 2012, some of the high school cheerleaders, some 
middle school cheerleaders, and their families filed suit in Texas state court, 
alleging this policy violated the students’ constitutional rights to free speech 
and free exercise.223  The plaintiffs filed an application for a TRO and a 
request for injunctive relief with their petition.224  The state trial court 
granted the plaintiffs’ TRO request and ordered the school district and 
 
 214 Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, No. 09-13-00251-CV, 2017 WL 4319908, 
at *1, *1 n.1 (Tex. App. Sept. 28, 2017).  Hereinafter, the plaintiffs in this action will be referred to 
as “the cheerleaders” for the sake of brevity. 
 215 Matthews, 482 S.W.3d at 124. 
 216 Id. 
 217 Id. 
 218 Id. 
 219 Id. 
 220 Id. at 125.  The court explained that “FFRF identifies itself as a ‘watchdog organization’ and 
appears to regularly send letters to federal, state, and local government officials objecting to 
activities that they believe violate the Establishment Clause.”  Id. at 125 n.3. 
 221 Id. at 125. 
 222 Id.  
 223 Id. at 123, 124 n.2, 125 (describing the high school litigants and discussing the similar middle school 
run-through banners practice); Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 
416, 417 (Tex. 2016) (referencing the middle school litigants). 
 224 Matthews, 482 S.W.3d at 125. 
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superintendent “to cease and desist from preventing the cheerleaders of 
Kountze Independent School District (“KISD”) from displaying banners or 
run throughs at sporting events and/or censoring the sentiments expressed 
thereon.”225   
Thereafter, the school district filed a plea to the district court’s 
jurisdiction based on governmental immunity and lack of standing.226  A plea 
to the jurisdiction in Texas is a challenge to the trial court’s “authority to 
decide a case on the merits.”227  For a court to have authority to decide a 
case against a government entity on the merits, the plaintiff must prove a 
valid waiver of immunity from suit because governmental immunity deprives 
trial courts of subject matter jurisdiction over the lawsuit.228   
On October 16, 2012, Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott filed a 
petition to intervene in the case in support of the cheerleaders.229  On that 
same day, the school district conducted community legislative proceedings 
regarding the superintendent’s banners policy.230  The next day, Abbott and 
Governor Rick Perry gave a press conference expressing their complete 
support for the cheerleaders.231  In this press conference, Abbott 
characterized the banners as “student-led expression . . . that’s perfectly 
constitutional.”232  He continued, “We will not allow atheist groups from 
outside the state of Texas to come into the state to use menacing and 
misleading and intimidating tactics to try to bully schools to bow down to the 
altar of secular beliefs.”233  Governor Perry stated, “We’re a nation built on 
the concept of free expression of ideas.  We’re also a culture built on the 
 
 225 Matthews ex rel. Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2012 WL 5269957, at 3 (Tex. 
Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2012). 
 226 Matthews, 484 S.W.3d at 417. 
 227 Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, No. 09-13-00251-CV, 2017 WL 4319908, 
at *2 (Tex. App. Sept. 28, 2017) (citation omitted). 
 228 Id.   
 229 Amy Moore, Cheerleaders Have Texas AG, Governor in Their Corner for Today’s Hearing, BEAUMONT 
ENTER. (Oct. 18, 2012, 8:21 AM), https://www.beaumontenterprise.com/news/article/
Cheerleaders-have-Texas-AG-Governor-in-their-3956566.php. 
 230 Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex. rel. Matthews, 482 S.W.3d 120, 127 (Tex. App. 2014). 
 231 Chris Tomlinson, Texas AG Intervenes in Cheerleader Banner Dispute, SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Oct. 17, 
2012, 5:34 PM), http://www.spokesman.com/stories/2012/oct/17/texas-ag-intervenes-in-cheer
leader-banner-dispute/. 
 232 Id. 
 233 Id. 
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concept that the original law is God’s law, outlined in the Ten 
Commandments.”234   
One day after the press conference, on October 18, 2012, the trial court 
determined that the plaintiffs were entitled to a temporary injunction.”235  In 
this order, the court found the constitutional claims presented a substantial 
threat of irreparable injury in the absence of injunctive relief.236  Specifically, 
the court found that, without injunctive relief, “the Defendants’ unlawful 
policy prohibiting private religious expression will remain in effect and the 
Plaintiffs will be prohibited from exercising their constitutional . . . rights at 
football games and other school sporting events.”237  This language, with the 
express inclusion of the terms “private religious expression,” would later be 
claimed by the cheerleaders to be the trial court’s classification of the student 
speech as “private speech, not government speech.”238  The injunction 
permitted the cheerleaders to display their religious run-through banners at 
the school football games for the remainder of the 2012 season.239   
On April 8, 2013, the school district’s Board of Trustees adopted a new 
policy that allowed the cheerleaders to display the religious run-through 
banners.240  This new formal district policy provided “that school personnel 
are not required to prohibit messages on school banners, including run-
through banners, that display fleeting expressions of community sentiment 
solely because the source or origin of such messages is religious.”241  
Thereafter, the school district supplemented its plea to the trial court’s 
jurisdiction to assert mootness based on the adoption of the new policy.242   
After this supplemented plea and throughout the cheerleaders’ free 
speech and free exercise litigation, the school district urged the court for a 
determination as to the applicability of the Establishment Clause on the 
school district’s policy.  The school district made multiple judicial admissions 
 
 234 Id. 
 235 Matthews ex rel. Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2012 WL 5269957, at 3 (Tex. 
Dist. Ct. Oct. 18, 2012). 
 236 Id. at 4.  
 237 Id.  
 238 Reply Brief of Petitioners at 20, Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 
416 (Tex. 2016) (No. 14-0453), 2015 WL 10321932, at *20. 
 239 Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796, at 1 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 
2013). 
 240 Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 482 S.W.3d 120, 127 (Tex. App. 2014). 
 241 Id. (quoting the resolution adopted by the Kountze ISD Board of Trustees). 
 242 Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 417 (Tex. 2016). 
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that it affirmed the April 8 policy and that it had no current or future 
intentions to ban religious messages on the run-through banners,243 so long 
as the Establishment Clause did not prohibit the school district from doing 
so.244  From the time of the filing of its first amended answer and through its 
filings in support of its request for declaratory relief, the school district 
repeatedly requested the court issue a ruling that the district’s allowance of 
the cheerleaders’ religiously themed run-through banners at the football 
games did not violate the Establishment Clause.245   
For example, in its October 12, 2012, motion for preliminary declaratory 
relief, the school district sought a judicial determination “that the 
Establishment Clause should not be interpreted so as to require Defendants 
to bar the religious banners at issue in this case.”246  It offered three 
arguments in support of this requested relief: 
1. There is evidence in the record that the application of Santa Fe 
Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000), to the 
religiously themed run-through banners at Kountze High School 
has created the impression that Defendants are hostile to religion; 
2. Establishment Clause decisions requiring the exclusion of religion 
from public life should be narrowly construed or reconsidered 
because they originated in anti-religious sentiment and depart from 
the original understanding of the Establishment Clause; and 
3. The Kountze High School run-through banners, including those 
with religiously themed messages, serve legitimate, nonreligious, 
secular purposes.247 
Under the first heading of this request for declaratory relief, the school 
district asked the court for a classification of the cheerleaders’ banner as 
 
 243 Matthews, 482 S.W.3d at 127–28.  
 244 See Kountze ISD’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Kountze ISD Regarding Its Request for Declaratory Relief at 1–3, Matthews ex rel. Matthews v. 
Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 2013), 2013 WL 2299644, at *1–3 
(requesting the Court to clearly state that the cheerleading squad could display religious banners 
without violating the Establishment Clause). 
 245 Id. at 1–2. 
 246 Defendants’ Motion for Preliminary Declaratory Relief at 1, Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. 
Dist., No. 53526 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 2013), 2012 WL 8203195, at *1. 
 247 Id. at 1–2. 
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government speech for Establishment Clause purposes.248  The net result of 
this motion was a request for an impermissible advisory opinion.249   
Because the cheerleaders wanted the same judicial finding on the 
Establishment Clause issue, they were not adverse parties to the school 
district on that issue.  In their motion for partial summary judgment, the 
cheerleaders sought a similar determination by the trial court that the school 
district “violates no law by allowing the Cheerleaders to display religious 
messages on their run-through banners.”250  A judicial determination of  “no 
law” violation would indicate this type of allowance does not violate the 
Establishment Clause.251   
In their April 29, 2013, reply to the school district’s motion for summary 
judgment for declaratory relief, the cheerleaders expressly acknowledged a 
lack of live controversy and a lack of adversity on this issue: “KISD’s sudden 
adoption of the Plaintiffs’ position that religious messages on the 
Cheerleaders’ run-through banners are constitutionally permissible 
vindicates the Cheerleaders’ rights and brings this case to an end.”252  The 
cheerleaders stated that the school district’s request for declaratory relief was 
“the SAME position the Plaintiffs (and the Texas Attorney General) have advocated from 
day one. . . . [and] the SAME relief the Plaintiffs have requested in their 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.”253   
The only point of disagreement between the parties was the classification 
of the speech as private or government speech.  Speech classification would 
have been necessary for the question of waiver of governmental immunity to 
the free speech and free exercise claims asserted in the cheerleaders’ petition.  
The cheerleaders, though, specifically stated that “no additional ruling 
regarding the nature of the speech is necessary at this time” because the 
 
 248 Id. at 5. 
 249 Id. at 7; see State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (barring advisory opinions 
based on their non-justiciability).  The second argument also implies that the school district 
requested the trial court not adhere to the hierarchical precedent doctrine. 
 250 Brief of Amicus Curiae American Jewish Committee at 15, Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze 
Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. 2016) (No. 14-0453), 2015 WL 12911362, at *15. 
 251 See id. (discussing the logical result of the cheerleaders’ request). 
 252 Plaintiffs’ Reply to Defendant’s Response to Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and 
Response to Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment of Kountze ISD Regarding its Request 
for Declaratory Relief at 1, Matthews ex rel. Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526 
(Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 2013), 2013 WL 2299634, at *1.  
 253 Id. at 2–3 (emphasis in original). 
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“Court has already determined that the messages on the Cheerleaders’ 
banners is private speech” in its temporary injunction order.254   
Regardless, that point of disagreement on the student speech 
classification did not create a justiciable controversy as to the Establishment 
Clause issue, because there was no controversy on that issue between actually 
adverse parties.  Every party in the lawsuit wanted the same resolution of the 
question of whether the district’s allowance of the banners violated the 
Establishment Clause.255  And that sought-after shared answer was “no.”  
The cheerleaders’ April 29, 2013, filing solidified that the parties were not 
adverse as to an Establishment Clause determination and that there was no 
live, actual controversy or adversity on that issue.  It does not matter that the 
parties differed on the reasoning for that joint determination, because, as 
Professor Ann Woolhandler has explained, the adverse party requirement 
for justiciability is one of adverse legal interests and not adverse legal 
arguments.256  Consequently, any Establishment Clause decision by the court 
would be an improper advisory opinion on a nonjusticiable issue.   
That impermissible advisory opinion is exactly what the court gave the 
parties.  Five days after this filing, and one month after the adoption of the 
revised banners policy, on May 8, 2013, the trial court issued an order on the 
parties’ multiple cross-motions for summary judgment, including the 
defendants’ motion for summary judgment regarding declaratory judgment 
and the defendants’ plea to the jurisdiction.257  Despite the vast complexity 
of Establishment Clause doctrine,258 the court made a cursory decision on 
the nonjusticiable issue of the application of that clause to the display of the 
 
 254 Id. at 3 n.12.  
 255 Although the FFRF had attempted to find someone in the Kountze High School community “to 
bring a countersuit” that claimed a violation of the Establishment Clause, it “[was] unable to find 
a person in the community who [was] willing to” do so.  Green, supra note 211. 
 256 See Woolhandler, supra note 82, at 1032–33 (“Adverse legal arguments . . . are clearly not sufficient 
for a case, nor are they always necessary. By contrast, adverse legal interests are necessary and often 
sufficient.  The most plausible version of the adverseness requirement is that a case requires a clash 
of legal interests but does not always require a clash of argument.”). 
 257 Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 
2013). 
 258 See Joseph O. Oluwole & Preston C. Green III, School Vouchers and Tax Benefits in Federal and State 
Judicial Constitutional Analysis, 65 AM. U. L. REV. 1335, 1357 (2016) (emphasizing the difficulty of 
judicial interpretation of the Establishment Clause); Anastasia P. Winslow, Sacred Standards: Honoring 
the Establishment Clause in Protecting Native American Sacred Sites, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1291, 1307–08 (1996) 
(discussing the persistent, inherent difficulties of Establishment Clause jurisprudence). 
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cheerleaders’ banners. 259  It did so in a nine-sentence, two-page order that 
did not cite any case law; that incorporated only two references to the 
“Establishment Clause” and one vague reference to the banners being 
“constitutionally permissible”; and that made two opaque references to “any 
other law.”260  There were no citations in the order.261   
In this short opinion, the court granted the cheerleaders’ motion for 
partial summary judgment in part and the school district’s motion for 
summary judgment regarding its request for declaratory judgment.262  
Although the plaintiffs had not asserted an Establishment Clause violation in 
their petition, the court granted the district’s request for a declaratory 
judgment about the Establishment Clause and made several conclusions of 
law about that clause.263   
First, the court found that the “religious messages expressed on run-
through banners have not created, and will not create, an establishment of 
religion in the Kountze community.”264  Next, it concluded that “[t]he 
Kountze cheerleaders’ banners that included religious messages and were 
displayed during the 2012 football season were constitutionally 
permissible.”265  Finally, it concluded that “[n]either the Establishment 
Clause nor any other law prohibits the cheerleaders from using religious-
themed banners at school sporting events.  Neither the Establishment Clause 
nor any other law requires Kountze I.S.D. to prohibit the inclusion of 
religious-themed banners at school sporting events.”266  The trial court did 
not make an express classification of the cheerleaders’ speech as being either 
private speech or government speech,267 which demonstrates that this order 
was an impermissible advisory opinion as its scope was limited to an issue to 
which the parties both agreed.  By granting the cheerleaders’ motion for 
partial summary judgment in part, this order implicitly denied the school 
 
 259 Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 
2013). 
 260 Id. 
 261 Id.  
 262 Id. 
 263 Id. 
 264 Id. at 1. 
 265 Id. at 2. 
 266 Id. 
 267 Id.  
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district’s plea to jurisdiction.268  The school district appealed this denial of its 
plea.269   
2. The First Texas Court of Appeals Decision 
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Texas in Beaumont determined that 
the plaintiffs’ claims were made moot by the school district’s April 8, 2013, 
policy that allowed the religiously themed run-through banners and the 
district’s judicial admissions regarding no intentions to prohibit these banners 
in the future.270  The court found there was no live controversy between the 
parties because the district’s “allegedly wrongful behavior [had] passed and 
[could not] reasonably be expected to recur.”271   
With respect to the cheerleaders’ counterargument to mootness—that a 
controversy still existed based on the disagreement between the parties as to 
whether the students’ speech was “governmental speech, student-sponsored 
speech, or private speech,” the court stated it had “no authority to resolve a 
theoretical or contingent dispute.”272  Without any evidence in the record 
that the district had prohibited the speech of the cheerleaders in light of the 
April 8 policy, the court was not required to decide if there was a free speech 
violation.273  The court emphasized that “[a]ny future policy regarding the 
cheerleaders’ speech can be challenged at a later date” as the court was “not 
empowered to decide cases on future contingencies or hypotheticals.”274  
Consequently, the court did not classify the cheerleaders’ speech as being 
either private speech or government speech,275 and the only mention of the 
Establishment Clause in the opinion was a reference to the FFRF complaint 
about the banners that led to the district superintendent’s initial restriction 
policy.276  The question of whether the trial court had the power under 
 
 268 Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, No. 09-13-00251-CV, 2017 WL 4319908, 
at *1 (Tex. App. Sept. 28, 2017). 
 269 Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 482 S.W.3d 120, 123 (Tex. App. 2014). 
 270 Id. at 127–28, 134. 
 271 Id. at 127, 132. 
 272 Id. at 131. 
 273 See id. at 131–32 (holding that the school’s adoption of the new policy indicated that “the allegedly 
wrongful behavior has passed and cannot reasonably be expected to recur”). 
 274 Id. at 132. 
 275 Id.  
 276 See id. at 125 (noting that a staff attorney with the FFRF wrote a letter to the superintendent 
contending that the school district would violate the Establishment Clause by continuing to allow 
the cheerleaders to put religious language on the banners). 
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justiciability requirements to make a determination on the Establishment 
Clause issue and whether it had issued an advisory opinion on a 
nonjusticiable issue was not taken up by the court of appeals, despite its 
apparent sua sponte duty to do so.277   
Instead, the court found the trial court erred in its denial of the school 
district’s plea to jurisdiction due to mootness, reversed the trial court’s order 
in part based on the mootness finding for the plaintiffs’ substantive claims, 
and rendered judgment that the school district’s plea to jurisdiction was 
granted.278  The court also vacated the October 18, 2012, temporary 
injunction.279  Importantly, the appellate court’s reversal of the trial court’s 
decision was only a reversal of the portion of the trial court’s order that 
granted the cheerleaders’ motion for partial summary judgment and 
implicitly denied the district’s plea to jurisdiction.280  It did not reverse the 
trial court’s order, granting in part the district’s motion for summary 
judgment on its request for declaratory relief on the Establishment Clause’s 
application to the case, because the appellate court stated that the school 
district’s “request for declaratory relief is not a claim against [the 
cheerleaders] and the grant of summary judgment to Kountze ISD on the 
declaratory relief claim is not challenged on appeal by any party.”281  This 
appellate decision was made on May 8, 2014.282  The cheerleaders petitioned 
the Texas Supreme Court for review,283 and the petition for review was 
granted by the state’s civil court of last resort.284   
3. The Texas Supreme Court Decision 
In the first sentence of its January 29, 2016, opinion, the Texas Supreme 
Court noted that the sole issue on appeal was “whether the [school district’s] 
voluntary cessation of challenged conduct rendered the plaintiffs’ claims for 
prospective relief moot.”285  However, before proceeding to the mootness 
analysis, the court recognized the parties’ dispute over the scope of the 
 
 277 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
 278 Matthews, 482 S.W.3d at 134. 
 279 Id. 
 280 Id. at 123–24, 134. 
 281 Id. at 124 n.1, 134. 
 282 Id. at 120.  
 283 Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 417 (Tex. 2016). 
 284 Id. at 420. 
 285 Id. at 417. 
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challenged conduct as a threshold matter.286  The court stated that “[t]he 
cheerleaders contend that they are challenging the District’s ongoing policy 
of treating their banners as ‘government’ speech[,]” while the school district 
contends that the cheerleaders only challenged the discrete action of the 
superintendent’s religious-message banners ban.287  The court noted the 
district’s contention was that “the cheerleaders are attempting to reframe the 
controversy as broader than they state in their petition.”288  However, the 
state high court did not resolve this dispute or make any classification 
decisions on whether the cheerleaders’ speech was private speech or 
government speech, due to its resolution of the case only through a mootness 
analysis.289  Consequently, the Court’s majority opinion contained no 
references to the Establishment Clause.290  The question of whether the trial 
court had issued an advisory opinion on a nonjusticiable Establishment 
Clause issue was not taken up by the court, despite its apparent sua sponte duty 
to do so.291   
In its analysis, the court instead found that the case was not moot.292  This 
determination was premised on the potential of a district policy reversal, the 
district’s stance in the litigation, and the nature of the challenged conduct 
being easily undone.293  Although the court acknowledged that “[t]he District 
no longer prohibit[ed] the cheerleaders from displaying religious signs or 
messages on banners at school-sponsored events[,] . . . that change hardly 
[made] ‘absolutely clear’ that the District [would] not reverse itself after this 
litigation [was] concluded.”294  The court found that the district’s continual 
defense of the constitutionality of the prohibition and its claimed “unfettered 
authority” to govern the content of the banners, as well as the absence of an 
unconditional statement by the district that it would not reinstate the 
prohibition, were significant factors that weighed against a mootness 
 
 286 Id. at 418. 
 287 Id.  
 288 Id.  
 289 Id. 
 290 See id. at 417–20. 
 291 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
 292 See Matthews, 484 S.W.3d at 418 (finding the case was not moot and, therefore, the court did not 
have to address the issue of how the cheerleaders framed the controversy). 
 293 Id. at 418–19. 
 294 Id.  
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finding.295  Finally, the court found that the easy potential reinstatement of 
the prohibition policy contraindicated mootness.296   
In its conclusion, the court determined that the district’s voluntary 
cessation of the prohibition policy “provide[d] no assurance that the District 
will not prohibit the cheerleaders from displaying banners with religious signs 
or messages at school-sponsored events in the future.”297  The court also 
found that the new district policy “only state[d] the District is not required to 
prohibit the cheerleaders from displaying such banners, and reserves to the 
District unfettered discretion in regulating those banners—including the 
apparent authority to do so based solely on their religious content.”298  As a 
result, the Texas Supreme Court determined the case was not moot.299  It 
reversed the judgment of the court of appeals and remanded the case to that 
court for further proceedings.300   
In Justice Willett’s concurrence, the Establishment Clause and its 
government speech/private speech dichotomy are referenced multiple 
times.301  Justice Willett praised the court for its narrow decision on mootness 
and its lack of classification of the student speech as government speech and 
private speech.302  However, this concurrence also articulated concern over 
the vigorous debate throughout the litigation regarding the applicability of 
the Establishment Clause to the student speech and regarding whether the 
speech was governmental or private.303  Justice Willett was troubled about 
the parties’ conflicting conclusions regarding the trial court’s May 8, 2013, 
order.304  Here, the school district interpreted that order to mean that the 
students’ banners were the school’s (government) speech, while the 
cheerleaders attested that “the order affirmed that the banners contain the 
cheerleaders’ private speech.”305  The concurrence surmised that the 
cheerleaders’ view was based on the inapplicability of the Establishment 
Clause to private speech and the language of the temporary injunction 
 
 295 Id. at 419. 
 296 Id. 
 297 Id. at 420. 
 298 Id. (emphasis in original). 
 299 Id. 
 300 Id. 
 301 See id. at 420–23 (Willett, J., concurring) (referencing the Establishment Clause six times). 
 302 See id. at 420 (lauding the court’s decision as “rightfully . . . within the borders of its authority”).  
 303 Id. at 421. 
 304 Id. at 421–22. 
 305 Id. at 422. 
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order.306  The concurrence then emphasized that “[t]he record [did] not 
yield a conclusive answer” on the classification of the religious speech, and 
that “[w]e don’t know” the answer to that question.307  As a result, Justice 
Willett called for clarity:  
My concern is that this case may return to the trial court for a final decision 
only to reappear on our docket with no clarity as to what this order achieves 
and what claims are actually live.  If that situation arises, the parties and trial 
court would do well to confront the shadowy place in this litigation and 
clarify with precision the status of this order and the cheerleaders’ claims.308   
Given the incredible complexity of this litigation—and the lingering 
questions as to whether the Establishment Clause prohibited the 
cheerleaders’ religious run-through banners, whether the student speech is 
government speech or private speech, and whether any of the state courts 
should have decided these questions—the one thing that was 
uncontrovertibly clear after the Texas Supreme Court’s decision was the 
need for some clarity.  
4. The Second Texas Court of Appeals Decision 
That clarity, at least for Establishment Clause purposes, was not achieved 
by the court of appeals’ September 28, 2017, unpublished decision.309  On 
remand, and unlike the district court litigation, “[n]either party . . . raised 
any issue concerning the Establishment Clause,” which the court expressly 
acknowledged.310  Although the court stated that Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is “murky” and “complicated” when applied to student 
religious speech,311 it specifically limited its discussion “to categorizing the 
student speech at issue,” and not to any Establishment Clause determinations 
given the absence of these issues raised by either party.312  So, once again, 
 
 306 Id. (“[T]he cheerleaders contended that ‘the Establishment Clause . . . is inapplicable to private 
speech[,]’ which, taken together with the text of the temporary injunction order, could explain the 
cheerleaders’ understanding . . . .”).  
 307 Id. 
 308 Id. at 423. 
 309 Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, No. 09-13-00251-CV, 2017 WL 4319908 
(Tex. App. Sept. 28, 2017); see also Collins v. Ison-Newsome, 73 S.W.3d 178, 180 (Tex. 2001) (citing 
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.7) (“[U]npublished opinions ‘have no precedential value and must not be cited 
as authority by counsel or by a court . . . .’”). 
 310 Matthews, 2017 WL 4319908, at *3 n.3. 
 311 Id. at *3 (quoting Morgan v. Swanson, 659 F.3d 359, 371, 382 (5th Cir. 2011)). 
 312 Id. at *3 & n.3. 
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the question of whether the Establishment Clause issue was a justiciable one 
for resolution by the trial court was not taken up by the court of appeals, 
despite its apparent sua sponte duty to do so.313   
Instead, the remand centered on whether the trial court had properly 
denied the school district’s original plea to the court’s jurisdiction based on 
issues of governmental immunity and standing.314  This discussion was 
limited to the school district’s original plea to the district court’s 
jurisdiction,315 because the school district’s supplemental plea to the court’s 
jurisdiction based on mootness had been disposed of by the Texas Supreme 
Court.316  In order for the trial court to have had proper subject matter 
jurisdiction over the lawsuit, the cheerleaders must have alleged facts to 
prove a valid waiver of governmental immunity and proper standing.317  The 
court of appeals highlighted that the trial court’s May 8, 2013, order was an 
“implicit” denial of the school district’s plea to the jurisdiction because the 
cheerleaders’ motion for partial summary judgment was granted in part by 
the trial court.318  
 The key determination for the court of appeals regarding this question 
of waiver of governmental immunity was whether the cheerleaders’ religious 
speech on the banners constituted private speech, as claimed by the 
cheerleaders, or government speech, as claimed by the school district.319  The 
court recognized that this classification dispute had been the “central 
disagreement” between the parties in the litigation,320 and it stated that it 
must engage in an extended classification analysis to resolve it.321   
The government speech/private speech classification was premised only 
upon an analysis of the question of waiver of governmental immunity to the 
free speech and free exercise claims in the cheerleaders’ original petition.322  
The court began its analysis by stating that under the government speech 
 
 313 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
 314 Matthews, 2017 WL 4319908, at *1, *2. 
 315 Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 S.W.3d 416, 417 (Tex. 2016). 
 316 See id. at 418. 
 317 Matthews, 2017 WL 4319908, at *2, *14. 
 318 Id. at *1. 
 319 Id. at *2. 
 320 Id. 
 321 Id. 
 322 See id. at *2 (noting that the issue of whether the speech is government speech or private speech 
controls the questions of governmental immunity). 
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doctrine, “[g]overnment speech is ‘not subject to scrutiny under the Free 
Speech Clause,’” which allows the government to restrict its own speech 
without implicating First Amendment speech provisions.323  Pursuant to that 
doctrine, if the banners were pure government speech, then that would be 
an “absolute defense” to the cheerleaders’ free speech claims and “the 
Cheerleaders could not prove a valid waiver of immunity from suit in order 
to invoke the court’s subject matter jurisdiction over their claim.”324  If the 
speech was private speech, then “governmental immunity has been waived 
for” the cheerleaders’ free speech claims.325   
Ultimately, the court found that the cheerleaders’ speech was “the pure 
private speech of the students” for the purposes of finding the trial court had 
proper subject matter jurisdiction over the free speech claims.326  In this 
analysis, the court invoked Santa Fe’s government speech/private speech 
dichotomy.327  Here, the court distinguished the cheerleaders’ religious 
banners from the football game student invocations that had been held to be 
government speech for Establishment Clause analysis in Santa Fe:328   
In contrast, Kountze ISD makes no claim in this case that the Cheerleaders 
were required or encouraged in any way to include religious messages on the 
banners.  Likewise, there is no school policy or rule that, in actuality or effect, 
even suggested, much less required, the placement of religious messages on 
the banners.  Indeed, until the school year in question, the messages painted 
on the banners had been entirely non-religious in nature.  The extent of the 
school’s policy concerning banners was that the cheerleaders should make 
banners to promote school spirit at football games.  The text and content of 
the message, aside from the prohibition on obscene material, is, was, and 
always had been, left up to the discretion of the cheerleaders.  Thus, we find 
the reasoning in Santa Fe to be inapposite.329   
The court instead found that the cheerleaders’ speech was “genuinely 
student-initiated” per an application of reasoning from other Establishment 
Clause case law and was, therefore, protected private speech.330  
Consequently, the court held that “the Cheerleaders pleaded sufficient facts 
 
 323 Id. at *2 (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 464 (2009)). 
 324 Id. 
 325 Id. 
 326 Id. at *13. 
 327 See id. at *7 (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000)). 
 328 See id. at *8 (contrasting the student election system in Santa Fe with the lack of a school policy 
suggesting or requiring the placement of religious messages on the banners in Matthews). 
 329 Id.  
 330 Id. (quoting Chandler v. James, 180 F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 1999)). 
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to show both a waiver of immunity and to affirmatively demonstrate that the 
trial court possessed jurisdiction over the dispute.”331   
There was no judicial discussion as to whether the trial court rendered 
an advisory opinion on the Establishment Clause in its May 8, 2013, order.  
Aside from one reference, the school district’s motion for summary judgment 
on its request for declaratory relief was not discussed.332  There was no 
discussion of the school district’s uncontested request for a judicial 
declaration that there was no Establishment Clause violation.  There was no 
discussion of the result of the court of appeals’ previous failure to reverse the 
trial court’s granting in part of the district’s motion for summary judgment 
on its request for declaratory relief on the Establishment Clause declaration.  
Instead, after the government immunity analysis, the court simply overruled 
“the school district’s issue on appeal and affirm[ed] the trial court’s ruling to 
deny Kountze ISD’s plea to the jurisdiction.”333   
With respect to the standing issue, the court rejected the school district’s 
claim that the individual cheerleader plaintiffs lacked standing to sue on 
behalf of the entire squad, which made  group decisions on the content of the 
banners.334  Specifically, the court found that the cheerleader litigants did not 
“lose their individual rights to free speech by speaking as a group.”335  The 
propriety of the cheerleaders’ parents bringing suit on behalf of their children 
was not disputed.336  Therefore, the court also overruled the lack of standing 
issue based on each minor cheerleader having “a justiciable interest in the 
controversy” through an allegation of a “breach of her constitutional right to 
freedom of speech,” which gave each of them standing to sue.337  The final 
sentence of the opinion stated: “Having overruled all of the issues of Kountze 
ISD on appeal, we affirm the trial court’s denial of the plea to the 
jurisdiction.”338  However, the question of whether the trial court issued an 
impermissible advisory opinion on the Establishment Clause, which goes to 
 
 331 Id. at *13 
 332 See id. at *1 (discussing the procedural history of the case). 
 333 Id. at *13. 
 334 See id. at *14. 
 335 Id. 
 336 See id. (“It is undisputed that each of the individual cheerleaders who sued was represented by their 
parents as that respective minor’s next friend . . . .”). 
 337 See id. 
 338 Id.  
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the heart of justiciability and was an issue that the court should have 
examined sua sponte, was never addressed.339   
5. Subsequent Requests for Review to the Texas Supreme Court 
The school district filed a petition for review of the appellate court’s 
decision with the Texas Supreme Court on January 15, 2018.340  This 
petition for review explicitly stated that “[n]either party has raised any issue 
concerning the Establishment Clause.”341  The Texas Supreme Court denied 
the petition on August 31, 2018, without an opinion.342  In Texas, the denial 
of a petition for review indicates that the “Texas Supreme Court is not 
satisfied that the opinion of the court of appeals has correctly declared the 
law in all respects but determines that the petition presents no error that 
requires reversal or that is of such importance to the jurisprudence of the 
State as to require correction.”343   
After the denial of the petition, Texas Attorney General Ken Paxton 
made a public announcement supporting the Texas Supreme Court’s denial 
of review.344  In a news release, he championed the Texas Court of Appeals’ 
private-speech classification decision, claiming that “[t]he Kountze 
cheerleaders case involved personal expressions of faith and an ill-advised 
school district change of policy that mislabeled their expressions as 
government speech.”345  He framed the case as a win for “[r]eligious liberty[, 
which] is the foundation upon which our society has been built.”346  He 
concluded with his endorsement of the “precedent” set by this case: “The 
Texas Supreme Court’s decision ensures that the Kountze cheerleaders and 
 
 339 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
 340 See Petition for Review, Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 484 S.W.3d 416 
(Tex. Jan. 15, 2018) (No. 17-0988). 
 341 Id. at 10 n.3. 
 342 See Denial of Petition for Review, Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 484 
S.W.3d 416 (Tex. Aug. 31, 2018) (No. 17-0988), http://www.search.txcourts.gov/Search
Media.aspx?MediaVersionID=5348b981-5cec-4a21-bd15-b3291308d3d4&coa=cossup&DT=PE
T%20FOR%20REVIEW%20DISP&MediaID=8d6afa52-d0b8-4f77-bf4e-2a57637165e5. 
 343 TEXAS LAW REVIEW ASS’N, TEXAS RULES OF FORM: THE GREENBOOK app. D (14th ed. 2018). 
 344 Press Release, Tex. Office of the Att’y Gen., AG Paxton: Texas Supreme Court’s Decision in 
Kountze Cheerleaders’ Case is a Win for Religious Liberty (Aug. 31, 2018), available at 
https://www.texasattorneygeneral.gov/news/releases/ag-paxton-texas-supreme-courts-decision-
kountze-cheerleaders-case-win-religious-liberty. 
 345 Id. 
 346 Id. 
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other cheerleaders across the state will be able to display their expressions of 
faith on banners at football games.”347   
The school district filed a motion for rehearing with the Texas Supreme 
Court on October 2, 2018, in which it asked for a declaration that the case 
was moot and a vacatur of all of the prior decisions in the case.348  Here, the 
school district argued the case became moot on March 24, 2017, when all of 
the original plaintiff cheerleaders no longer were eligible to be school 
cheerleaders due to graduating or not qualifying for the squad, which was six 
months prior to the state court of appeals decision that classified the banners 
as private speech.349  The school district argued that, with the case becoming 
moot, the appellate court lacked jurisdiction to make this decision, and, 
instead, should have dismissed the case.350   
The school district next argued that the “cheerleaders abandoned” the 
controversy regarding whether the banners constitute private speech “by 
agreeing in substance and form to the trial court’s [May 8, 2013] order which 
disposed of their motion for summary judgment without characterizing the 
banners as their private speech.”351  Without a live controversy between the 
parties as to whether the banners were the students’ private speech, the court 
of appeals lacked jurisdiction to classify the banners as private speech.352  
Consequently, the school district argued that the September 28, 2017, 
opinion of the court of appeals was a prohibited advisory opinion.353  It did 
not argue the same as to the original trial court’s order, which makes sense 
as the school district wanted that judicial declaration that the district was not 
violating the Establishment Clause.   
In the alternative to these mootness arguments, the school district argued 
the high court should grant the petition for review because the appellate 
court’s determination that the banners were private speech conflicted with 
the First Amendment.354  Here, the district argued the banners were school-
sponsored government speech under the Supreme Court’s First Amendment 
 
 347 Id. 
 348 See Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing of the Denial of Its Petition for Review at 24, Kountze Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 484 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. Oct. 2, 2018) (No. 17-0988). 
 349 Id. at 8–9. 
 350 Id. at 9. 
 351 Id. at 13. 
 352 Id. at 14. 
 353 See id. (arguing that “[s]uch an opinion is prohibited under Texas law”).  
 354 Id. at 15. 
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free-speech jurisprudence,355 and, as such, the district’s government 
immunity had not been waived.356  Therefore, the district argued that the 
Texas Supreme Court should grant the petition for review and reverse the 
appellate court’s order that affirmed the denial of the school district’s plea to 
the jurisdiction.357   
The school district’s final argument for the grant of its petition for review 
was an Establishment Clause argument.358  Specifically, the school district 
argued that “[t]he petition for review should be granted because the lower 
court’s decision could lead to the violation of the Establishment Clause of the 
First Amendment.”359  Here, the school district said that Santa Fe made clear 
the cheerleaders’ run-through banners were government speech under 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence because of the perception of school 
endorsement they created and because they were the result of a majoritarian 
selection process among the squad.360  If the school district was “unable to 
maintain reasonable control over the school-sponsored speech on run-
through banners, it [would be] likely that the expression contained on the 
banners would be attributed to the school and that such attribution of the 
content of the unregulated banners could potentially subject the school to 
liability for violations of the Establishment Clause” under Santa Fe in the 
future.361  Therefore, the school district urged the Texas Supreme Court to 
“grant this motion and the petition for review, recognize that the banners are 
school-sponsored speech, and assist [the school district] in avoiding future 
lawsuits based on the Establishment Clause.”362  The Texas Supreme Court 
denied the school district’s motion for rehearing of the denial of its petition 
for review on November 9, 2018, without opinion.363   
 
 355 See id. at 15–20 (“Pursuant to Hazelwood and its progeny, the banners are school-sponsored speech 
and may be regulated.”). 
 356 Id. at 21–22. 
 357 Id. 
 358 See id. at 22–24 (using the interpretation of the Establishment Clause from Santa Fe Independent School 
District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)). 
 359 Id. at 22. 
 360 See id. at 23–24 (citing Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 307–08, 314, 316–17). 
 361 Id. at 22 (citing Santa Fe, 530 U.S. 290). 
 362 Id. at 24. 
 363 Denial of Petitioner’s Motion for Rehearing of the Denial of its Petition for Review, Kountze Indep. 
Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 484 S.W.3d 416 (Tex. Nov. 9, 2018) (No. 17-0988), 
http://www.search.txcourts.gov/SearchMedia.aspx?MediaVersionID=fc350abd-391b-483e-a30
2-66b58a2c2d63&coa=cossup&DT=REHEARING%20DISP&MediaID=f031814b-daa2-4d8c-
8edd-9df35369bc70. 
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6. Lessons to be Learned from the Confusion of this Case 
This convoluted case is paradigmatic of the confusion and lack of clarity 
regarding the Establishment Clause and the classification of student religious 
speech as government speech or private speech.  The trial court made an 
error in issuing its order on May 8, 2013, that declared as a conclusion of law 
that the Establishment Clause did not prohibit “the cheerleaders from using 
religious-themed banners at school sporting events,” given the absence of a 
justiciable controversy for that issue.364  Without a live controversy between 
adverse parties, the court should not have rendered a prohibited advisory 
opinion on any Establishment Clause issues.365  This was the very definition 
of a nonjusticiable issue, but the trial court proceeded regardless in violation 
of the fundamental justiciability requirements and constitutional provisions 
of the state—requirements that parallel the justiciability requirements of the 
federal courts.     
In their original petition, the cheerleaders alleged that their free-speech 
and free-exercise rights were violated.366  They did not assert an 
Establishment Clause violation, because they wanted their banners classified 
as protected private speech for free speech and free exercise purposes.367  And 
it is clear that private speech is not subject to Establishment Clause 
constraints.368  The school district’s motion for summary judgment regarding 
its request for declaratory relief, in which it sought a judicial declaration that 
the district’s allowance of the cheerleaders’ display of religiously themed 
 
 364 Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796, at *2 (Tex. D. Ct. May 8, 
2013). 
 365 See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. 2012) (“The Texas Constitution—the 
source of the requirements of justiciability in Texas—bars our courts from rendering advisory 
opinions and limits access to the courts to those individuals who have suffered an actual, concrete 
injury.”). 
 366 Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 482 S.W.3d 120, 125 (Tex. App. 2014). 
 367 See Reply Brief of Petitioners at 20–21, Matthews ex rel. Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., 484 
S.W.3d 416 (Tex. Aug. 27, 2015) (No. 14-0453), 2015 WL 10321932 (stating that a necessary 
component of the district court’s order was that the banners were private, and not government, 
speech, which was in accord with the cheerleaders’ position). 
 368 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (quoting Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 
496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality opinion)) (providing the private speech and government speech 
dichotomy for Establishment Clause jurisprudence). 
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banners at football games was not a violation of the Establishment Clause, 
did not convert the action to a live Establishment Clause controversy.369   
This is so because there was not an actual controversy between actually 
adverse parties as to the Establishment Clause determination, and an actual 
controversy between adverse parties with adverse legal interests is required 
in order for a Texas court to have the authority to make an adjudication on 
a justiciable matter,370 including when a party is requesting a declaratory 
judgment.371  The state’s provisions on declaratory relief do not give the 
courts carte blanche to decide all controversies, regardless of their 
justiciability.372  The cheerleaders’ response to this motion clearly indicated 
that there was no live controversy or adversity as to the Establishment Clause 
issue, because the parties sought the exact same relief on that issue.373   
The only remaining potentially justiciable issues at the time of the May 
8, 2013, order were 1) the question of waiver of governmental immunity to 
the free-speech and free-exercise claims, which would require the 
classification of the banners as government speech or private speech, and 2) 
the standing of the individual plaintiffs to bring suit when the squad made 
decisions on the banners’ content as a group.  These issues were only 
potentially justiciable given that the initial banners restriction had been 
amended prior to the court’s order, which raised the question of mootness of 
the cheerleaders’ original claims.  The court order failed to make any 
determination on either of those potentially justiciable issues and made a 
decision instead on a nonjusticiable issue in the endemically complex 
Establishment Clause arena.374   
 
 369 See Kountze ISD’s Reply to Plaintiffs’ Response to Traditional Motion for Summary Judgment of 
Kountze ISD Regarding Its Request for Declaratory Relief at 1–3, Matthews v. Kountze Indep. 
Sch. Dist., No. 53526 (Tex. D. Ct. May 3, 2013), 2013 WL 2299644, at *1–3  (requesting court to 
issue a declaration that the Establishment Clause does not prohibit the school district from allowing 
the cheerleader squad to utilize religious messages on run-through banners). 
 370 See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993) (providing 
justiciability requirements under the Texas Constitution). 
 371 See Dallas v. VSC, LLC, 347 S.W.3d 231, 240 (Tex. 2011) (requiring an actual controversy to have 
a justiciable declaratory judgment proceeding). 
 372 See Denver City Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Moses, 51 S.W.3d 386, 391 (Tex. App. 2001) (stating that the 
Declaratory Judgments Act is a procedural vehicle to decide controversies that already exist within 
the court’s jurisdiction). 
 373 See supra text accompanying notes 250–51. 
 374 See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 387, 392 (1983) (stating the Supreme Court has “oft-repeated [that 
the Establishment Clause] . . . presents especially difficult questions of interpretation and 
application.”). 
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In doing so, the trial court issued an order and opinion that stated these 
banners did not violate the Establishment Clause, without an express 
classification of the student speech as either government speech or private 
speech.375  It did so summarily in nine sentences with no references to any 
case law, with two mentions of the term “the Establishment Clause,” and 
with no legal citations.376  Essentially, the trial court found that there was no 
Establishment Clause violation because the court said so.  Ipse dixit, there you 
go.377  While the summary nature of this opinion should not be too harshly 
criticized, given the overwhelming dockets that Texas trial courts, like all 
courts, face,378 basic rules of hierarchical precedent still must apply when 
lower courts issue decisions.  A just application of the law requires more than 
a conclusory, unsupported statement.379  Such criticism of the cursory nature 
of the opinion could easily have been avoided, though, had the court declined 
to decide the nonjusticiable issue, as it was legally bound to do.      
The trial court failed to comply with justiciability limits when it issued 
such an impermissible advisory opinion by judicial fiat,380 and all of the 
reviewing appellate courts should have reversed and vacated this 
Establishment Clause aspect of the trial court’s judgment as a matter of 
law.381  This was cogently argued by the American Jewish Committee in its 
 
 375 See Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796, at *1–2 (Tex. D. Ct. 
May 8, 2013) (concluding that the banners were constitutionally permissible but not stating why). 
 376 Id.; see Brett A. Geier & Annie Blankenship, Praying for Touchdowns: Contemporary Law and Legislation 
for Prayer in Public School Athletics, 15 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 381, 405 (2017) (critically deeming this 
district court order “very succinct”). 
 377 See Ipse Dixit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999) (translating “ipse dixit” to “‘he himself said 
it” and defining it as “[s]omething asserted but not proved”); Richard C. Wydick, The Attorney-Client 
Privilege: Does It Really Have Life Everlasting?, 87 KY. L.J. 1165, 1172 n.41 (1998) 
(“Ipse dixit means roughly: it’s so because I say so.”). 
378 See OFFICE OF COURT ADMIN., ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT FOR THE TEXAS JUDICIARY: 
FISCAL YEAR 2018, at 2–9 (2018), available at https://www.txcourts.gov/media/1443455/2018-ar-
statistical-final.pdf (showing statewide trend of increasingly heavy caseloads for all Texas civil 
courts). 
 379 See Mary B. Trevor, From Ostriches to Sci-Fi: A Social Science Analysis of the Impact of Humor in Judicial 
Opinions, 45 U. TOL. L. REV. 291, 302 (2014) (arguing judges must provide clear and credible 
explanations in their opinions). 
 380 See Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 444 (Tex. 1993) (discussing how 
neither Texas nor federal courts can render advisory opinions).  
 381 See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 315 (1991) (vacating an appellate court’s judgment and 
remanding with instructions to dismiss a nonjusticiable cause of action when there was an absence 
of a live controversy filed and decided upon in the trial court); State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 
S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994) (providing that a decision that does not bind the parties is by definition 
an impermissible advisory opinion). 
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brief as an amicus curiae to the Texas Supreme Court.382  Each of the 
reviewing courts should have examined this core justiciability issue sua sponte.  
None of the state’s appellate courts did so.383  As a prudential matter, the 
courts should also have avoided this improper course to not contribute to the 
jurisprudential confusion that surrounds the Establishment Clause.  This was 
a fundamental error that contravened all of the requirements of justiciability 
and a missed opportunity by all of these courts to provide much needed 
clarity in this area of school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  It also 
set up state officials to endorse the continued practice of school districts’ 
allowance of the display of these types of student religious messages as per se 
constitutional,384 which creates a public perception that this practice will 
never be an Establishment Clause violation.385  And this is all based on a 
nine-sentence order on a nonjusticiable issue.  If faced with similar cases in 
the future, courts should avoid the costly mistakes of the Matthews case.386   
B. The Establishment Clause and Student-Led Graduation Invocations: The Judicial 
Fiat Dilemma of Schultz v. Medina Valley Independent School District 
When the Supreme Court limited its review in Santa Fe only to the 
establishment question of the football game prayer policy and did not review 
the constitutionality of  the school district’s “allow[ing] students to read 
Christian invocations and benedictions from the stage at graduation 
ceremonies,”387 it left the question of whether state policies and practices 
regarding student invocations at public school graduations were violative of 
the Establishment Clause open for future judicial resolution and public 
 
 382 See Brief of Amicus Curiae American Jewish Committee at 2–3, Matthews ex rel. M.M. v. Kountze 
Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 14-0453, 2015 WL 12911362, at *2–3 (Tex. Aug. 20, 2015) (arguing the trial 
court’s advisory opinion on a nonjusticiable matter was error).  
 383 See Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Matthews ex rel. Matthews, 482 S.W.3d 120 (Tex. App. 2014). 
 384 See Paxton, supra note 344 (describing the Texas Attorney General’s support of the Kountze 
cheerleaders’ “personal expressions of faith”). 
 385 See, e.g., Bob Cook, US Supreme Court is Hinting Public School Coaches Won’t Have to Leave Religion on the 
Sidelines, FORBES (Feb. 22, 2019), https://www.forbes.com/sites/bobcook/2019/02/22/us-
supreme-court-is-hinting-public-school-coaches-wont-have-to-leave-religion-on-the-sidelines/#11
23e38818ff (characterizing the Texas Supreme Court’s Kountze decision as “a curious decision, to 
say that public school cheerleaders writing religious messages in their school-issued uniforms with 
school-issued pens on school-issued banners to have players run through in front of God and 
everybody is constitutionally okie-dokie”). 
 386 This case example is relevant to all courts given the symmetry between the federal and Texas 
justiciability requirements.  See supra Part II.A. (discussing Texas justiciability requirements). 
 387 Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 295 (2000). 
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debate.388  Although there have been many cases that have touched on the 
issue of student prayer at school graduations,389 there have been relatively 
few federal cases that have been litigated since Santa Fe that have involved 
the constitutionality of an express student “invocation” policy for school 
graduations.   
1. The Trial Court Proceedings  
One prominent example of such a case is Schultz v. Medina Valley 
Independent School District, which was filed in the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Texas on May 26, 2011.390  In the complaint, a 
graduating agnostic senior of Medina Valley High School, Corwyn Schultz, 
his agnostic parents, and his agnostic brother, a graduate of the high 
school,391 claimed that the school district violated the Establishment Clause 
through its “longstanding custom, practice, and policy of sponsoring 
graduation prayers” as evidenced by its express, formal inclusion of an 
“‘invocation’ and ‘benediction’” in its “official graduation-ceremony 
program.”392  The Schultz family first contacted the school district on 
October 10, 2010, raising constitutional concerns with this policy and asking 
whether the upcoming graduation would include prayer.393  Because the 
school district did not notify the Schultz family until May 25, 2011,394 that 
the June 4, 2011, graduation ceremony would include an invocation and 
 
 388 See Kent Greenawalt, Fundamental Questions About the Religion Clauses: Reflections on Some Critiques, 47 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131, 1144 (2010) (discussing the different perspectives on the constitutionality 
of graduation prayers at public schools); Frederick B. Jonassen, Free Speech and Establishment Clause 
Rights at Public School Graduation Ceremonies: A Disclaimer: The Preceding Speech Was Government Censored 
and Does Not Represent the Views of the Valedictorian, 55 WAYNE L. REV. 683, 730 (2009) (discussing the 
lack of resolution on this issue by Santa Fe). 
 389 See Sorkin, supra note 27, at 357–95 (providing a comprehensive account of the federal court cases 
that have addressed the constitutionality of public school graduation prayer). 
 390 Complaint, Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 5:11-cv-422, 2011 WL 7561368 (W.D. 
Tex. May 26, 2011). 
 391 See id. at 5 (describing the Schultz family’s religious background). 
 392 Id. at 5–6. 
 393 Plaintiff-Appellees’ Opposition to Defendant-Appellant’s Emergency Motion to Dissolve 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 12, Schultz, No. 11-50486 (5th Cir. 
June 3, 2011). 
 394 Plaintiffs’ Motion for a Temporary Restraining Order and a Preliminary Injunction at 4, Schultz 
v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 5:11-cv-422 (W.D. Tex. May 26, 2011), 2011 WL 7561377, 
at *4. 
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benediction,395 the plaintiffs filed a motion for a TRO and a preliminary 
injunction on the same day as the complaint, asking the court to enjoin 
prayer at the graduation ceremony.396  On May 27, 2011, the presiding 
judge, Chief Judge Fred Biery, entered an order that set the motion for TRO 
and preliminary injunction for hearing on May 31, 2011.397 
After that hearing, on June 1, 2011, the federal district court entered an 
amended order that granted the plaintiffs’ injunctive relief motion, based on 
a finding of a likelihood of plaintiffs’ success on the merits that the inclusion 
of the graduation prayers violated the Establishment Clause and stating that 
the court was bound to follow Santa Fe and other controlling Establishment 
Clause precedent.398  It cited to eleven cases in support of its decision.399  The 
court ordered the school district to “remove the terms ‘invocation’ and 
‘benediction’ from the graduation ceremony programs and to replace them 
“with ‘opening remarks’ and ‘closing remarks.’”400  It also ordered the school 
district to tell the students who had been “selected to deliver the ‘invocation’ 
and ‘benediction’ to modify their remarks to be statements of their own 
beliefs as opposed to leading the audience in prayer.”401   
Further, all graduation speakers were to: 
be instructed that they may not ask audience members to “stand,” “join in 
prayer,” or “bow their heads,” they may not end their remarks with “amen” 
or “in [a deity’s name] we pray,” and they shall not otherwise deliver a 
message that would commonly be understood to be a prayer, nor use the 
word “prayer” unless it is used in the student’s expression of the student’s 
personal belief, as opposed to encouraging others who may not believe in 
the concept of prayer to join in and believe the same concept.  The students 
may in stating their own personal beliefs speak through conduct such as 
kneeling to face Mecca, the wearing of a yarmulke or hijab or making the 
sign of the cross.402 
 
 395 Id. at 2–5. 
 396 See id. at 1, 11. 
 397 Order Setting Hearing on Motion for Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, 
Schultz, No. 5:11-cv-422-FB, available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-
0001-9000.pdf (Docket Entry No. 10). 
 398 Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-11-CA-422-FB, 2011 WL 13234770, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. June 1, 2011). 
 399 See id. at *1 (citing eleven cases). 
 400 Id. at *2. 
 401 Id. 
 402 Id. 
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Finally, the school district was ordered to review the students’ remarks to 
ensure compliance with the order and to instruct the students not to deviate 
from their district-approved remarks at the graduation ceremony.403  
2. The Interlocutory Appeal to the Fifth Circuit 
 On June 2, 2011, the school district filed an emergency amended appeal 
in the Fifth Circuit to dissolve the trial court’s order.404  This twenty-page 
emergency motion had extensive citations to the Constitution and Supreme 
Court authority.405  On the same day, the school’s valedictorian, Angelina 
Hildenbrand, who wanted to pray during her speech, sought to intervene in 
the appeal in opposition to the district court’s order.406  The State of Texas 
also filed a twenty-three page amicus brief with citations to hierarchical 
precedent in the matter.407  In a statement to the public about the case, Texas 
Attorney General Abbott stated, “This is part of an ongoing attempt to purge 
God from the public setting, while at the same time demanding from the 
court increased yielding to all things agnostic and atheistic[.]”408  Abbott also 
stated that “[Judge] Biery’s ruling would allow a student to ‘bend over in 
honor of Mecca,’ but not lead a prayer to the Christian God.”409  The Schultz 
family filed their response in opposition to the appeal on June 3, 2011, in a 
forty-eight page brief with extensive citations to the Constitution and 
Supreme Court precedent.410   
 
 403 Id. 
 404 Amended Appeal of Order, Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 5:11-cv-00422-FB, 
available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-9000.pdf (Docket Entry 
No. 19).  The school district had filed an appeal with the Fifth Circuit of the first order of the court 
on June 1, 2011.  Appeal of Order, Schultz, No. 5:11-cv-00422-FB, available at https://www.clearing
house.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-9000.pdf (Docket Entry No. 17). 
 405 See Medina Valley Independent School District’s Opposed Emergency Motion to Dissolve 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. 
Dist., No. 11-50486 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011).  
 406 Jim Forsyth, Valedictorian Fights Judge’s Ban on Graduation Prayer, REUTERS (June 2, 2011), 
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-prayer-graduation-texas/valedictorian-fights-judges-ban-on-
graduation-prayer-idUSTRE75177D20110602. 
 407 See Brief of the State of Texas as Amicus Curiae, Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 
11-50486 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011). 
 408 Forsyth, supra note 406. 
 409 Id. 
 410 See Plaintiff-Appellees’ Opposition to Defendant-Appellant’s Emergency Motion to Dissolve 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction, Schultz, No. 11-50486 (5th Cir. June 3, 
2011). 
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In the appeal, the school district argued that the plaintiffs could not meet 
their burden of a strong showing that they were entitled to injunctive relief.411  
The school district argued that the district court had abused its discretion 
with its injunctive order, because “[t]he District clearly ha[d] not violated the 
Establishment Clause” and the graduation policies were consistent with the 
Establishment Clause.412  The school district cited to the government 
speech/private speech dichotomy in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.413  
It distinguished Santa Fe, as that case dealt with “prayer at football games” and 
not prayer at “graduation ceremonies.”414  It asserted that the speaker selection 
process, based on a random drawing from student volunteers from a pool of 
“the top three academically ranked graduates, the class president, and 
student council officers,” created a limited public forum for the graduation 
ceremony.415  Consequently, the central argument of the school district 
revolved around how to classify the religious speech of the students within 
the dichotomy of government speech and private speech in Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence.416  Specifically, the school district asserted that the 
“student speakers at graduation unquestionably are engaging in private 
speech that is altogether distinctive from government speech and does not 
run afoul of the Establishment Clause.”417  The school district also argued 
that the court’s injunctive relief order failed to make the requisite findings of 
fact and conclusions of law under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.418   
In their opposition to the appeal, the Schultz family argued that the 
school district lacked standing to assert the constitutional rights of its 
students, that the district was not entitled to expedited relief given its six-
month delay in responding to their inquiry as to whether the graduation 
ceremony would include prayer and its lack of cooperation in the trial court 
proceedings, and that the school district had “not met the procedural 
 
 411 See Medina Valley Independent School District’s Opposed Emergency Motion to Stay Enforcement 
of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 14, Schultz, No. 11-50486 (5th Cir. 
June 3, 2011). 
 412 See id. at 4, 14. 
 413 See id. at 7. 
 414 Id. at 9 (emphasis in original) (citing Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000)). 
 415 Id. at 10–11. 
 416 See id. at 11–12. 
 417 Medina Valley Independent School District’s Opposed Emergency Motion to Stay Enforcement 
of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 11, Schultz, No. 11-50486 (5th Cir. 
June 3, 2011). 
 418 See id. at 13–14. 
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requirements for a stay of the preliminary injunction.”419  The Schultz family 
also argued the district court correctly found that the plaintiffs were likely to 
prevail on the merits of the case.420  They asserted that the Supreme Court’s 
emphasis in Lee v. Weisman on the unconstitutional coercion of prayers at 
graduation ceremonies applied to the graduation at hand.421  In opposition 
to the school district, the Schultz family argued that Santa Fe did apply to the 
graduation invocation and benediction “prayers delivered by students”422 and 
that Santa Fe applied to prayer at graduation ceremonies, not just football 
games.423  They argued that graduation ceremonies are not limited public 
forums.424   
Finally, they argued against the private speech classification, stating that 
“[t]he reasonable observer could hardly be expected to appreciate that the 
graduation speeches are private when they arise in a context of pervasive 
religiosity that is plainly government-sponsored.”425  Therefore, these 
speeches “would reasonably be perceived to be government-sponsored,” 
which meant that the Establishment Clause regulated this type of religious 
student speech.426  Consequently, the plaintiff-appellees urged the court to 
not grant the school district’s emergency motion to dissolve the trial court’s 
order because:  
Only by distorting and ignoring the relevant case law can the District build 
support for the unprecedented rule of law that it invites the Court to adopt, 
namely, that Medina High School’s graduation prayer-givers are purely 
private actors — and can thus present even sectarian and proselytizing 
messages — even though the students have been asked by the school to 
present their messages, the messages have been denominated in the program 
of ceremonies as an “invocation” and “benediction” and have been pre-
screened by government officials, and the messages comprise a formal 
portion of a government-controlled ceremony presented to a captive 
audience whose attendance is not “in any real sense of the term[,] 
‘voluntary.’”427   
 
 419 See Plaintiff-Appellees’ Opposition to Defendant-Appellant’s Emergency Motion to Dissolve 
Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction at 11–15, Schultz, No. 11-50486 (5th 
Cir. June 3, 2011). 
 420 See id. at 16. 
 421 See id. (citing Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587, 592 (1992)). 
 422 Id. at 18–19. 
 423 Id. at 21–22. 
 424 See id. at 28. 
 425 Id. at 34. 
 426 Id. at 35. 
 427 Id. at 1–2. 
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The next day, during the afternoon of June 3, 2011,428 the Fifth Circuit 
dissolved the TRO and injunction in a per curiam decision, based on a four-
sentence determination:   
On this incomplete record at this preliminary injunction stage of the case, 
we are not persuaded that plaintiffs have shown that they are substantially 
likely to prevail on the merits, particularly on the issue that the individual 
prayers or other remarks to be given by students at graduation are, in fact, 
school-sponsored.  We also observe in particular that the plaintiffs’ motion 
may be rooted at least in part in circumstances that no longer exist.  For 
example, the school has apparently abandoned including the words 
“invocation” and “benediction” on the program.  The motion also did not 
expressly address the involvement of the valedictorian in the graduation 
ceremony.429 
There was no mention of the Constitution, the Establishment Clause, or any 
case law in the entire opinion,430 although the reference to whether the 
graduation prayers were “school-sponsored” presumably reflected the core 
Establishment Clause government speech/private speech dichotomy.431  The 
court also denied Ms. Hildenbrand’s motion to intervene and permitted her 
to proceed as amicus curiae.432  The court remanded the case to the trial court 
“for possible further proceedings.”433  In support of the Fifth Circuit’s 
decision, Attorney General Abbott stated, “‘It should not be illegal for 
students to say a prayer at a graduation ceremony.  Now, the federal court 
of appeals agrees.’”434 
 
 428 See Ethan Cole, Texas Graduation Takes Advantage of Prayer Ruling, Goes All Out, CHRISTIAN POST REP. 
(June 5, 2011), https://www.christianpost.com/news/texas-graduation-takes-advantage-of-prayer
-ruling-goes-all-out.html (stating the Fifth Circuit’s decision came down “late Friday”). 
 429 Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 11-50486, 1–2 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011), available at 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-0005.pdf. 
 430 See generally id.  
 431 See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 302 (2000) (discussing the differences between 
government speech endorsing religion and private speech endorsing religion). 
 432 Schultz, No. 11-50486, at 2. 
 433 Id.  
 434 Raven Clabough, Fed Appeals Court Overturns Prayer Ban at Medina Valley, TX Graduation, NEW AM. 
(June 6, 2011), https://www.thenewamerican.com/culture/faith-and-morals/item/933-fed-app
eals-court-overturns-prayer-ban-at-medina-valley-tx-graduation. 
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3. The Aftermath of the Fifth Circuit Decision 
The Medina Valley High School graduation took place the next day, on 
Saturday, June 4, 2011,435 with increased security based in part on threats 
against Hildenbrand.436  The school district superintendent provided a 
disclaimer at the start of the graduation ceremony that the “speakers’ views 
were their own.”437  The graduation programs did not contain the terms 
“invocation” and “benediction” as the school district had determined, after 
scrutinizing this policy, that those terms “could be misinterpreted.”438  Those 
terms were changed to “opening remarks” and “closing remarks.”439  The 
student who delivered these opening remarks began by saying, “Those who 
wish, would you please pray with me?”440  There were many prayers and 
invocations to God during the ceremony, including in the valedictory speech 
and the speech by Texas State Representative John V. Garza.441  The 
graduation ceremony “was likened to a revival meeting.”442  Corwyn Schultz, 
the student who had brought the original action, and his family did not 
attend the graduation.443 
By that Saturday, multiple critiques and threats had been made against 
Judge Biery and the courthouse staff.444  Anonymous sources within the 
courthouse reported to the media that “Biery and the court got more than 
500 calls from people all over the country, demanding he change his 
ruling.”445  Senator John Cornyn, one of the United States senators from 
Texas, “blasted Biery’s order, saying it was hostile to ‘all things religious in 
public life.’”446  Regarding the trial court’s order, Governor Perry stated, 
 
 435 See Craig Kapitan, Medina Valley Graduates Hear Prayers Aplenty, MY SAN ANTONIO (June 4, 2011, 
11:54 PM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Medina-Valley-graduates-
hear-prayers-aplenty-1410195.php (describing the aftermath of the litigation). 
 436 See Guillermo Contreras, Appeals Panel Overturns Medina Valley Graduation Prayer Ban, MY SAN 
ANTONIO  (June 4, 2011, 7:33 PM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article
/Appeals-panel-overturns-Medina-Valley-graduation-1408548.php (describing the aftermath of 
the litigation).  
 437 Kapitan, supra note 435. 
 438 Contreras, supra note 436. 
 439 Id. 
 440 Kapitan, supra note 435. 
 441 See id. (describing the commencement ceremony). 
 442 Cole, supra note 428. 
 443 See Kapitan, supra note 435 (detailing the commencement ceremony). 
 444 See Contreras, supra note 436 (describing the physical dangers caused by the prayer controversy). 
 445 Id. 
 446 Id. 
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“The reprehensible action taken by a federal judge underscores the 
increasingly inappropriate federal encroachment into the lives of Americans 
by unconstitutionally banning prayer at a Texas high school 
graduation[.]”447  
The trial court proceedings continued after the graduation, and so did 
the vitriol.448  Judge Biery was given “a nearly round-the-clock security 
detail” by the federal marshals in response to the threats he received after his 
ruling.449  Groups called for the judge’s resignation.450  Presidential hopeful 
Newt Gingrich advocated for the elimination of “dictatorial religious bigots 
such as Judge Biery” at campaign stops.451  On national television, Gingrich 
stated that Judge Biery should be subpoenaed by Congress to explain his 
ruling.452  Gingrich went on to say that “he would send the U.S. Capitol 
Police or U.S. Marshals to arrest [judges] and force them to testify” as a way 
to make federal judges, like Judge Biery, “comply with [these types of] 
congressional subpoenas.”453  He also called for Judge Biery’s 
impeachment.454 
On July 11, 2011, the trial court entered an Advisory and Order 
Concerning Procedures to Reach Resolution of the Merits of the Case, in 
 
 447 Jennifer Riley, Texas Valedictorian Can Pray at Graduation, Appeals Court Rules, CHRISTIAN POST (June 
4, 2011), https://www.christianpost.com/news/texas-valedictorian-can-pray-at-graduation-appea
ls-court-rules.html. 
 448 See Guillermo Contreras, Colorful Judge Biery at Eye of Legal Storm, MY SAN ANTONIO (July 3, 2011, 
2:18 AM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Colorful-Judge-Biery-at-
eye-of-legal-storm-1450798.php (“Some writers or callers [to the federal courthouse] identified 
themselves as Christians—then proceeded to say that Biery should ‘die from cancer’ or drink 
human waste, or that they will ‘kick his ass.’”). 
 449 Id. 
 450 See id. (explaining the backlash experienced by Judge Biery). 
 451 Id.; Tracy Idell Hamilton, Biery’s the Man Gingrich Just Loves to Hate, MY SAN ANTONIO (Jan. 28, 
2012, 12:22 AM), https://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/Biery-s-the-man-
Gingrich-just-loves-to-hate-2764583.php. 
 452 See Andrew Cohen, Gingrich: Time to Subpoena Federal Judges, ATLANTIC (Oct. 9, 2011),  
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/10/gingrich-time-to-subpoena-federal-judg
es/246407/ (discussing Speaker Gingrich’s critique of Judge Biery). 
 453 Matt DeLong, Gingrich: Send U.S. Marshals to Compel ‘Radical’ Judges to Explain Rulings, WASH. POST 
(Dec. 19, 2011), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/election-2012/post/gingrich-send-us-
marshals-to-arrest-uncooperative-judges/2011/12/18/gIQAlYUg2O_blog.html?utm_term=.f38
c2af38b12. 
 454 See Johnathan Turley, Gingrich: I Will Arrest Federal Judges, JONATHAN TURLEY BLOG (Dec. 19, 
2011), https://jonathanturley.org/2011/12/19/gingrich-i-will-arrest-federal-judges/ (criticizing 
Speaker Gingrich’s call for judges to be subpoenaed before Congress as an “attack on the 
judiciary”). 
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which the court ordered each party to provide “a statement of which judicial 
process road that particular party chooses: to attempt sooner and less 
expensive resolution or proceed immediately to longer and more expensive 
litigation.”455  In this order, the court provided examples of protracted 
litigation that “caused considerable divisiveness within the community” and 
examples of cases that reached early resolution that saved considerable time 
and money.456  The court encouraged the parties to choose the latter path as 
a way to safeguard the parties’ time and finite funds.457  The court also 
reminded the “adults on both sides [that they] not only have a responsibility 
to teach, but also are stewards of financial resources best used for education 
of children, as opposed to litigation among adults.”458  Consequently, the 
Court encouraged the parties to “conclude the matter, not only sooner and 
less expensively, but as a teachable moment and example for the district’s 
children of how people of opposing views can listen to one another and 
resolve disagreements peaceably.”459  
Although the parties entered into alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”), 
the court was notified that they did not settle on August 23, 2011.460  
Additional ADR did not resolve the case in September of that year.461  The 
case proceeded towards trial.  On November 7, 2011, Judge Biery entered 
an order on the school district’s motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the 
plaintiffs’ motion to amend complaint, and the motion for leave to permit an 
anonymous plaintiff.462  In this order, the court stated that it had “738 pages” 
before it on the pending motions and glibly noted that “there [was] not much 
[else] for [the court] to do.”463 
 
 455 Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 5-11-CA-422, at 5 (W.D. Tex. July 11, 2011), 
available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-0006.pdf. 
 456 Id. at 2. 
 457 See id. at 3 (encouraging the use of a more efficient procedure). 
 458 Id. 
 459 Id. at 4. 
 460 Notice of Alternative Dispute Resolution Outcome, Schultz, No. 5:11-cv-00422-FB, available at 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-9000.pdf (Docket Entry No. 40). 
 461 Notice of Alternative Dispute Resolution Outcome, Schultz, No. 5:11-cv-00422-FB, available at 
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-9000.pdf (Docket Entry No. 42). 
 462 See Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 5-11-CA-422, 2011 WL 13234771, at *1 (W.D. 
Tex. Nov. 7, 2011). 
 463 Id. (noting that there are “about 250 felony defendants to whom the Court is required to give 
precedence and about 200 pending civil cases, most of which are older than this matter” and that 
“[a]dministrative duties over seven divisions spread over 90,000 square miles and about 800 Court 
employees also take considerable time”). 
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The Court also emphasized that “the parties are spending what appears 
to be inordinate amounts of money and time which could be better spent on 
educating students.”464  Thereafter, the court granted the motion to amend 
the complaint, denied the motion for lack of jurisdiction due to mootness 
based on the claims of the amended complaint, and allowed the anonymous 
plaintiff to proceed as such for a time until disclosure was required for 
discovery.465  Echoing the court in Santa Fe, which allowed anonymous 
student plaintiffs,466 the court expressed its sadness “that youngsters fear the 
people within their own community and some of the adults responsible for 
their education” because the  “pleadings on the issue . . . document[ed] a 
pattern of harassment, threats and intimidation of those who disagree with 
the majority view in the school district community.”467  
The trial court never determined whether the student graduation prayers 
were government speech or private speech for the purposes of Establishment 
Clause analysis, because, ultimately, the parties settled.468  The parties’ 
settlement agreement was approved by the court on February 9, 2012.469  In 
reviewing the settlement agreement, the court found that “it achieve[d] 
reasonable balance between competing First Amendment rights of free 
speech for student speakers and freedom from government endorsement of 
a particular religious belief.”470   
In this settlement agreement, the parties agreed that “The School District 
[would] not include a prayer—whether referred to as a prayer, blessing, 
invocation, benediction, or otherwise—as part of the official program of any 
graduation ceremony”; that the student remarks would be labeled with a 
non-religious term in the program; and that the school district would not 
invite graduation speakers who it had “reason to believe will proselytize, 
promote religion, or disparage the religious beliefs (or lack thereof) of 
students or members of the community during their remarks.”471  With 
 
 464 Id. 
 465 See id. at *1–2 (stating the holdings on the motions). 
 466 See supra text accompanying note 163 (explaining that the Santa Fe court allowed student plaintiffs 
to proceed anonymously). 
 467 Schultz, 2011 WL 13234771, at *2. 
 468 See Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. SA-11-CA-422-FB, 2012 WL 517518, at *1 
(W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2012) (approving settlement), available at https://www.clearinghouse.net/
chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-0001.pdf. 
 469 See id. (approving settlement). 
 470 Id. 
 471 Id. at *2. 
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respect to student graduation remarks, the parties agreed that the school 
district would “not restrict, revise, edit, alter, or otherwise influence [or pre-
screen] the content of Student Remarks”; that the district “may permit 
student graduation speakers to pray as part of Student Remarks”; and that a 
disclaimer, akin to the following, would be printed in the graduation program 
and announced at the ceremony: 
The students who shall be speaking at graduation were selected based on 
neutral criteria to deliver messages of the students’ own choices.  The content 
of each student speaker’s message is the private expression of the individual 
student and does not reflect the endorsement, sponsorship, position, or 
expression of the District.  We ask that the audience sit and remain seated 
during the Student Remarks.472  
This Establishment Clause litigation was long, costly, and contentious, 
like most of these First Amendment religion and school cases.473  Judge 
Biery’s Personal Statement in the court’s opinion approving the settlement 
provided a clear coda to another cautionary tale within Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence:  
During the course of this litigation, many have played a part: To the United 
States Marshal Service and local police who have provided heightened 
security: Thank you.  To those Christians who have venomously and 
vomitously cursed the Court family and threatened bodily harm and 
assassination: In His name, I forgive you.  To those who have prayed for my 
death: Your prayers will someday be answered, as inevitably trumps 
probability.  To those in the executive and legislative branches of 
government who have demagogued this case for their own political goals: 
You should be ashamed of yourselves.  To the lawyers who have advocated 
professionally and respectfully for their clients’ respective positions: Bless 
you.474 
4. Lessons to be Learned from the Lack of Clarity of this Case 
This case is also paradigmatic of the lack of clarity and continued 
confusion regarding the Establishment Clause and the classification of 
student religious speech as government speech or private speech.  Although 
 
 472 Id. at *2–3. 
 473 See Ira C. Lupu, Which Old Witch?: A Comment on Professor Paulsen’s Lemon Is Dead, 43 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 883, 898 (1993) (noting that Establishment Clause litigation is expensive and that “within 
small communities, [it] is unusually divisive and difficult for families who have the courage to pursue 
it”); William Marshall, The Limits of an Establishment Clause “Restatement”: A Response to Professor Sedler, 
43 WAYNE L. REV. 1465, 1471 (1997) (“Establishment Clause litigation is often as divisive as it is 
contentious.”). 
 474 Schultz, No. SA-11-CA-422-FB, at 3 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 9, 2012), available at  
https://www.clearinghouse.net/chDocs/public/FA-TX-0001-0001.pdf. 
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the Fifth Circuit had jurisdiction over the justiciable issue raised on appeal, 
the appellate court failed to provide an opinion reflective of the fundamental 
jurisprudential principles of hierarchical precedent.  
Despite the court’s signal that the litigation hinged on the classification of 
the student graduation prayer as either government speech or private speech, 
it provided no discussion of this issue beyond its finding that the plaintiffs had 
not “shown that they are substantially likely to prevail on the merits, 
particularly on the issue that the individual prayers or other remarks to be 
given by students at graduation are, in fact, school-sponsored.”475  While the 
appellate court was not charged with making a final substantive 
determination on the classification of the student religious speech, it still had 
a judicial obligation to provide reasoned support for its finding the plaintiffs 
had not demonstrated a substantial likelihood they would prevail on the 
merits that this student prayer was school-sponsored speech, not private 
speech.  Instead, the Fifth Circuit opted to issue an eight-sentence judicial 
fiat that lacked a single reference to the Constitution, the Establishment 
Clause, or any case law.476 
This failure to provide any legal analysis to support its conclusion on the 
speech classification was jurisprudential error.  Even during exigent 
circumstances,477 the judiciary needs to provide reasoned judgments for 
parties in dispute.478  Reasoned legal judgment, by its very nature, 
encompasses reasoning and an express application of precedent.479  Between 
the parties and the amicus brief, ninety-one pages of briefing, replete with 
binding, relevant Supreme Court precedent and constitutional citations, had 
 
 475 Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 11-50486, at 1 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011). 
 476 See id. at 1–2 (finding that plaintiffs had not shown that they were substantially likely to prevail on 
the merits). 
 477 Although it does take some time to reach a reasoned response, interlocutory appeals, like this one, 
do not require an ex tempore decision.  See Deborah J. Merritt, Bias, the Brain, and Student Evaluations of 
Teaching, 82 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 235, 278 (2008) (“To make thoughtful evaluations, the brain needs 
time to recall diverse bits of data, compare them, group pieces of information into larger chunks of 
partial judgments, and ultimately yield a reasoned response.”).   
 478 See Frederick Schauer, Authority and Authorities, 94 VA. L. REV. 1931, 1936 (2008) (describing how 
judicial authority is derived through the provision of “reasons for . . . rules, commands, orders, or 
instructions”). 
 479 See Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26 YALE 
L.J. 710, 712–13 (1917) (stating that an understanding and application of legal precedent is the 
“formal foundation of judicial reasoning and decision”); Gerald J. Postema, Jurisprudence, the Sociable 
Science, 101 VA. L. REV. 869, 885 (2015) (arguing that effective jurisprudence relies upon the 
application of past precedents). 
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been filed to assist in such reasoning.480  However, the Fifth Circuit chose 
another option that is not reflective of the core ideals of the application of 
hierarchical precedent in the American judicial system of rules and 
constitutional standards.481  Like Matthews, this is another example of harmful 
ipse dixit in action.482  
Issuing such an opinion in such a contentious and divisive case was 
insufficient for several reasons.  First, this was a missed opportunity by the 
circuit court to provide much needed clarity in this area of classification of 
student religious speech in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.  Under 28 
U.S.C. § 1292,483 interlocutory appeals  are designed to “simplify . . . the 
future course of litigation” and to “reduce the burdens of future 
proceedings.”484  The eight-sentence order, with no reference to case law or 
the Constitution, achieved neither of these goals.  The Fifth Circuit could 
have positively contributed to the cloudy area of Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence involving the religious speech of students, but it failed to do so.  
Opinions via judicial fiat, like this one, also degrade and delegitimize 
constitutional interpretation in this important area of school law.  The Fifth 
Circuit’s opinion contributed to a public perception of results-based 
jurisprudence.485  Its absence of reasoning lent itself to capitalization by 
elected politicians who asserted that the appellate opinion set a precedent 
that it did not set.486  Its lack of analytical support and citation to hierarchical 
precedent certainly did nothing to quell the extant political demagoguery of 
the case, and it likely allowed for the continued inflammatory rhetoric about 
 
 480 See supra text accompanying note 400. 
 481 See Jess M. Krannich et al., Beyond “Thinking Like A Lawyer” and the Traditional Legal Paradigm: Toward 
A Comprehensive View of Legal Education, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 381, 389 (2009) (describing the 
American judicial system as a rules-based system). 
 482 See supra text accompanying notes 375–77 (discussing the Matthews opinion). 
 483 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (2018) (giving the courts of appeals jurisdiction to review district court’s 
injunctive relief orders prior to the district court’s final decision). 
 484 Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995). 
 485 See Andrew Cohen, Judge-Bashing Comes to the 2012 GOP Race, ATLANTIC (Dec. 27, 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2011/12/judge-bashing-comes-to-the-2012-gop-
race/250385/ (characterizing the Fifth Circuit’s decision as “a convenient cop-out by a federal 
court unwilling to address the merits of the Supreme Court’s school prayer precedent”). 
 486 See, e.g., supra text accompanying note 434 (discussing Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott’s 
characterization of Schultz). 
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the trial court’s decision within the political arena.487  This led to real harms 
in the form of  overwhelming threats to the bodily and reputational integrity 
of Judge Biery, his family, and the courthouse staff.488  
The Fifth Circuit’s judicial fiat also harmed both religion and the state.  
It hurt religious liberty and sanctity, as it sent negative messaging to both 
adherents and non-adherents of religion through the court “blithely 
dispatch[ing] with the case,” and not affording this complex and important 
constitutional issue sufficient analysis.489  In terms of state harms, the Fifth 
Circuit’s judicial fiat on interlocutory appeal did not provide any 
simplification or clarification for the proceedings once they returned to the 
trial court, as beneficial interlocutory opinions should do.490  The result was 
contentious and expensive litigation, as well as an exponential strain on the 
already limited resources of the district court.  Finally, this cursory circuit 
opinion conveyed an anti-democratic principle to the Medina Valley ISD 
schoolchildren—that a judicial edict can be based just on a rationale of 
because the court said so and not on the application of the Constitution and 
hierarchical precedent.  If faced with similar cases in the future, all courts 
should avoid the harmful jurisprudential approach of the Fifth Circuit in the 
Schultz case. 
IV. A JURISPRUDENTIAL FRAMEWORK THAT REQUIRES JUSTICIABILITY 
AND AVOIDS JUDICIAL FIAT IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CASES 
INVOLVING RELIGIOUS SPEECH OF STUDENTS  
Requiring justiciability and avoiding ruling by judicial fiat are both 
matters of judicial restraint.491  The need for judicial restraint, broadly, has 
 
 487 See Benjamin P. Edwards, When Fear Rules in Law’s Place: Pseudonymous Litigation as a Response to 
Systematic Intimidation, 20 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 437, 462 (2013) (discussing the threats and backlash 
against Judge Biery after the Fifth Circuit’s intervention in the case). 
 488 See Cohen, supra note 13 (discussing the threats that were directed toward the judge, his family, and 
his staff after the trial court order and the Fifth Circuit decision); Hamilton, supra note 451 
(discussing the intimidation that resulted from the criticism of the trial court’s order after the Fifth 
Circuit’s decision). 
 489 Cohen, supra note 485; see also Bonnie Barron, 5th Circuit Lets Texans Pray at H.S. Graduation, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS (June 8, 2011), https://www.courthousenews.com/5th-circuit-lets-texans-
pray-at-h-s-graduation/ (noting that the court admitted the opinion was “hastily issued”). 
 490 See Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309–10 (1995) (discussing the benefits that interlocutory review 
should provide). 
 491 See Ronald K.L. Collins, Foreword: The Once “New Judicial Federalism” and Its Critics, 64 WASH. L. REV. 
5, 7 (1989) (identifying criticism of “rule by judicial fiat” as a call for “judicial restraint”); Philip A. 
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been a consensus point throughout the jurisprudential ideological 
spectrum,492 as it has been called for by proponents of classical and modern 
liberalism,493 advocates for conservatism,494 and centrist process theorists 
who disavow the espousal of any of these views and who are “merely seeking 
to preserve ‘public faith in the objectivity and detachment of the [courts].’”495  
Like so many aspects of Establishment Clause jurisprudence, though, the 
concept of “judicial restraint” lacks a unified definition.496  It means many 
things to many people, and that construct can shift with the sands.497  For 
example, judicial restraint has been used as the antithesis of “judicial 
activism.”498  Judicial activism in this context is typically framed to mean 
decision-making with which the source does not agree or decision-making 
that is extolled if it fits within the preferred jurisprudential approach of the 
source.499  Sadly, the notion of judicial restraint has become a highly 
 
Talmadge, Understanding the Limits of Power: Judicial Restraint in General Jurisdiction Court Systems, 22 
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 695, 707 (1999) (“Justiciability constraints constitute the essence of judicial 
restraint[.]”). 
 492 See Mark C. Modak-Truran, Corrective Justice and the Revival of Judicial Virtue, 12 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 
249, 249 (2000) (noting that many advocate judicial restraint); Zachary Baron Shemtob, Following 
Thayer: The Many Faces of Judicial Restraint, 21 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 61, 62 (2011) (discussing how 
liberals and conservatives have both championed judicial restraint). 
 493 See, e.g., MILL, supra note 1, at 403 (advocating for judicial restraint in the forms of justiciability and 
application of precedent); Linda Greenhouse, The Supreme Court; A Sense of Judicial Limits, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 22, 1993), http://www.nytimes.com/1993/07/22/us/the-supreme-court-a-sense-of-judicial-
limits.html (characterizing Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg as “a judicial-restraint liberal”). 
 494 See Scott L. Cummings, Movement Lawyering, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1645, 1678 (2017) (discussing 
traditional conservative reliance on judicial restraint). 
 495 G. Edward White, Unpacking the Idea of the Judicial Center, 83 N.C. L. REV. 1089, 1125 (2005) (quoting 
Philip B. Kurland, The Supreme Court and its Judicial Critics, 6 UTAH L. REV. 457, 466 (1959)). 
 496 See David A. Strauss, Originalism, Conservatism, and Judicial Restraint, 34 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 137, 
137 (2011) (“‘Judicial restraint’ is not a well-defined term.”). 
 497 See Rebecca E. Zietlow, Popular Originalism? The Tea Party Movement and Constitutional Theory, 64 FLA. 
L. REV. 483, 502 (2012) (discussing the evolving and changing embraces of notions of judicial 
restraint by conservative and liberal jurists and legal theorists). 
 498 See J. Clifford Wallace, The Jurisprudence of Judicial Restraint: A Return to the Moorings, 50 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1, 1 (1981) (“The opposite of juridical activism [is] judicial restraint”); Corey Rayburn 
Yung, Flexing Judicial Muscle: An Empirical Study of Judicial Activism in the Federal Courts, 105 NW. U. L. 
REV. 1, 5 (2011) (deeming judicial activism’s antithesis to be restraint). 
 499 See Joseph Isenbergh, Activists Vote Twice, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 159, 159 (2003) (“Judicial activism has 
a bipolar press . . . .  [W]hen a high-profile decision cuts against [scholars’] preferential grain, they 
denounce it; and when it promises to advance their favored vision of the future, they wax 
rhapsodic.”). 
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politicized one, and, in a meta way, critiques of highly politicized judicial 
restraint have become highly politicized.500  
Yet, this politicization of judicial restraint need not be the norm.  Ideal 
judicial restraint can be articulated in a non-polemical and ideologically 
inclusive way.  Judicial restraint can mean advocacy for basic justiciability 
requirements and a common recognition that lower courts in interpreting 
the Constitution should follow hierarchical precedent, should apply that 
precedent, and should provide a reasoned, articulated, and explicit 
application of that precedent in their judicial decision-making processes.501  
This should be uncontroversial.502  However, despite the clarity of this 
proposed foundation for ideal jurisprudence, this type of “judicial restraint 
has frequently gone unrealized in practice.”503  This has certainly become an 
issue within the growing body of Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
involving the religious speech of students.504 
Given the clarity of the requirement of justiciability for judicial decision-
making, hierarchical precedent, and the fundamental government 
speech/private speech dichotomy, continued controversies regarding how to 
classify students’ religious speech must indicate a gap in school law 
 
 500 See, e.g., Frank Michelman, The Common Law Baseline and Restitution for the Lost Commons: A Reply to 
Professor Epstein, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 57, 59 (1997) (discussing the viability of a perspective that calls 
for “judicial restraint of majoritarian excess without undue politicization of the judiciary”); Roger 
Pilon, A Court Without a Compass, N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 999, 1010 (arguing that “both sides [of the 
conservative and liberal judiciary] play the ‘judicial restraint’ card”); Ilya Shapiro, Introduction, 
2016–2017 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 1, 3 (2017) (“Living constitutionalists and their judicial-restraint 
handmaidens have politicized the law such that judges quail at enforcing the Constitution’s 
structural limits and face attacks for not seeing statutes in a way that favors ‘the little guy.’’); Conor 
Fierdersdorf, Movement Liberals Cannot Credibly Demand Judicial Restraint, ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2012), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2012/04/movement-liberals-cannot-credibly-dem
and-judicial-restraint/255375/ (discussing the politicization of judicial restraint by both 
conservatives and liberals). 
 501 See Debra Lyn Bassett & Rex R. Perschbacher, Realigning Parties, 2014 UTAH L. REV. 109, 129 
(2014) (discussing the consensus on the core live case or controversy and adverse party justiciability 
requirements). 
 502 But see Pfander & Birk, supra note 80, at 1360 (stating the adverse party requirement of justiciability 
“sits uneasily with the reality of federal judicial practice”); James E. Pfander, Standing, Litigable 
Interests, and Article III’s Case-or-Controversy Requirement, 65 UCLA L. REV. 170, 189 (2018) 
(“Noncontentious jurisdiction . . . casts doubt upon three core elements of modern ‘case-or-
controversy’ jurisprudence.”); Jonathan R. Siegel, A Theory of Justiciability, 86 TEX. L. REV. 73, 134 
(2007) (arguing that “advisory opinions should not be viewed as constitutionally forbidden”). 
 503 Shemtob, supra note 492, at 62. 
 504 See Russell W. Galloway Jr., Basic Establishment Clause Analysis, 29 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 845, 848 
(1989) (noting repeated “justiciability problems . . . in Establishment Clause cases”). 
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Establishment Clause jurisprudence.505  The Matthews and Schultz cases 
demonstrate the practical and jurisprudential harms that can result from an 
undisciplined judicial approach via advisory opinions or summary opinions 
based on judicial fiat, rather than express applications of binding precedent 
to justiciable issues, to these classifications.  In response to this problem, this 
Article offers a clear framework for courts to use in their evaluation of 
students’ religious speech in school law Establishment Clause cases.  
This dual-pronged framework consists of a justiciability requirement and 
a precedential requirement.  First, it requires justiciability in order for a court 
to make any Establishment Clause determination, which requires a live 
Establishment Clause case or controversy between parties with adverse legal 
interests on that issue.  If this justiciability requirement is not met, courts 
cannot and should not issue an impermissible advisory opinion.  Instead, a 
lack of justiciability necessitates the cessation of any judicial Establishment 
Clause analysis and decision-making.  If and only if the justiciability 
prerequisite is met, the framework next requires courts to make a proper and 
fully supported classification of the religious student speech as government 
speech or private speech through an application of the United States 
Constitution and binding precedent rather than through mere ipse dixit.506  
To properly apply the Establishment Clause in cases involving students’ 
religious speech, courts cannot simply ignore existing precedent in this area 
of jurisprudence or issue summary opinions of judicial fiat.  Overall, this 
framework will help courts to make the government speech/private speech 
determination accurately at the outset of Establishment Clause litigation if 
they have the requisite justiciability to do so and in a way that will bring 
much needed clarity to establishment doctrine in school law, rather than 
further complicating this area of jurisprudence. 
A. The Requirements of Justiciability in Establishment Clause Cases Involving 
Religious Speech of Students 
At the center of American jurisprudence is the fundamental principle of 
justiciability.  This is a particularly important aspect of constitutional 
 
 505 See Bassett & Perschbacher, supra note 501, at 127 (discussing how legal commentary has sometimes 
overlooked “the necessity for an adversarial context” in justiciability scholarship). 
 506 See Kirt Shuldberg, Comment, Digital Influence: Technology and Unpublished Opinions in the Federal Courts 
of Appeals, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 541, 568 (1997) (“[J]udges are required to provide reasons for the 
decisions they reach.”). 
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jurisprudence as it respects “the proper—and properly limited—role of the 
courts in a democratic society.”507  Like Establishment Clause jurisprudence, 
questions of justiciability can be confusing and conceptually unclear.508  In 
Flast v. Cohen, the Supreme Court recognized that “justiciability is itself a 
concept of uncertain meaning and scope” and is not “susceptible of [sic] 
scientific verification.”509  
Still, certain aspects of justiciability, just like certain aspects of 
Establishment Clause doctrine, are clear.  Justiciability requires an actual 
case or controversy between actually adverse parties in order for federal 
courts to make a determination on that issue.510  Some state courts, like those 
in Texas, are constitutionally bound to commensurate case-or-controversy 
requirements for justiciability.511  Requests for advisory opinions are requests 
for courts to rule on nonjusticiable matters without a live case or controversy 
and without an actual dispute between adverse parties.  There is no 
justiciable controversy when parties seek an advisory opinion.512  
The first hurdle in clarifying school law Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence is satisfying the requirement of a justiciable issue for any 
Establishment Clause determinations, which entails a live case or controversy 
between parties with adverse interests on that issue.  These cases, like others 
, can and should be litigated amicably, but for a court to proceed, there still 
“must be an actual controversy[] and adverse interests.”513  Courts have an 
 
 507 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984). 
 508 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94 (1968) (describing the case-or-controversy justiciability 
requirements as having “an iceberg quality, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged 
complexities which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of government”); Caprice L. 
Roberts, Asymmetric World Jurisprudence, 32 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 569, 584 (2009) (stating most 
justiciability “doctrines are not absolute conceptually”). 
 509 Flast, 392 U.S. at 95. 
 510 See United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 304 (1943) (holding “the absence of a genuine adversary 
issue between the parties” made the case not justiciable); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 
361 (1911) (providing federal courts may only decide “actual controversies arising between adverse 
litigants”). 
 511 See Heckman v. Williamson Cty., 369 S.W.3d 137, 147 (Tex. 2012) (identifying the Texas 
Constitution as the source of justiciability requirements for Texas courts). 
 512 See Flast, 392 U.S. at 95 (explicitly stating there is “no justiciable controversy . . . when the parties 
are asking for an advisory opinion”); Heckman, 369 S.W.3d at 147 (stating that Texas requests for 
advisory opinions are nonjusticiable). 
 513 Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 255 (1850). 
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affirmative duty to examine the record to determine if there is a lack of the 
required actual case or controversy between actually adverse parties.514  
If this justiciability requirement is not met, courts cannot and should not 
issue an impermissible advisory opinion.  Instead, a lack of justiciability 
necessitates the cessation of any judicial Establishment Clause analysis and 
decision-making.  Seeking an impermissible advisory opinion is an attempt 
to circumvent the requirements of justiciability, and trial courts should reject 
such requests in no uncertain terms as advisory opinions are “nullit[ies].”515 
All of these justiciability requirements were met in the Santa Fe case, as 
there was an actual controversy regarding whether the football game 
invocation policy was a violation of the Establishment Clause between the 
school district and the Doe plaintiffs, who had adverse legal interests in the 
matter.516  The court limited its decision-making to that actual Establishment 
Clause controversy, it “made no sweeping pronouncements barring religious 
speech from public settings,”517 and it did not venture into the territory of 
nonjusticiability. 
Conversely, when courts in systems that prohibit advisory opinions make 
determinations on nonjusticiable issues,518 they act outside of their powers 
and err as a matter of law.  This was the case in Matthews, when the trial court 
made its determination that “[n]either the Establishment Clause nor any 
other law prohibits the cheerleaders from using religious-themed banners at 
school sporting events.  Neither the Establishment Clause nor any other law 
requires Kountze I.S.D. to prohibit the inclusion of religious-themed banners 
at school sporting events.”519  Federal and state courts should learn a lesson 
from this nonjusticiable advisory opinion in Matthews that led to years of 
protracted litigation and a continued state of confusion for Texas school 
districts.  Avoiding impermissible advisory opinions in these cases is 
imperative to not exacerbate the confusion in this area of constitutional law.  
Alternative approaches create significant harms, which include the 
 
 514 See supra text accompanying notes 85–93. 
 515 Lord, 49 U.S. at 256. 
 516 See supra Part II.A. 
 517 Michael W. McConnell, State Action and the Supreme Court’s Emerging Consensus on the Line Between 
Establishment and Private Religious Expression, 28 PEPP. L. REV. 681, 706–07 (2001). 
 518 The arguments regarding prohibited advisory opinions in this Article are geared toward those 
judicial systems that have this prohibition. 
 519 See Matthews v. Kountze Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 53526, 2013 WL 1914796 (Tex. Dist. Ct. May 8, 
2013). 
 
June 2020] JUSTICIABILITY AND JUDICIAL FIAT 983 
   
 
delegitimization of this area of constitutional interpretation, as well as 
corresponding harms to the state and religion. 
Issuing advisory opinions in school law Establishment Clause cases 
contributes to the already confused state of this area of jurisprudence.  
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is notoriously confusing, as are 
justiciability requirements.520  When courts act outside of the constraints of 
justiciability requirements when construing the religion clauses of the First 
Amendment, this confusion is only magnified.521  Distortions of the law 
naturally occur when there is a lack of adversity between the parties with 
respect to the sought-after judicial declaration on that issue.   Departures 
from justiciability in this area of school law will result in case dispositions that 
“lack the clarity and force which ought to inform the exercise of judicial 
authority.”522 
Issuing advisory opinions in school law Establishment Clause cases also 
delegitimizes constitutional interpretation in this area.  As the Supreme 
Court stated in its 1850 Lord v. Veazie decision, attempts to obtain judicial 
resolutions of issues “when there is no real and substantial controversy 
between those who appear as adverse parties to the suit, is an abuse which 
courts of justice have always reprehended, and treated as a punishable 
contempt of court.”523  The aim of justiciability is the protection of the law 
and the adjudicatory process.524  By issuing Establishment Clause decisions 
in school law cases only when justiciability requirements are met, courts will 
provide the necessary safeguards to achieve this aim.  When courts stray from 
these requirements, public perceptions about the judicial process diminish, 
especially in cases involving schoolchildren.  
Issuing advisory opinions in school law Establishment Clause cases also 
contributes to the continued delegitimization of constitutional interpretation 
 
 520 See Fallon, supra note 12, at 60 (“Establishment Clause doctrine is notoriously confused and 
disarrayed.”); Michael L. Wells, A Litigation-Oriented Approach to Teaching Federal Courts, 53 ST. LOUIS 
U. L.J. 857, 870 (2009) (likening the doctrines of justiciability to an “opaque, confusing, and 
intricate set of obstacles”). 
 521 See Mark C. Rahdert, Forks Taken and Roads Not Taken: Standing to Challenge Faith-Based Spending, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 1009, 1025–26 (2011) (discussing the confusion the Court has engendered by 
its justiciability decisions in Establishment Clause litigation). 
 522 Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 324 (1991). 
 523 Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 255 (1850). 
 524 See Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 16 (1993) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“It is a 
rule whose aim is to protect not parties but the law and the adjudicatory process.”). 
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in this area by allowing possible end runs around the Establishment 
Clause.525  When a state requests an advisory opinion that a practice 
involving religious student speech is not a violation of the Establishment 
Clause, when that matter is not the live controversy at issue and  there is no 
adversity of legal interests, this should indicate a potential red flag to the 
judiciary.526  Here, a governmental entity may be trying to maneuver around 
the Establishment Clause’s restraints on what was deemed unconstitutional 
school-sponsored prayer in Santa Fe to continue this type of unconstitutional 
practice.  This might be the case “especially in religiously homogeneous areas 
where a lack of opposition to the practice may prevent a justiciable case or 
controversy from arising.”527  
Despite all of the division within this area of jurisprudence, “it seems clear 
that the state should not compel people [especially children] to follow the 
dictates of any given religion or impose burdens on them for failing to do 
so.”528  Claims of free exercise of religion cannot be used as a zero-sum game 
to circumscribe the limits of the Establishment Clause.  As the Court stated 
in Lee, “[t]he principle that government may accommodate the free exercise 
of religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by the 
Establishment Clause.”529  Courts certainly should not allow this practice to 
 
 525 The term “end run” here means “an evasive trick or maneuver.” End run, MERRIAM-WEBSTER 
ONLINE DICTIONARY, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/end%20run (last visited 
June 15, 2020).  Appropriately, based on the cases scrutinized in this article, the term’s etymology 
is from football, meaning “a football play in which the ballcarrier attempts to run wide around the 
end of the line” of players.  Id.  The incorporation of this sports-derived term, with the inclusion of 
its specific definition, is intended to be helpful to understand the difficult concepts of justiciability 
and the Establishment Clause, and not as a way to accede to a gendered orthodoxy.  See Adam 
Benforado, Color Commentators of the Bench, 38 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 451, 457 (2011) (arguing sports 
analogies “present the best opportunity to demystify the world of law for the widest possible cross-
section of the public at a time when distrust of the judicial branch of government is high and when 
myths about the work of judges proliferate”); Geraldine Szott Moohr, Opting in or Opting Out: The 
New Legal Process or Arbitration, 77 WASH. U. L.Q. 1087, 1087 n.4 (1999) (stating that sports analogies 
are not helpful when provided without clear definition); Jeanne L. Schroeder, Subject: Object, 47 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 1, 110 (1992) (describing sports metaphors as “masculinist”); Catherine Weiss & 
Louise Melling, The Legal Education of Twenty Women, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1299, 1337 (1988) (framing 
a critique of the use of sports analogy in law schools as a gender issue).  
 526 Of course, parties may seek to capitalize on litigation in states that allow for advisory opinions to 
pursue free exercise and free speech claims as a mechanism for judicial decisions on Establishment 
Clause applicability. 
 527 Kenneth Katkin & Laurie Lamb, The Establishment Clause: A Survey of Recent Religion Cases Decided 
Within the Sixth Circuit, 29 N. KY. L. REV. 73, 112 (2002). 
 528 Rubin, supra note 205, at 38–39. 
 529 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992). 
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occur via an end run around the Establishment Clause in the form of an 
advisory opinion.   
Finally, issuing advisory opinions in school law Establishment Clause 
cases harms both religion and the state.  It harms religious liberty, in that a 
decision on a nonjusticiable issue involving religious practices or nonreligious 
practices that many schoolchildren530 (and their families)531 may hold dear is 
made in a context that lacks the full presentation of all relevant information, 
as there are no “adverse parties, with a stake in the outcome of the litigation, 
[who would] perform this task best.”532  Requesting advisory opinions and 
granting those requests also sacrifices judicial efficiency by taking up precious 
time and resources in a matter that should not be addressed by the courts.533  
Conversely, the early resolution of justiciability issues aims to serve judicial 
efficiency, because resolving problems with justiciability concludes litigation 
at the appropriate time and in earlier stages.534  For courts that are evaluating 
the application of the Establishment Clause to student religious speech, this 
justiciability determination should be the first item on the judicial agenda.   
Following a justiciability and rules-based jurisprudential approach in this 
area of educational constitutional law will “make the judicial process a 
principled one.”535  
When courts are presented with nonjusticiable requests for prohibited 
advisory opinions in Establishment Clause cases, the only correct response is 
a denial of such a request based on a lack of justiciability.  Courts have the 
affirmative duty to inquire as to the justiciability of a case, which means that 
they must ensure there is a live controversy with truly adverse parties in order 
to proceed.536  Without an actual controversy between actually adverse 
 
 530 See Emily Buss, The Adolescent’s Stake in the Allocation of Educational Control Between Parent and State, 67 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 1233, 1264 (2000) (“The development of a sense of religious identity is an important 
piece of the adolescent’s larger identity formation process[, g]oing as it does to the core of one’s 
beliefs, values, practices, and affiliations.”). 
 531 See id. (discussing the importance parents often place in the reproduction of their own religious 
identities in their children). 
 532 ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 44 (6th ed. 2012). 
 533 See Siegel, supra note 502, at 87 (“Judges are busy with a multitude of cases.”). 
 534 See Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312, 324 (1991) (“If the as-applied challenge had been resolved first 
in this case, the problems of justiciability that determine our disposition might well have concluded 
the litigation at an earlier stage.”). 
 535 Id.  
 536 See Hatfield v. King, 184 U.S. 162, 164–65 (1902) (stating that it is well settled that a court has the 
duty to make justiciability inquiries “in order that it may not be imposed on by an apparent 
controversy to which there are really no adverse parties”). 
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parties on the issue, courts lack the authority to decide the matter.  The Texas 
trial court in Matthews failed to take this correct jurisprudential course, and 
the effect was years of costly and unnecessary litigation that only served to 
complicate the area of Establishment Clause applicability to religious student 
speech even more and to create perceptions of distortion of the legal process 
and religious values.537  Consequently, courts must not render advisory 
opinions in cases dealing with religious student speech that do not have a live 
Establishment Clause controversy between truly adverse parties.  If trial 
courts incorrectly do so, appellate courts have the sua sponte responsibility to 
vacate the nonjusticiable issue determination.  This is a necessary way to 
ameliorate the current state of confusion within school law Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence when courts are tasked with the classification of 
religious student speech as being government speech or private speech.     
B. The Avoidance of Judicial Fiat in Establishment Clause Cases Involving Religious 
Student Speech 
If and only if the prerequisites of justiciability are met, should courts 
proceed to classify religious student speech as government speech or private 
speech for a determination of an alleged Establishment Clause violation.538  
When doing so, courts must make this classification through an application 
of the United States Constitution and binding precedent rather than through 
mere ipse dixit.  To properly apply the Establishment Clause in cases involving 
religious speech of students, courts cannot simply issue summary opinions of 
judicial fiat with no references to precedent.  Unfortunately, unlike the 
careful, supported reasoning of the Santa Fe decision, the Matthews and Schultz 
cases featured two examples of this type of deleterious judicial fiat.  To 
disregard a careful and measured approach to Establishment Clause cases 
involving the religious speech of students, like these courts did, is to 
perpetuate the confusion in and delegitimize this area of jurisprudence, 
which harms both religion and the state.  Other courts should take care to 
avoid judicial fiat in the arena of Establishment Clause jurisprudence and 
should instead employ an express application of hierarchical precedent as the 
basis for their decisions. 
 
 537 See supra Part III.A. 
 538 This applies to all courts, as “American judges have the unique privilege—the privilege of 
interpreting constitutional law—at all levels of the American judicial system.” Nancy Gertner, The 
Globalized District Court, 26 U. HAW. L. REV. 351, 353 (2004). 
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The hierarchical precedent doctrine is an axiomatic aspect of the 
American judicial system.539  In Hubbard v. United States, the Court stated that, 
“We would have thought it self-evident that the lower courts must adhere to 
our precedents.”540  When lower federal and state courts are making federal 
constitutional decisions, they must follow the Supreme Court’s case law.541  
This fundamental component of jurisprudence is “a consideration grounded 
in formalism, or the notion that judicial decision making must adhere to 
formal legal rules.”542  The alternative to this notion of hierarchical precedent 
would be chaos.543  Indeed, in countries without a hierarchical precedent 
doctrine, “courts may and often do change their view on the application of 
one law or another, and therefore jurisprudence may serve only as a guide, 
never as a rule.”544  Unlike these judicial systems, the American judicial 
system follows this doctrine, because it is “[a] government of laws[, which] 
means a government of rules.”545  
When courts work within this system, they derive their judicial power 
from reasoned decision-making and not fiat.546  Reasoned judgment relies on 
hierarchical precedent and provides an express articulation of the application 
 
 539 See Caminker, supra note 122, at 820 (stating that “the doctrine of hierarchical precedent . . . 
constitutes a virtually undiscussed axiom of adjudication”); Joshua A. Douglas & Michael E. 
Solimine, Precedent, Three-Judge District Courts, and the Law of Democracy, 107 GEO. L.J. 413, 417 (2019) 
(“Of course, all courts must follow precedent from the Supreme Court[.]”). 
 540 Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 713 n.13 (1995). 
 541 See ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617 (1989) (reaffirming the requirement that state 
courts must follow Supreme Court precedent in interpreting the federal constitution); Wallace v. 
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 47 n.26 (1985) (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1982)) (“Federal 
district courts and circuit courts are bound to adhere to the controlling decisions of the Supreme 
Court.”). 
 542 Douglas & Solimine, supra note 539, at 441. 
 543 See Charles J. Cooper, Stare Decisis: Precedent and Principle in Constitutional Adjudication, 73 CORNELL L. 
REV. 401, 402 n.6 (1988) (stating the alternative to vertical stare decisis is “so obviously chaos”). 
 544 Ioan-Luca Vlad, General Introduction, Romania, in 6 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA LAWS: FAMILY 
AND SUCCESSION LAW 27 (Aspen ed., 2019). 
 545 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 733 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 546 See Colin Starger & Michael Bullock, Legitimacy, Authority, and the Right to Affordable Bail, 26 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 589, 593 n.17 (2018) (“[P]ropositions that do require justification by authority 
are fallacious if supported only by ipse dixit argument.”). 
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of that precedent.547  Judicial fiat, or judgment that lacks reasoning, runs 
contrary to the core values of the hierarchical binding precedent doctrine.548  
The basic translation of fiat is “let it be done.”549  Broadly defined, it is a 
“governmental decree or order,”550 but it has acquired a negative 
connotation when used in the term “judicial fiat.”551  Judicial fiat has been 
defined in several different ways.  For some, judicial fiat indicates when 
“courts make law by broad pronouncement rather than by narrowly deciding 
the cases before them.”552  For others, judicial fiat is a criticism of courts when 
they “say[] too little.”553  Other perceptions of judicial fiat deem it to be 
decision-making “without definition.”554  A common understanding of 
judicial fiat is when a court makes a decision based on a rationale of “because 
the court said so,” without adequate or even “an iota of . . . interpretation or 
citation to legal precedent,”555 rather than based on a reasoned, articulated 
judgment derived from the application of binding hierarchical precedent.556 
This common understanding is reflected in the criticism of judicial fiat 
through the “pejorative use of the phrase ipse dixit.”557  The basic (and 
 
 547 See Andrew C. Spiropoulos, Just Not Who We Are: A Critique of Common Law Constitutionalism, 54 VILL. 
L. REV. 181, 205–06 (2009) (stating “reliance on evolving precedent” is what makes “reasoned 
judgment [reasoned]—and what makes it reasoned rather than judicial fiat”). 
 548 See Tracey E. George, Developing A Positive Theory of Decisionmaking of U.S. Courts of Appeals, 58 OHIO 
ST. L.J. 1635, 1642–43 (1998) (discussing how the cornerstones of classical legal theory are the 
premise “that judicial decisions were based on logical reasoning” and an emphasis on “the primacy 
of rules”); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 633–34 (1995) (“Results 
unaccompanied by reasons are typically castigated as deficient on precisely those grounds.  In law, 
and often elsewhere, giving reasons is seen as a necessary condition of rationality.”). 
 549 Fiat, WEBSTER’S II NEW COLLEGE DICTIONARY 423 (3d ed. 2005) (defining fiat as “Lat., let it be 
done. 1. An arbitrary decree. 2. Authorization or sanction”). 
 550 Fiammetta Piazza, Bitcoin in the Dark Web: A Shadow over Banking Secrecy and A Call for Global Response, 
26 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 521, 527 (2017). 
 551 See William N. Drake, Jr., The Common Law and the Rule of Law: An “Uncomfortable Relationship,” 45 
STETSON L. REV. 439, 448 (2016) (“[Fiat] is a term with a negative connotation of authoritarianism 
that long had been eschewed by our courts as inapplicable to their function in our system.”). 
 552 Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 2022 (1994). 
 553 Id. (emphasis omitted) (describing Justice Scalia’s perceptions of judicial fiat). 
 554 Malcolm J. Harkins III, The Uneasy Relationship of Hobby Lobby, Conestoga Wood, the Affordable Care 
Act, and the Corporate Person: How A Historical Myth Continues to Bedevil the Legal System, 7 ST. LOUIS U. J. 
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 201, 203–04 (2014). 
 555 Ceausu v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., No. CV12-6254PSG(VBKx), 2013 WL 12131280, at *8 (C.D. 
Cal. Oct. 10, 2013). 
 556 See Bernard Schwartz, “Brennan vs. Rehnquist”––Mirror Images in Constitutional Construction, 19 OKLA. 
CITY U. L. REV. 213, 222 (1994) (discussing how judicial fiat disregards precedent). 
 557 Dorf, supra note 552, at 2022; see also Schauer, supra note 548, at 634 (“To characterize a conclusion 
as an ipse dixit—a bare assertion unsupported by reasons—is no compliment.”). 
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gendered) translation of ipse dixit is “he himself said it,”558 or in a non-
gendered way, “it’s so because I say so.”559  So, ipse dixit is “something said 
but not proved.”560  It is a stated, but unproven bare, dogmatic assertion.561  
In its application to jurisprudence, the term “is a statement that lacks 
reasoning to support its conclusion but, nevertheless, must be taken as true 
simply because the court says so.”562 
Criticism of judicial fiat has united people from all over the ideological 
spectrum.  Justice Antonin Scalia argued that jurisprudence based on ipse dixit 
is dangerous and “ill-considered,”563 and it results in grievous harm to the 
Constitution.564  In Morrison v. Olson, he criticized such a jurisprudential 
example that “gutt[ed] in six quick pages devoid of textual or historical 
precedent for the novel principle it set forth, a carefully researched and 
reasoned 70-page opinion.”565  Justice John Paul Stevens criticized a plurality 
opinion in an Establishment Law case as judicial fiat that was “divorced from 
the methodology prescribed by [the Court’s] doctrine.”566  Professor Michael 
McConnell has argued the Framers themselves had an expectation that the 
evolution of their rights would not be the result of judicial fiat.567 
The Santa Fe decision was not a decision of judicial fiat.  It was the product 
of careful reasoning and supported analysis.  It certainly did not resort to ipse 
dixit.  Instead, the Court displayed a devotion to the facts of the disputed 
invocation policy and its limited analysis to the establishment dispute at 
issue.568  It “engaged in a careful, context-sensitive analysis of why, under the 
circumstances of this case, the school district’s argument that the football 
game prayers were ‘private speech’ should not be accepted.”569 
 
 558 Ipse dixit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 833 (7th ed. 1999). 
 559 Richard C. Wydick, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Does It Really Have Life Everlasting?, 87 KY. L.J. 1165, 
1172 (1999) (providing this translation). 
 560 Bryan A. Garner, GARNER’S DICTIONARY OF LEGAL USAGE 482 (3d ed. 2011). 
 561 See id.; Ipse dixit, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (7th ed. 1999). 
 562 Dorf, supra note 552, at 2022. 
 563 Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. 844, 881, 882 (2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 564 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 725–26 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 565 Id. at 726. 
 566 Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. 700, 755 (2010) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 567 See Michael W. McConnell, The Importance of Humility in Judicial Review: A Comment on Ronald Dworkin’s 
“Moral Reading” of the Constitution, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1269, 1292 (1997) (“[T]he people who 
instituted the Constitution expected that their traditional rights and privileges would continue to 
evolve—not by judicial fiat, but by decentralized processes of legal and cultural change.”). 
 568 McConnell, supra note 517, at 706. 
 569 Id. at 707. 
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Conversely, there have been instances in school law when courts have 
issued determinations on Establishment Clause violations or on the 
classification question of religious student speech in a cursory, unsupported 
way.   The Matthews and Schultz cases’ sub-ten-sentence orders and opinions 
on core Establishment Clause issues present two prominent examples of this 
type of ipse dixit approach to school law decisions.  Because Establishment 
Clause cases are difficult,570 future courts should avoid this approach to 
decision-making regarding the classification of religious student speech and 
the extent of the Establishment Clause’s constraints on that speech.  Avoiding 
judicial fiat in these cases is imperative to not further contribute to the 
confusion of this area of constitutional law.  Alternative approaches create 
significant harms, which include the delegitimization of this area of 
constitutional interpretation and harms to religion and to the state. 
Issuing cursory opinions by judicial fiat in school law Establishment 
Clause cases contributes to continued confusion in an already-confused area 
of law.  Although “[d]istinguishing between government speech and private 
speech is famously difficult,” when tasked to do so on a justiciable issue, 
courts need to engage in this endeavor through an application of precedent 
and reasoned judgment.571  Here, the issue is not so much the endorsement 
of only one bright-line rule of Establishment Clause interpretation in all cases 
in the school law setting,572 as that is not consistent with the pluralistic 
American society in which these cases arise.573  Instead, this argument calls 
on courts to provide some explanation when making these difficult 
decisions.574  “Unexplained decisions . . . encourage appeals and make it 
 
 570 See John T. Valauri, The Concept of Neutrality in Establishment Clause Doctrine, 48 U. PITT. L. REV. 83, 
144 (1986) (discussing the difficulty in “reach[ing] principled decisions” in Establishment Clause 
cases).  
 571 Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
972, 1015 (2010). 
 572 See Glenn A. Phelps & John B. Gates, The Myth of Jurisprudence: Interpretive Theory in the Constitutional 
Opinions of Justices Rehnquist and Brennan, 31 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 567, 570 (1991) (arguing proper 
jurisprudential approaches are premised on “principled[] constitutional theories,” even if they are 
different approaches). 
 573 See Iddo Porat, The Dual Model of Balancing: A Model for the Proper Scope of Balancing in Constitutional Law, 
27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1393, 1402 (2006) (stating the varietals of Establishment Clause analyses 
exemplify a “pluralistic society[’s] . . . idea that different and conflicting world-views can co-exist 
within it”). 
 574 See Ronald Turner, On Substantive Due Process and Discretionary Traditionalism, 66 SMU L. REV. 841, 
877–78 (2013) (discussing the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the need for constitutional reasoning 
in order to have reasoned judgment). 
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difficult, even impossible, for the appellate court to determine whether the 
lower court erred.”575  Judges need to provide legal rationales for their 
decisions in compliance with the doctrine of hierarchical precedent to 
preserve basic clarity and core stability in this area of law.576  
This becomes especially important when an appellate court takes up an 
interlocutory appeal, like the Fifth Circuit did in Schultz.577  This type of 
appellate review is “the exception, not the rule”578 and can create confusion 
akin to the confusion generated by Establishment Clause jurisprudence and 
justiciability requirements. 579  Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, federal circuit courts 
have jurisdiction to review “all final decisions of the district courts.”580  The 
courts of appeals also have jurisdiction to review trial court injunctive 
interlocutory orders under  28 U.S.C. § 1292(a).581  Although interlocutory 
appeals can have beneficial effects for litigants,582  they also “can make it 
more difficult for trial judges to do their basic job—supervising trial 
proceedings . . . [and] can threaten those proceedings with delay, adding 
costs and diminishing coherence.”583  Interlocutory review also “risks 
additional, and unnecessary, appellate court work.”584  Consequently, 
appellate courts need to take care that they are not acting in an unsupported 
 
 575 David Dyzenhaus & Michael Taggart, Reasoned Decisions and Legal Theory, in COMMON LAW 
THEORY 134, 148 (Douglas E. Edlin ed., 2007). 
 576 See James Bopp, Jr. & Anita Y. Woudenberg, An Announce Clause by Any Other Name: The 
Unconstitutionality of Disciplining Judges Who Fail to Disqualify Themselves for Exercising Their Freedom to 
Speak, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 723, 727 (2007) (discussing the need for judges to provide legal rationales 
in their decisions); Randy J. Kozel, Stare Decisis in the Second-Best World, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1139, 
1159 (2015) (linking adherence to precedent to stability within the law). 
 577 See Schultz v. Medina Valley Indep. Sch. Dist., No. 11-50486 (5th Cir. June 3, 2011) (order granting 
emergency motion to the dissolve temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction). 
 578 Johnson v. Jones, 515 U.S. 304, 309 (1995). 
 579 Bryan Lammon, Rules, Standards, and Experimentation in Appellate Jurisdiction, 74 OHIO ST. L.J. 423, 
423 (2013) (“This system of interlocutory appellate review is a mess; the exceptions are so many, 
the requirements so vague, and the judicial treatment so inconsistent that the regime is too 
complicated and too unpredictable.”). 
 580 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (2018). 
 581 Id. § 1292(a)(1) (2018) (giving federal circuit courts jurisdictional review of trial court orders 
“granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or 
modify injunctions” and excepting jurisdiction “where a direct review may be had in the Supreme 
Court”). 
 582 Johnson, 515 U.S. at 309 (stating that interlocutory appeals “may avoid injustice by quickly 
correcting a trial court’s error[;] . . . can simplify, or more appropriately direct, the future course of 
litigation[; and] . . . can thereby reduce the burdens of future proceedings”).  
 583 Id. 
 584 Id. 
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dictatorial way in these interlocutory appeals to avoid these harms to 
themselves and the underlying trial courts. 
Issuing cursory opinions by judicial fiat in school law Establishment 
Clause cases also delegitimizes constitutional interpretation in this area.  
Jurisprudence matters.  This principle is at the core of constitutional 
theory.585  “[I]t is, by adhering to rules and principles in the positive law, 
within the constraints of practical reason as incorporated into the law and 
the methodology by which it is applied that judges fulfill their constitutional 
function of preserving and protecting the boundaries of the laws made by the 
people . . . .”586  The judiciary requires those who practice before it to provide 
reasoning based on precedent; the courts should require no less of themselves 
to ensure the continued legitimacy of the judicial system.587 
When judges issue edicts that are not reflective of principled reasoning, it 
creates a subversion that implies to the American public, and in school law, 
to schoolchildren, that decision-making is premised on desired outcomes, 
rather than a reasoned application of the law.   That is a perilous position for 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence involving the religious speech of 
students, as it threatens “the very authority and stability of [our] 
constitutional system.”588  The rule of law is constrained, in a positive way, 
by the requirements of consistency and transparency.589  “[T]he integrity and 
functionality of the [judicial] system depend[] upon the shared expectation 
that lawmakers and judges will play by the rules of the game, i.e., that they 
will follow the rules and precedents produced by the system itself . . . .”590  
Things fall apart with the dissolution of these twin aims in judicial decision-
making, and the avoidance of such dissolution is paramount in the area of 
constitutional school law.  In essence, when courts issue a judicial fiat without 
 
 585 See Phelps & Gates, supra note 572, at 570 (“Much of the energy and passion expended on the 
pursuit of the constitutional theory is predicated on the notion that jurisprudence matters . . . .”). 
 586 Evelyn Keyes, Judicial Strategy and Legal Reason, 44 IND. L. REV. 357, 382 (2011). 
 587 See Michael J. Higdon, The Legal Reader: An Exposé, 43 N.M. L. REV. 77, 107 (2013) (“[L]egal readers 
expect legal support . . . .”). 
 588 Phelps & Gates, supra note 572, at 570. 
 589 See A. Christopher Bryant & Kimberly Breedon, How the Prohibition on “Under-Ruling” Distorts the 
Judicial Function (and What to Do About It), 45 PEPP. L. REV. 505, 522 (2018) (discussing the problems 
that result from the dissolution of the “requirements of consistency and transparency” in judicial 
decision-making). 
 590 Keyes, supra note 586, at 382. 
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any supporting case law, they “sacrifice [their] legitimacy.”591  As Justice 
Thurgood Marshall stated, it is “fidelity to precedent” that will create a 
public “conception of ‘the judiciary as a source of impersonal and reasoned 
judgments.’”592    
Rulings by judicial fiat in this area also can suggest subjectivity in 
jurisprudence as a way “to secure a political, Machiavellian end.”593  This is 
dangerous decision-making, especially in the area of Establishment Clause 
cases involving the religious speech of students.594  Conversely, providing 
decisions based on articulated reasons through an application of binding 
precedent respects the dignitary values of the parties, “reassur[ing] the 
litigants that the case has been thoroughly considered by the judge and 
satisfies the basic human demand of those affected by judicial action to be 
told why.”595  
It also communicates to the public positive messaging about the judicial 
process.596  Essentially, it “enhance[s] public confidence that a judge is not 
simply acting by virtue of his or her power through judicial fiat but rather 
through a reasoned process whereby the conclusion leading to his or her 
decision is transparent, logical, and reasonable.”597  Such supported reason-
giving is at the core of Deweyan ideal educative philosophy, which is an 
appropriate ideal for courts to follow in school law jurisprudence.598  
Although this requires more work and is more time-intensive, the provision 
of such a legal rationale in school law establishment cases is the best way for 
 
 591 Adam M. Smith, Making Itself at Home: Understanding Foreign Law in Domestic Jurisprudence: The Indian 
Case, 24 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 218, 264 (2006). 
 592 Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 852 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Moragne v. States 
Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 403 (1970)). 
 593 Ellis Washington, Natural Law Considerations of Juvenile Law, 32 WHITTIER L. REV. 57, 102 (2010). 
 594 See Edwards, supra note 487, at 463 (describing the Schultz case as making the unmistakably clear 
point that “church-state cases are dangerous”); Christopher J. Peters, Adjudication as Representation, 
97 COLUM. L. REV. 312, 420 (1997) (discussing the dangers of rule by judicial fiat). 
 595 Dyzenhaus & Taggart, supra note 575, at 148. 
 596 See Donald J. Kochan, The “Reason-Giving” Lawyer: An Ethical, Practical, and Pedagogical Perspective, 26 
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 261, 264 (2013) (stating that when people’s desire for reasons is 
“[u]nquenched, that thirst also leaves us unsatisfied and generally less accepting in the face of events 
or circumstances that are not or cannot be explained”). 
 597 Rosemary Barkett, Judicial Discretion and Judicious Deliberation, 59 FLA. L. REV. 905, 911 (2007). 
 598 See JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK 27–28 (1910) (arguing the best practices of education “cultivate 
deep-seated and effective habits of discriminating tested beliefs from mere assertions, guesses, and 
opinions; . . . develop a lively, sincere, and open-minded preference for conclusions that are 
properly grounded, and . . . ingrain into the individual’s working habits [appropriate] methods of 
inquiry and reasoning”).  
 
994 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:4 
   
 
courts to have these rules make sense to the schoolchildren who are affected 
by these decisions.599  
Finally, issuing cursory opinions by judicial fiat and without adequate 
support in school law Establishment Clause cases harms both church and 
state.  The Establishment Clause “is primarily an equal liberty provision,”600 
designed to provide protections for free exercise and against establishment.  
One might say that “[t]he defining paradox of the Establishment Clause is 
that it exists to protect the government from religion in order to protect 
religion from the government.”601  When courts use ipse dixit to make 
determinations in cases involving the religious speech of students, they are 
harming both sides of Jefferson’s wall.  This jurisprudential approach harms 
religious liberty.  It harms the judiciary.  It harms schoolchildren by teaching 
them anti-democratic principles.602  Consequently, this type of unreasoned 
decision-making should be avoided in the milieu of school law.  
Proper analysis of the Establishment Clause is necessary for both 
adherents and non-adherents to religion, especially for minors in schools.603  
The religion clauses of the First Amendment are meant “to define the 
protection granted to an objector or a dissenting nonbeliever,” as well as to 
“protect religion from government interference.”604  James Madison was 
opposed to religious establishment not just because of “its effect on the 
minority,” but also because of a concern with “‘maintaining the purity and 
efficacy of Religion.’”605  So, a failure to engage in reasoned analysis that 
incorporates hierarchical precedent in cases involving the religious speech of 
 
 599 See Marleen O’Connor-Felman, American Corporate Governance and Children: Investing in Our Future 
Human Capital During Turbulent Times, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 1255, 1299 (2004) (discussing how child 
development theorists state the best approach for children to understand “prosocial behavior” is 
through a “purposive and calculated” reasoned explanation, even though this method is “more 
hands on, emotionally draining, and time-intensive”). 
 600 Ira C. Lupu, Reconstructing the Establishment Clause: The Case Against Discretionary Accommodation of 
Religion, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 555, 568 (1991). 
 601 Gey, supra note 207, at 28. 
 602 See Jerry L. Mashaw, Reasoned Administration: The European Union, the United States, and the Project of 
Democratic Governance, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 99, 101 (2007) (“[R]eason-giving’s most fundamental 
function [is] the creation of authentic democratic governance.”). 
 603 See Stanley Ingber, Religious Children and the Inevitable Compulsion of Public Schools, 43 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 773, 792 (1993) (stating that “[s]chools cannot avoid instilling values” in schoolchildren). 
 604 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 589–90 (1992). 
 605 Id. at 590 (quoting JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ASSESSMENTS (June 20, 1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 1784–1786, at 301 
(Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1973)). 
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students harms religious liberty, as it can signify to both religious and 
nonreligious children that legal matters dealing with students’ religious 
practices or conscientious practices do not merit extended treatment and 
careful consideration by the judiciary. 
Specifically, issuing unsupported decisions that imply that student 
religious exercises are of a de minimis character, which will receive only the 
court’s abbreviated attention, are affronts to religion and its adherents.606  
These opinions communicate a message that cases involving “[r]eligious 
faith, [which] is a significant component in the lives of many children, 
forming their identity, values, and sense of self-worth in their developing 
years,” are cases that merit only cursory review.607  When courts issue 
summary dictates regarding Establishment Clause claims, that implies a 
potential lack of careful consideration of the matter, which can be perceived 
as the judiciary’s lack of respect for such religious faith. 
The messaging of the insignificance of minor encroachments through an 
ipse dixit opinion also harms non-adherents to religion, especially 
impressionable schoolchildren.  Courts must ever be mindful of “both the 
fundamental place held by the Establishment Clause in our constitutional 
scheme and the myriad, subtle ways in which Establishment Clause values 
can be eroded.”608  Claimed de minimis Establishment Clause violations or 
“minor encroachments” of that clause, if proven, are still Establishment 
Clause violations.609  Therefore, they require carefully reasoned judgments 
by courts that expressly apply hierarchical precedent.  A failure to provide 
judgments that reflect the doctrine of hierarchical precedent can create 
schisms among students of different religious faiths or no religious faith, 
which contradicts the “vital need” that Justice Felix Frankfurter articulated 
in the McCollum opinion, “to keep out divisive forces” in American schools 
when evaluating Establishment Clause cases.610 
 
 606 See id. at 594 (stating the characterization of a claimed constitutional “intrusion of the religious 
exercise” as being “of a de minimis character . . . would be an affront to the rabbi who offered them 
and to all those for whom the prayers were an essential and profound recognition of divine 
authority”). 
 607 Green, supra note 138, at 848. 
 608 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 609 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963) (“[I]t is no defense to urge that the 
religious practices [at issue in Establishment Clause cases] may be relatively minor encroachments 
on the First Amendment.”). 
 610 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948).  
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Issuing decisions via judicial fiat in school law cases can also harm the 
structures in which constitutional judicial decision-making is seated.  The 
practical and legal harms that can occur because of such a jurisprudential 
approach are typified by the events that transpired in the Schultz case after 
the issuance of the Fifth Circuit’s eight-sentence opinion.611  After that 
opinion, the federal district judge who entered the initial TRO and his staff 
were threatened with death and bodily assault.612  It does not seem like a 
stretch beyond reason that the Fifth Circuit’s cursory opinion contributed to 
a public perception of a lack of legitimacy of the trial court’s initial order 
granting the request for injunctive relief at the high school graduation.  A 
perception of a lack of legitimacy in judicial decision-making can lead to 
public resistance to that judicial act.613 
Issuing decisions via judicial fiat in school law cases also teaches anti-
democratic principles to children and runs contrary to the Supreme Court’s 
ideology in the area of school law Establishment Clause cases.614  The Court 
has emphasized how vital its school law Establishment Clause jurisprudence 
is because “[t]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere 
more vital than in the community of American schools.”615  In order for 
children “to become self-fulfilling, self-sustaining adults who can contribute 
to the civic community,”616 state institutions, like the courts, need to model 
the ways to best achieve this maturation.  Consequently, courts need to 
function in a way that best represents the core ideals of our civic democracy 
through supported judicial reasoning and not ipse dixit.  As Professor Glen 
Staszewski has stated, “[i]n a true democracy, citizens are ordinarily entitled 
to a more meaningful explanation for the official exercise of coercive 
 
 611 See supra Part III.B. 
 612 See supra Part III.B. 
 613 See Kochan, supra note 596, at 267–68 (“[R]eason-giving demands a check of power and helps the 
governed determine whether those in power are acting within their constraints . . . .  [T]his helps 
to engender a more democratic relationship with the giver and receiver.  Reasons add legitimacy 
and deviations from given reasons tend to call action into question.”). 
 614 See David Schimmel, Studying the Massachusetts Goodridge Decision on Same-Sex Marriage as an Antidote to 
Mutual Misunderstanding and a Lesson in Civics and Law, 2011 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 495, 512 (2011) 
(arguing that “thoughtful and wise decision-making” is necessary “in our pluralistic constitutional 
democracy”). 
 615 Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) (quoting Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 
(1960)). 
 616 Rodney J. Blackman, Showing the Fly the Way Out of the Fly-Bottle: Making Sense of the First Amendment 
Religion Clauses, 42 U. KAN. L. REV. 285, 350 (1994). 
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authority.” 617  This applies with equal if not more resonant force for the 
requisite judicial reason-giving to schoolchildren when a court is making a 
decision regarding the religious speech of students and the Establishment 
Clause, given that “[t]he public school is at once the symbol of our 
democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common 
destiny.”618  Consequently, religious student speech in the public school 
context presents “unique circumstances” that require cautious and careful 
judicial scrutiny in the area of Establishment Clause jurisprudence.619  If 
courts are to teach democratic principles to impressionable schoolchildren in 
this area of law,620 courts must avoid a judicial fiat approach. 
A legal judgment regarding a case that alleges a violation of the 
Establishment Clause based on the religious speech of students requires 
adherence to the hierarchical precedent doctrine and express articulation of 
the same.  The application of the Establishment Clause “requires 
interpretation of a delicate sort.”621  When courts are making determinations 
on Establishment Clause claims in the context of religious student speech, 
they need to provide that delicate and careful interpretation through an 
express and supported application of Supreme Court precedent.  This is the 
only way for this area of jurisprudence to begin to find some much needed 
clarity, to retain its legitimacy, to protect against state and religious harms, 
and to ensure American schoolchildren have sufficient safeguards through 
more than “mere platitudes.”622  Although “Establishment Clause cases . . . 
stir deep feelings[] and we are divided among ourselves,” courts must take 
these cases head-on when there is justiciability to do so and accord them the 
proper reasoned analysis that our nation and our schoolchildren deserve.623  
 
 617 Glen Staszewski, Reason-Giving and Accountability, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1253, 1286 (2009).  
 618 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948). 
 619 See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 596–97 (1992) (highlighting the differences of Establishment 
Clause cases that arise in “the public school context” versus other environments); Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Every government practice must 
be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an endorsement or 
disapproval of religion.”). 
 620 See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 583–84 (1987) (discussing students’ impressionability); 
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 616 (1971) (emphasizing “the impressionable age of the pupils, 
in primary schools particularly”). 
 621 Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963). 
 622 W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943). 
 623 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). 
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CONCLUSION 
The Establishment Clause seeks to prevent division along religious 
lines.624  Yet, the interpretation of this clause has created expansive 
divisiveness.625  Arguably, this jurisprudence is fractured to the point where 
“diversity and multiplicity in Establishment Clause doctrine are endemic and 
ineradicable.”626  It is possible that no other area of constitutional 
jurisprudence is quite as complex.627  Given the fluidity of Establishment 
Clause jurisprudence,628 it is hard to find a coherent theory within this 
doctrine.629  This has created rampant controversy among scholars and 
jurists as to how courts should approach these cases.  Although some of this 
discussion has been polemical,630 most of this division is simply a reflection 
of the seemingly inconsistent nature of First Amendment jurisprudence.631  
Indeed, it almost seems that every Establishment Clause case should begin 
with the Walrus’s speech in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass and What 
 
 624 Town of Greece v. Galloway, 572 U.S. 565, 577 (2014) (articulating this core purpose of the 
Establishment Clause). 
 625 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 16, at 227 (“Recent Establishment Clause cases look like a mess. The 
proliferation of standards and distinctions is perplexing even to scholars.”); Shari Seidman 
Diamond & Andrew Koppelman, Measured Endorsement, 60 MD. L. REV. 713, 713 (2001) (discussing 
the lack of “unified Establishment Clause doctrine”). 
 626 Fallon, supra note 12, at 72.  
 627 See Gary C. Leedes, Rediscovering the Link Between the Establishment Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment: 
The Citizenship Declaration, 26 IND. L. REV. 469, 471–72 (1993) (citing Rex Lee, The Religion Clauses: 
Problems and Prospects, 1986 BYU L. REV. 337, 338 (1986)) (“A former United States Solicitor 
General rates the doctrinal coherence of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause cases on a 
scale of one to ten as between ‘zero’ and ‘less than zero.’”). 
 628 See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (stating the Establishment Clause creates “a 
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on all the circumstances of a particular 
relationship”). 
 629 See Samuel D. Brunson, Dear IRS, It Is Time to Enforce the Campaigning Prohibition. Even Against Churches, 
87 U. COLO. L. REV. 143, 189 (2016) (deeming the “Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause 
jurisprudence . . . largely incoherent”).  
 630 See Nelson Tebbe, Religion and Social Coherentism, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 363, 372 (2015) 
(discussing harsh cross-critiques of Establishment Clause scholarship). 
 631 See, e.g., Richard Albert, Religion in the New Republic, 67 LA. L. REV. 1, 4 (2006) (arguing that 
Establishment Clause doctrine “is more properly viewed as an evolving product of the continuing 
public constitutional discourse among Americans and between public and private forces about the 
proper role of religion in the American polity”); Steven D. Smith, Discourse in the Dusk: The Twilight 
of Religious Freedom?, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1869, 1870–72, 1893, 1905–06 (2009) (reviewing 2 KENT 
GREENAWALT, RELIGION AND THE CONSTITUTION: ESTABLISHMENT AND FAIRNESS (2008)) 
(criticizing an alternate interpretation of the Establishment Clause, but then excusing it, “not so 
much [as] an individual failure[, but rather as] a reflection of the current condition of the 
tradition”). 
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Alice Found There: “‘The time has come,’ the Walrus said, ‘To talk of many 
things: Of shoes—and ships—and sealing-wax—Of cabbages—and kings—
And why the sea is boiling hot—And whether pigs have wings.”’632  Yet, there 
is at least one point of consensus in this confusion and division,633 which even 
the Supreme Court admitted in a school law case: “Establishment Clause 
cases are not easy.”634  
 Much of the Court’s establishment doctrine in the area of education 
remains inconsistent, unclear, and disputed.635  Despite this division and 
confusion, courts have an obligation to attempt to decipher that doctrine 
when evaluating student religious speech constitutional claims when there is 
justiciability to do so and, if so, through the application of the rule of law and 
pursuant to binding precedent.  This is the only way to clarify the muddy 
waters of this area of school law.636   
A failure to do so constitutes judicial error, and it results in exponential 
jurisprudential and practical harms.  One needs to look only to the Matthews 
and Schultz cases’ judicial approaches to the Establishment Clause’s 
applicability to student religious speech to see the harms of advisory opinions 
and opinions by judicial fiat.  An advisory opinion or ipse dixit approach to 
these cases contributes to the continued confusion of school law 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence; delegitimizes constitutional 
interpretation in this area; allows possible end runs around the Establishment 
Clause; harms religious liberty; harms the administration of the judicial 
system; and teaches anti-democratic principles to citizens and 
 
 632 LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS AND WHAT ALICE FOUND THERE, in THE 
ANNOTATED ALICE: THE DEFINITIVE EDITION 129, 185 (Martin Gardner ed., W.W. Norton & 
Co. 2000) (1872). 
 633 See Steven G. Gey, Life After the Establishment Clause, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 1, 35 (2007) (“Commentators 
and jurists on all sides of the debate about the proper scope of the Establishment Clause have long 
agreed that Establishment Clause doctrine is a chaotic and contradictory mess.”); Mary Ann 
Glendon, Law, Communities, and the Religious Freedom Language of the Constitution, 60 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 672, 674 (1992) (stating “the Supreme Court’s Religion Clause case law has reached the point 
where it is described on all sides as confused, inconsistent, and incoherent.”). 
 634 Comm. for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980). 
 635 See Kevin T. Baine, Education Litigation: Prospects for Change, 35 CATH. LAW. 283, 287 (1994) 
(concluding “the Supreme Court has decided a series of [Establishment Clause] education cases 
that, read together, simply defy comprehension”); Thomas C. Berg, Vouchers and Religious Schools: The 
New Constitutional Questions, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 151, 193 (2003) (“[D]isputes over religion in the 
public schools . . . at graduation and other school events . . . are highly divisive and emotional. . . .”). 
 636 See Lund, supra note 571, at 1020 (“The problem, however, is that the distinction between 
governmental and private speech gets muddy in the middle. . . .”). 
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schoolchildren.  Courts that have disregarded the core principles of 
justiciability and hierarchical precedent have confusingly converted school 
law Establishment Clause jurisprudence into a sword that harms religion and 
the state, rather than preserving it as the shield that it was meant to be for 
both parts of the axiomatic Jeffersonian principle.637  These injurious 
jurisprudential practices must stop.  Ensuring justiciability and avoiding 
judicial fiat are the mechanisms to do so. 
 
 637 See JEFFERSON, supra note 60, at 113 (“Believing with you that religion is a matter which lies solely 
between man and his God; that he owes account to none other for his faith or his worship; that the 
legislative powers of the government reach actions only, and not opinions,—I contemplate with 
sovereign reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature 
should ‘make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,’ 
thus building a wall of separation between church and State.”). 
